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Abstract 
As growing role players in corporate governance, institutional investors are regulated 
and guided by a series of rules, according to which they are required to address their 
fiduciary duty by protecting the interests of their clients as well as a diverse group of 
stakeholders. This study explores whether institutional investors comply with this 
fiduciary duty through an investigation of their prudent stockholding behaviour and 
their impact on improved corporate governance. 
 
The first empirical chapter assesses what types of firms institutional investors tend to 
invest in. The impact of institutional investors on corporate governance has been 
considered from both financial and non-financial perspectives in prior studies. The 
financial perspective includes institutional investors’ impact on financial performance 
and on corporate operations (earnings management in this study). These aspects are 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively. The non-financial perspective is 
represented by the impact of institutional investors on corporate environmental, social 
and governance (ESG) performance, which is studied in Chapter 5. 
 
South Africa and China, two major emerging markets where institutional investors 
and corporate governance have experienced considerable development in recent years, 
were employed as cases for this study. The selected sample came from South African 
companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), observed over the 
period 2010 to 2013, and Chinese companies listed on either the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE) or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), observed over the period 
2008 to 2013. After taking account of endogeneity problems and by using pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effect (FE), two-stage least squares (2SLS) and 
system generalized method of moments (Sys-GMM) estimations, this study observed 
that similarities and differences co-exist in terms of institutional investors’ 
stockholding behaviour and their relationship with improved corporate governance 
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between South Africa and China, between pressure-insensitive and pressure-sensitive 
institutional investors, and between passive and non-passive institutional investors. 
 
More specifically, it was found that institutional investors overall in both South Africa 
and China are not always prudent in terms of their stockholding behaviour; although 
institutional ownership was observed to have a significant relationship with improved 
corporate financial performance and earnings management alleviation, it was 
insignificantly associated with corporate ESG performance. Institutional investors are 
therefore considered more conventional than socially responsible, and seem unlikely 
to accept suboptimal financial performance to pursue ESG aims. It should be noted 
that institutional investors seem effective in promoting corporate governance 
disclosure in South Africa, but this phenomenon was not detected in China. 
 
By disaggregating institutional investors into specific types, this study found that 
pressure-insensitive institutional investors, compared to their pressure-sensitive 
counterparts, appear to be more effective in monitoring, with a resulting advancement 
in corporate financial performance. Additionally, passive institutional investors in 
both South Africa and China were noted to show less preference towards past 
financial performance when they select stocks; in China, however, they exhibit a 
stronger association with improved corporate financial performance after the 
investment relationship has been built than their non-passive peers. 
 
Key words: institutional investors; fiduciary duty; responsible investment; corporate 
governance; stockholding preference; financial performance; earnings management; 
ESG performance 
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Opsomming 
Institusionele beleggers, wat deesdae ’n al hoe groter rol in korporatiewe beheer 
vervul, word deur verskeie reëls gelei en gerig om hulle fidusiêre plig na te kom, 
naamlik om die belange van hulle kliënte sowel as van ’n diverse groep 
belanghebbendes te beskerm. Hierdie navorsing ondersoek of institusionele beleggers 
wel hierdie vertrouensplig nakom deur hulle omsigtige aandeelhoudingsgedrag en 
hulle impak op beter korporatiewe beheer te bestudeer. 
 
Die eerste empiriese hoofstuk bepaal in watter soorte firmas institusionele beleggers 
geneig is om te belê. Vorige studies het die impak van institusionele beleggers op 
korporatiewe beheer uit ’n finansiële sowel as ’n nie-finansiële hoek beskou. 
Eersgenoemde sluit in institusionele beleggers se impak op finansiële prestasie en 
korporatiewe werksaamhede (“verdienstebestuur” in hierdie studie). Hierdie aspekte 
word in hoofstuk 3 en 4 onderskeidelik bespreek. Die nie-finansiële beskouing handel 
oor institusionele beleggers se impak op korporatiewe omgewings-, maatskaplike en 
beheer- (“ESG”-)prestasie, wat in hoofstuk 5 ondersoek word. 
 
Suid-Afrika en China, twee belangrike ontluikende markte waar institusionele 
beleggers en korporatiewe beheer die afgelope paar jaar beduidend ontwikkel het, is 
as gevallestudies gebruik. Die gekose steekproef kom uit Suid-Afrikaanse 
maatskappye wat op die Johannesburgse Effektebeurs (JEB) genoteer is en oor die 
tydperk 2010 tot 2013 waargeneem is, sowel as Chinese maatskappye wat op hetsy 
die Shanghai-effektebeurs (SEB) of die Shenzhen-effektebeurs (SZEB) genoteer is en 
oor die tydperk 2008 tot 2013 waargeneem is. Ná inagneming van 
endogeniteitsprobleme en met behulp van momenteberamingsmetodes soos 
saamgevoegde gewone kleinste kwadrate (“OLS”), vaste effek (“FE”), tweestadium- 
kleinste kwadrate (“2SLS”) en stelselveralgemening (“Sys-GMM”), toon hierdie 
studie dat, wat institusionele beleggers se aandeelhoudingsgedrag en verband met 
beter korporatiewe beheer betref, daar ooreenkomste én verskille bestaan tussen Suid-
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Afrika en China, tussen druk-onsensitiewe en druksensitiewe institusionele beleggers, 
en tussen passiewe en nie-passiewe institusionele beleggers. 
 
In die besonder word daar bevind dat institusionele beleggers in Suid-Afrika én China 
oor die algemeen nie altyd omsigtig is in hulle aandeelhoudingsgedrag nie; 
waarnemings toon ’n beduidende verband met beter korporatiewe finansiële prestasie 
en laer verdienstebestuur, maar ’n onbeduidende verband met korporatiewe ESG-
prestasie. Institusionele beleggers word dus as meer konvensioneel as maatskaplik 
verantwoordelik beskou, en sal waarskynlik nie suboptimale finansiële prestasie 
aanvaar om ESG-doelwitte na te jaag nie. ’n Interessante bevinding is dat 
institusionele beleggers in Suid-Afrika doeltreffend blyk te wees in die bevordering 
van openbaarmaking van korporatiewe beheer, terwyl hierdie verskynsel nie in China 
opgemerk word nie. 
 
Deur institusionele beleggers in bepaalde tipes in te deel, bevind die studie dat druk-
onsensitiewe institusionele beleggers klaarblyklik meer doeltreffend as hulle 
druksensitiewe eweknieë moniteer, wat korporatiewe finansiële prestasie bevorder. 
Daarbenewens toon passiewe institusionele beleggers in sowel Suid-Afrika as China 
minder voorkeur vir vorige finansiële prestasie wanneer hulle aandele kies; in China 
blyk hulle egter ’n sterker invloed te hê op beter korporatiewe finansiële prestasie as 
hulle nie-passiewe eweknieë nadat die beleggingsverhouding gevestig is. 
 
Trefwoorde: institusionele beleggers; fidusiêre plig; verantwoordelike belegging; 
korporatiewe beheer; aandeelhoudingsvoorkeur; finansiële prestasie; 
verdienstebestuur; omgewings-, maatskaplike en beheer- (“ESG”-)prestasie 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
1.1.1 Corporate governance: A salient issue around the world 
Agency theory treats the company as a contract under which the shareholders 
(principals) engage managers (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf, and 
commonly principals delegate decision-making authority to the agent (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Wu, Zhao & Tang, 2014). Under this agency relationship, the 
misalignment of interests between shareholders and managers is created by the 
separation of ownership and control (Berle & Means, 1932; Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
The agency problem (also known as the principal-agent problem) thus arises and has 
become a pervasive phenomenon in modern corporations across the globe (McGee, 
2009; Romano, 1993; Steyn & Stainbank, 2013). 
 
Corporate governance is essentially viewed as a mechanism in the agency relationship 
to mitigate the agent’s self-serving behaviour (Bar-Yosef & Prencipe, 2013; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Peni & Vähämaa, 2012; Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012). While “in 
its broadest sense, corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance 
between economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals…the 
aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, of corporations, and of 
society” (Cadbury, 2003: vii), which is in line with stakeholder theory, where 
companies are required to not only ensure the interests of shareholders, but also those 
of the other stakeholders1 (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Gillan, 2006). That is, the 
objective of corporate governance is not limited to assuring the suppliers of finance to 
corporations of getting a return on their investment, as Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
suggested, but to maximise the contribution of the firm to society and the economy 
                                                        
1 A stakeholder is commonly referred to as “any group or individual that can affect or be affected by realization of 
an organization’s purpose” (Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Parmar & De Colle, 2010: 26). 
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overall. This concept is increasingly accepted worldwide (Ayuso, Rodríguez, García-
Castro & Ariño, 2014; Gnan, Hinna, Monteduro & Scarozza, 2013). 
 
As a result of events such as the worldwide wave of privatisation, the takeover wave, 
the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, the most recent global financial crisis and a 
series of corporate scandals (Chen, 2013; Leng, 2009), the importance of corporate 
governance for firms, for markets and for countries has been widely recognised 
(Claessens, 2006; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). Corporate governance has become a 
prominent concern, with increased attention from both academics and practitioners 
(Allen, 2005; Aguilera & Jackson, 2010). One of the keystones of corporate 
governance research is the idea that good corporate governance practices could 
enhance competitive advantages (Madhani, 2014; Zeidan, 2011), and firms are 
accordingly becoming more likely to adopt better corporate governance practices 
(Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira & Matos, 2011). Nonetheless, the questions of how to 
advance corporate governance and mitigate the agency problem remain debated. 
 
1.1.2 Institutional investors: A prominent role-player in corporate governance 
Institutional investors have become increasingly important as equity holders in many 
markets, especially in more developed markets. For instance, over 50 per cent of the 
total equity ownership in both the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) 
is held by institutional investors (Andriosopoulos & Yang, 2015; Çelik & Isaksson, 
2014; Lewellen, 2011). In recent years, emerging markets have also witnessed a 
substantial growth in the participation of institutional investors (Ashraf & Muhammad, 
2013; IOSCO, 2012; OECD & IFC, 2011). 
 
Along with their increased participation in markets, institutional investors at the same 
time have abilities and incentives to monitor their investee companies (Gillan & 
Starks, 2000; Lin, Wu, Fang & Wun, 2014; Rose, 2007; Yuan, Xiao & Zou, 2008). 
This is in accordance with property rights theory, which suggests that property rights 
could create incentives for owners to supervise management (Alchian & Demsetz, 
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1972; Carroll, 2004). In this regard, institutional investors are identified as an 
important mechanism of corporate governance (Elsayed & Wahba, 2013; Gillan & 
Starks, 2003; Mallin, 2012): they could advance corporate governance practices either 
by selling shares (‘voting with their feet’ or the ‘Wall Street Rule’), or by direct 
intervention through conducting shareholder activism (‘voice’ or shareholder 
engagement) (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Bajo, Barbi, Bigelli & Hillier, 2013; Brickley, 
Lease & Smith, 1988; Hirschman, 1970), the latter of which has gained increased 
prominence over the last few years (Gillan & Starks, 2000; Mallin, 2012; Nix & Chen, 
2013). McCahery, Sautner and Starks (2016) documented that the governance benefits 
of corrective actions through either ‘voting with their feet’ or ‘voice’ are likely to 
discipline management. 
 
Accordingly, it is not surprising to observe that American corporations have moved 
from an era of managerial capitalism to one of investor capitalism (Useem, 1996). It is 
in fact not limited to the US and other countries that have adopted the Anglo-Saxon 
model of governance, where firms are outsider-dominated. Improving corporate 
governance by means of institutional investors’ participation is an approach that is 
also being adopted in Continental Europe, as well as in Japan, where firms are bank-
oriented and insider-dominated (Mizuno, 2010; Nix & Chen, 2013; Schaefer & 
Hertrich, 2013; Suto & Takehara, 2012). Additionally, the attendance of institutional 
investors in corporate governance is also likely to provide an effective way for 
transition economies and emerging markets to overcome internal control problems 
and protect the rights of minority shareholders (Huang & Zhu, 2015; IOSCO, 2012; 
OECD & IFC, 2011; Reed, 2002; Vaughn & Ryan, 2006). Noting that different 
contexts hold different needs for corporate governance, the role of institutional 
investors in corporate governance varies across contexts. Whether institutional 
investors are a part of the solution or a part of the problem for corporations and equity 
markets is hotly debated (Heineman & Davis, 2011; Pound, 1988). 
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1.1.3 Responsible investment: Moving into the mainstream 
The increasingly important role that institutional investors are playing in equity 
markets can be linked to their increased fiduciary responsibilities towards the 
individuals who contribute their money to these institutions (Heineman & Davis, 
2011), as well as to a diverse group of other stakeholders (Aon, 2007). In recent years, 
the increasing growth in the institutional investment industry has been extended to 
responsible investment (RI) (Barreda-Tarrazona, Matallín-Sáez & Balaguer-Franch, 
2011), which has evolved into a significant phenomenon in global financial markets 
(Scholtens, 2014). RI is commonly considered as an investment process that combines 
investors’ financial objectives with concerns about environmental, social (ES) and 
governance (ESG) issues (Eurosif, 2008). Conventionally, the fiduciary duty of 
institutional investors is to maximise investment returns for their clients. Institutional 
investors who support this view argue that there are conflicts between the 
implementation of their fiduciary obligations and ESG integration (Berry, 2011). This 
restrictive perception, however, has been challenged. The 2005 Freshfields Report on 
fiduciary duty states that “it may be a breach of fiduciary duties to fail to take account 
of ESG considerations that are relevant and to give them appropriate weight, bearing 
in mind that some important economic analysts and leading financial institutions are 
satisfied that a strong link between good ESG performance and good financial 
performance exists” (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2005: 100). That is to say, 
fiduciary duty is not an obstacle to integrating ESG; instead, incorporating ESG is an 
approach to addressing fiduciary duty (UNPRI, UNEP FI, UNEP Inquiry & UN 
Global Compact, 2015). 
 
Along with this deepening understanding towards RI, RI is moving from a marginal 
concern to a mainstream strategy (Child, 2015; Glac, 2009; PwC, 2014; Sparkes & 
Cowton, 2004). According to the US Forum for Sustainable and Responsible 
Investment (US SIF), there were over USD 6.57 trillion of assets managed under an 
RI strategy as of year-end 2013 in the US, signifying that one out of every six dollars 
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under management was invested according to an RI strategy (US SIF, 2014). In the 
UK, GBP 2.89 trillion of assets were invested in the RI market through various 
strategies by the end of 2013 (Eurosif, 2014). Furthermore, the United Nations-
supported Principles for Responsible Investment Initiative (UNPRI) was established 
in April 20062. This initiative has attracted 1 380 signatories globally, representing 
USD 59 trillion assets under management (AuM), and the signatories are willing to 
integrate ESG concerns into their decision-making. It should, however, be noted that 
RI is still an emerging topic for mainstream academic researchers (Capelle-Blancard 
& Monjon, 2012; Glac, 2009; Zarbafi, 2011) and remains under-explored. 
 
1.1.4 Challenges in emerging markets 
Emerging markets are increasingly becoming attractive destinations for international 
investors, even if investors still have to bear higher risks when investing in these 
markets compared to developed markets (Patel, McKay, Van Rensburg & Bhagwan, 
2013; Van Dijk, Griek & Jansen, 2012). EIRIS (2012) found that poor corporate ESG 
disclosure is one of the biggest challenges to investing in emerging markets. 
McKinsey (2002) observed that investors are willing to pay a higher premium for 
better-governed companies in emerging markets than for their peers in developed 
markets. It is no wonder that Claessens (2006), Munisi and Randøy (2013) and 
Rossouw (2002) stated that the prominence of corporate governance in most 
developing markets is driven by the desire to attract foreign investment, to gain national 
and international legitimacy and to stimulate country-level economic development. 
 
Furthermore, when referring to the agency problem, unlike in the US and the UK 
(where firms have dispersed ownership), firms in most emerging markets are 
identified with concentrated ownership (Hu, Tam & Tan, 2010; Munisi, Hermes & 
Randøy, 2014; Zhang, Uchida & Bu, 2013). These firms may be in pyramidal 
                                                        
2The United Nations-supported Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI) Initiative is “an international 
network of investors working together to put the six Principles for Responsible Investment into practice. Its goal is 
to understand the implications of sustainability for investors and support signatories to incorporate these issues into 
their investment decision making and ownership practices” (UNPRI, n.d.). 
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ownership structures, under the dominance of business groups, and may also 
demonstrate high levels of related-party transactions (Claessens & Fan, 2002; He, 
Mao, Rui & Zha, 2013). In other words, apart from the principal-agent problem, there 
exists conflicts between controlling shareholders (principals) and minority 
shareholders (principals), known as the principal-principal problem (Chen & Zhang, 
2014; Hu et al. 2010; La Porta, Lopez-de-Sailnes & Shleifer, 1999). Accordingly, the 
agency problem gets more complicated in emerging markets where, combined with 
weak protection of minority investor rights, high demands are placed on a sound 
corporate governance mechanism (McGee, 2009). 
 
It is undeniable that corporate governance has generally improved in most emerging 
markets in recent years (Hugill & Siegel, 2014). Yet it is still not well established and 
remains a critical risk element for investors. There are high expectations on 
institutional investors to promote corporate governance (Hu et al., 2010). They have 
witnessed great development in many emerging markets, while generally still 
remaining small in their ownership scale (Faias & Ferreira, 2016) and lagging behind 
their developed market counterparts in terms of RI (IFC, 2011a). The investment 
behaviour of institutional investors as well as their relationship with improved 
corporate governance has not been well researched. 
 
1.2 The South African and Chinese context 
As member countries of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), South 
Africa (officially the Republic of South Africa, RSA) and China (officially the 
People’s Republic of China, PRC) were selected as the context of this study. China 
includes Mainland China and two special administrative regions (SARs): Hong Kong 
and Macao. Due to the differences in the development stages of corporate governance, 
responsible investment and investor structure between Mainland China and the two 
SARs (Li, 2016), this study collected only evidence from Mainland China to avoid 
ambiguity.
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Along with improved economic and institutional conditions, South Africa and China 
have been undertaking corporate governance reforms for years. At the same time, 
institutional investors are playing increasingly important roles in these two major 
emerging markets. Their investment behaviour and relationships with improved 
corporate governance are, however, still largely unknown. This section summarises the 
general economic and institutional conditions in South Africa and China; and introduces 
the situations regarding corporate governance, institutional investors and responsible 
investing in these two countries to provide a solid basis for further discussion. 
 
1.2.1 Basic statistics 
A country’s macro-environment has an influence on corporate governance practices 
(Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2013). Basic and salient statistics regarding the economic and 
institutional conditions in South Africa and China are provided in Table 1.1. 
 
South Africa is the most sophisticated economy on the African continent (Boulle & 
Chella, 2014). In terms of gross domestic product (GDP), it was the second largest 
economy in Africa in 2014, and third in 2016. China is the second largest economy in 
the world, with a GDP exceeding USD 10 trillion. Nonetheless, GDP per capita for 
both countries is low compared to more developed markets (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 
2013). In terms of GDP growth, China is no longer on a double-digit path, but did 
manage to keep growth above 6.5 per cent in 2015. South Africa has faced slow 
economic growth in recent years, with its annual growth falling to 1.3 per cent in 
2015. South Africa was the top destination for inward FDI in Africa by project 
numbers in 2015, while China was the leading recipient of inward FDI by project 
numbers in Asia-Pacific (fDi Intelligence, 2016). Trade plays an important role in 
both South Africa’s and China’s economy. The statistics provided in Table 1.1 show 
that South Africa’s economy relies much more on trade than China. 
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Table 1.1  
Overview of economic and institutional indicators in South Africa and China 
 South Africa China Period Source 
GDP 
GDP (USD billions) 312.7 10 866.4 2015 World Bank 
GDP growth (annual %) 1.3 6.9 2015 World Bank 
GDP per capita (USD) 5 691.7 7 924.7 2015 World Bank 
Trade 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (USD 
millions) 
1 575 249 858 2015 
World Bank 
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) 0.5 2.3 2015 World Bank 
Trade (% of GDP) 63 41 2015 World Bank 
Stock market 
Stock market JSE SSE/SZSE - WFE 
Year of establishment 1887 SSE: 1990/SZSE:1990 - JSE/SSE/SZSE 
Board 
Main board/ AltX 
SSE: Main board/SZSE: Main board; 
SME board; ChiNext board 
- JSE/SSE/SZSE 
Market capitalisation (USD millions) 735 945.2 SSE: 4 549 288.0/ SZSE:3 638 731.3 2015 WFE 
Worldwide ranking 19 SSE: 3/SZSE: 5 2015 WFE 
Number of listed companies 382 SSE: 1 081/SZSE: 1 746 2015 WFE 
Annual share turnover (%) 31.8 480.3 2015 World Bank 
Benchmark index e.g. FTSE/JSE Top 40 e.g. CSI 300 - JSE/SSE/SZSE 
Institution 
Strength of minority investor protection index (0-10) 7.2 4.3 2015 World Bank 
Extent of shareholder governance index (0-10) 6.3 3.7 2015 World Bank 
Corruption perception index (0-100) 44 37 2015 Transparency International 
Source: Author’s own construction 
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With regard to equity markets, South Africa and China both have world-class stock 
exchanges according to World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) statistics, i.e. the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) in South Africa, and the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in China. The JSE was 
established in 1887; it is the largest stock exchange in Africa and ranks the nineteenth 
largest in the world by market capitalisation. Currently, the JSE has around 380 
companies listed on its main board and AltX. Moreover, the JSE, a partner member of 
the United Nations Sustainable Stock Exchange Initiative, is the world’s first stock 
exchange to require integrated reporting from its listed companies (JSE, 2016). China 
set up its stock markets (SSE and SZSE) in 1990, but they have grown rapidly since. 
Today, the SSE and SZSE are among the world’s top ten exchanges by market 
capitalisation, and have around 2 800 listed firms on their main board, SME board and 
ChiNext board. Although the Chinese equity market is larger than its South African 
counterpart in overall market capitalisation, it is smaller when considering market 
capitalisation as a share of GDP. In terms of market liquidity, China has shown a 
higher turnover ratio than South Africa. 
 
Table 1.1 presents some salient institutional environment indicators that are generally 
relevant to corporate governance and market development. A legal environment for 
minority investor (shareholder) rights protection seems well established in South Africa, 
compared to in China. South Africa has an Anglo-Saxon legal tradition, and South 
African law is a mixed legal system with a combination of common law and civil law 
(De Waal, 2004). China’s legal system is a mixture of socialist law and civil law (Zhang, 
2010). Common law is generally considered to offer better protection of property rights 
than civil law (Roland, 2016; Schmiegelow, 2014). The extent of shareholder governance 
index in Table 1.1 indicates that South African firms in general show favourable 
performance in the extent of shareholder rights, the strength of governance structure and 
the extent of corporate transparency compared to their Chinese counterparts. However, 
corruption, as reflected in the relatively low corruption perception scores (higher 
scores mean less corruption), is a serious problem in both South Africa and China.
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1.2.2 Institutional investors 
1.2.2.1 South Africa 
In South Africa, institutional investors account for the vast majority of investors on 
the JSE (National Treasury of RSA, 2013), and they mainly consist of pension and 
provident funds, insurance companies and collective investment schemes (CIS) 
(Nonhlanhla & Nombulelo, 2011; Sibanda & Holden, 2014). The assets held by different 
types of institutional investors have increased substantially over the last few decades. 
For instance, the assets held by non-bank financial institutions represented 214 per 
cent of the country’s GDP by the end of 2012, according to the Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis (2016). More specifically, the total assets held by the South African long-
term and short-term insurance industries by March of 2015 were over R2.5 trillion 
(including reinsurers); the retirement fund industry’s assets had reached R3.2 trillion in 
2015; while assets to the value of R1.8 trillion, R318 billion, R37 billion and R1.1 billion 
were being managed by local CIS managers in securities, foreign CIS managers, CIS 
managers in property and CIS managers in participation bonds respectively by the end of 
March 2015, according to the Financial Service Board’s (FSB) annual report for 2015. 
 
It is worth noting that South Africa possesses the largest pension fund on the African 
continent, i.e. the South African Government Employee Pension Fund (GEPF), which 
is also the eighth biggest pension fund in the world (Towers Watson, 2015). The 
GEPF was launched in May 1996, and the total assets of the GEPF had reached R1.6 
trillion (of which 59 per cent was allocated to equity) by the end of March 2015, 
according to the GEPF’s 2015 annual report. The assets held by the GEPF are largely 
managed by the Public Investment Corporation (PIC), the wholly South African 
government-owned asset manager. 
 
Additionally, numerous European and North American investors divested from South 
Africa under the apartheid system (Teoh, Welch & Wazzan, 1999), and since the collapse 
of apartheid in 1994, foreign investors have gradually returned (Vaughn & Ryan, 2006). 
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South Africa has become an attractive destination for foreign investment (Gstraunthaler, 
2010). The equity market features high participation of foreign investors, partly due to its 
improved regulatory environment. For instance, foreign investors held about 39 per cent 
of the Top 100 listed companies at the end of 2013, and almost half of the FTSE/JSE Top 
40 index listed companies were majority-owned by foreigners in 2015 (JSE, 2015). 
 
The financial sector cannot fully develop without a conducive regulatory environment. 
In recent years, South Africa has been undergoing financial regulatory reform so as to 
make the financial system safer and more stable, and to make financial institutions work 
more effectively and fairly (National Treasury of RSA, 2011). Taking lessons from the 
most recent global financial crisis, the National Treasury of RSA released a policy 
document titled A safer financial sector to serve South Africa better in February 2011. 
The document outlined reform initiatives for the financial sector, in which four policy 
objectives were addressed, namely financial stability, consumer protection and market 
conduct, expanding access through financial inclusion, and combating financial crime. 
In order to attain these objectives, the policy document suggested a shift towards a twin 
peaks approach of financial sector regulation, which features a separation of prudential 
and market conduct regulators (National Treasury of RSA, 2011). 
 
This shift was approved by the Cabinet in July 2011. Later, in December 2013, the 
draft Financial Sector Regulation Bill was released. It intended to establish two 
regulators under the twin peaks approach, namely a Prudential Authority within the 
South African Reserve Bank (SARB) and a new Financial Sector Conduct Authority 
(FSCA). This draft bill was revised in December 2014, and finalised in October 2015. 
Figure 1.1 shows a diagrammatic simplification of the current regulatory structure for 
financial institutions. Once the twin peak model is enacted, the Prudential Authority 
will act as the prudential regulator, with the FSCA as the market conduct regulator. 
Table 1.2 presents the parts of the regulations relevant to institutional investors. The 
quality of relational regulations and supervision is expected to be further improved 
with this financial regulation shift. 
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Figure 1.1 Current regulation structure for financial institutions in South Africa. This figure is 
adapted from Goodspeed (2013) and the National Treasury of RSA (2011: 32). 
 
1.2.2.2 China 
China has experienced enormous changes in the investor structure of its equity market 
since the 1990s. According to He (2003), Huang and Jiang (2010) and Yang and Zhou 
(2014), the development process of institutional investors can be divided into three 
phases: the initial phase (1990-1996), the adjustment phase (1997-2003) and the rapid 
development phase (2004 to present). Each one of these phases will be discussed in 
detail in the following section. 
 
During the initial phase, the equity market was highly dominated by individual 
investors, with institutional investors not playing a significant role at the time. 
Institutional investors were mainly presented as securities firms, and the scales of 
securities investment funds were small at this stage (Yang & Zhou, 2014). In 1991, 
the Wuhan Securities Investment Fund and the Shenzhen Nan Shan Risk Investment 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
13 
 
Fund were established, marking the beginning of the securities fund industry (Gong, 
2014). The Shandong Zibo Township Investment Fund was issued in 1992, and listed 
as the first closed-end fund on the SSE in 1993 (Mu, 2007). Operating under an 
absence of regulations, the funds established before 1997 were referred to as ‘old 
funds’, a term which is used to distinguish them from securities investment funds 
launched after the release of the Interim Measures on the Management of Securities 
Investment Funds (henceforth the Interim Measures) in 1997 (Li, 2005). In total, there 
were 75 old funds with AuM of more than RMB 5.8 billion at the end of 1997 (Gong, 
2014). Most of these funds were allocated to real estate and industries projects, and 
limited to securities (Yang & Zhou, 2014). During this period, the development of 
investment funds was stagnant largely due to the lack of proper regulations (He, 2003; 
Li, 2005; Yang & Zhou, 2014). 
 
In the adjustment phase, the Chinese authorities conducted a series of actions to 
promote institutional investors’ development, which began with the release of the 
Interim Measures in 1997 and the launch of the mutual funds of Jintai and Kaiyuan 
(closed-end funds) in 1998. In 2000, the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) stated that “government will nurture and develop institutional investors 
unconventionally and creatively”. Subsequently, the first open-end mutual fund was 
launched in 2001. The Provisional Measures on Administration of Domestic Securities 
Investments of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFIIs) took effect in 
December 2002, indicating that QFIIs would be allowed to enter the Chinese A-share 
market. However, due to the presence of a large number of non-tradable shares (NTS), 
institutional investors’ influence on the market was mostly limited at that point, 
regardless of them holding a relatively large proportion of the outstanding shares. 
 
In 2004, with the enactment of Some Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the 
Reform and Opening and Steady Growth of Capital Markets (henceforth the 2004 
Opinions), the equity market gained considerable momentum. The 2004 Opinions 
suggests guiding institutional investors to become the prominent force in the equity 
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market. Since then, institutional investors have entered a rapid development phase. In 
2004, insurance companies were permitted to directly invest in the Chinese stock 
market. Starting in 2005, the Non-tradable Share Reform (henceforth the NTS Reform) 
provided the solution to the circulation problem of NTS. As a result of the NTS 
Reform, companies promised to gradually unlock the NTS, hence the Chinese stock 
market gained liquidity. The completion of the NTS Reform increased the value of 
investing in the Chinese stock market and provided wider development opportunities 
for institutional investors. More recently, in March 2015, a policy proposal by the 
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) showed that China would 
channel a proportion of the local pension fund (RMB 3.06 trillion) to the stock market. 
 
Currently, the key institutional investors in the Chinese equity market consist of 
mutual funds (referred to as securities investment funds in China), social security 
funds, insurance companies, securities firms and QFIIs. According to the SSE 
Statistics Annual 2015, in the SSE, the market value of shares held by institutional 
investors accounted for 14.65 per cent of the total market value of A-shares in 
circulation at the end of 2014. This indicator was 18.32 per cent of the SZSE at the 
end of 2012. More specifically, mutual funds represent the largest institutional 
investors in the Chinese equity market, their total AuM having reached RMB 3.9 
trillion by the end of May 2014 (CSRC, 2014). The proportion of shares held by other 
institutional investors remains small. 
 
Furthermore, unlike the South African equity market, the Chinese equity market has 
not been entirely open to foreign investors. Foreign institutional investors were not 
allowed to directly invest in the A-share market until the QFII scheme was created in 
2002. Following this, the Renminbi QFII (RQFII) scheme was released in 2011. 
Unlike the QFII, which is foreign currency settled, the RQFII uses RMB for 
settlement. According to the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) of the 
PRC, altogether 274 (158) overseas institutions have received QFII (RQFII) quotas, 
amounting to USD 80.951 billion (RMB 471.425 billion) by March 2016. 
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Overall, China is making excellent progress in financial liberalisation, but at the same 
time, the country has been facing challenges in the stability of its financial markets in 
recent years (Huang, 2010; IMF, 2011). A silo (institutional) approach to financial 
regulation is currently used by the regulators (see Figure 1.2), while China has been 
considering a transition to a more effective financial regulatory system (Li, 2016). 
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Figure 1.2 Current regulation structure for financial institutions in China. This figure is 
adapted from Elliott and Yan (2013: 10). 
 
Under the current financial regulatory system, as indicated in Figure 1.2, different 
financial institutions are regulated and supervised by different authorities. Banks, 
insurance companies and securities investment funds are overseen by the China 
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), the CSRC, and the China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission (CIRC) respectively. Some of the regulations relevant to 
institutional investors are summarised in Table 1.2. 
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Table 1.2 
Some relevant regulations for institutional investors 
Country  Regulations 
South 
Africa 
 Collective Investment Schemes Control Act (No. 45 of 2002) 
 Credit Rating Services Act (No. 24 of 2012) 
 Financial Advisory and Intermediaries Services Act (No. 37 of 2002) (FAIS Act) 
 Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act (No. 28 of 2001) 
 Financial Intelligence Centre Act (No. 38 of 2001) 
 Financial Markets Act (No. 19 of 2012) 
 Financial Services Board Act (No. 97 of 1990) 
 Financial Services Ombud Schemes Act (No. 37 of 2004) 
 Financial Supervision of the Road Accident Fund Act (No. 8 of 1993) 
 Friendly Societies Act (No. 25 of 1956) 
 Inspection of Financial Institutions Act (No. 80 of 1998) 
 Long-term Insurance Act (No. 52 of 1998) 
 Pension Funds Act (No. 24 of 1956) 
 Securities Services Act (No. 36 of 2004) 
 Short-term Insurance Act (No. 53 of 1998) 
 Supervision of the Financial Institutions Rationalisation Act (No. 32 of 1996) 
 Policy Board for Financial Services and Regulation Act (No. 141 of 1993) 
 Securities Services Act (No. 36 of 2004) 
China  Trust Law 
 Securities Law 
 Securities Investment Fund Law 
 Insurance Law 
 Regulation on the Supervision and Administration of Securities Companies 
 Rules for National Social Security Fund 
 Measures for the Administration of Investment in Basic Pension Insurance 
Funds 
 Measures for the Administration of Securities Investment Fund Management 
Companies 
 Measures for the Administration of Information Disclosure of Securities 
Investment Fund 
 Supervisory and Administrative Measures for Futures Companies 
 Administrative Measures on Domestic Securities Investments by Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investors 
 Measures for Pilot Domestic Securities Investment Made by RMB Qualified 
Foreign Institutional Investors of Fund Management Companies and Securities 
Companies 
 Provisions on the Administration of Insurance Companies 
Source: FSB (2015) and National Treasury of RSA (2011) for South Africa; for China, the 
author collected the information from regulators’ websites. 
 
1.2.3 Corporate governance and responsible investment 
1.2.3.1 South Africa 
During the apartheid era, South Africa was virtually isolated from the global economy, 
and South African corporate practices and national regulations were far behind 
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international norms (Vaughn & Ryan, 2006). When re-entering the global economy 
after apartheid collapsed in 1994, South African companies began to embrace the 
improved standards of corporate governance in order to address some concerns, such 
as market pressure, shifts in corporate control structures and the emerging market 
crisis (UNEP, GRI, KPMG & Centre for Corporate Governance in Africa, 2013; 
Vaughn & Ryan, 2006). The launch of the King Committee on Corporate Governance 
in 1994 initiated corporate governance reform in South Africa (IoD, 2004). In the 
same year, the first King report was released. It was the first corporate governance 
code of best practice within developing markets, and was followed by the release of 
the second King Report in 2002 (King II) and the third King Report in 2009 (King III). 
King III is in line with the Companies Act (No. 71 of 2008, as amended), which came 
into effect in May 2011. Besides the Insider Trading Act (No.135 of 1998), the launch 
of the JSE SRI Index in May 2004 and the mandatory disclosure of integrated 
reporting are some of the important corporate governance reform initiatives that have 
proved crucial to improving corporate governance standards. The fourth edition of 
King report (King IV) will be launched in late 2016 to cope with the corporate 
governance and regulatory developments locally and internationally. Nowadays, 
South Africa is the pioneer among emerging countries in corporate governance; the 
King III report indicates that “South African listed companies are regarded by foreign 
institutional investors as being among the best governed in the world’s emerging 
economies” (IoDSA, 2009: 6). 
 
South African corporate governance and corporate culture are firmly rooted in the 
British tradition (Andreasson, 2011). Thus, the corporate governance model of South 
Africa aligns with the traditional Anglo-Saxon orientation, with its focus on 
shareholders’ interests. However, it has changed with corporate governance reform, 
especially after the King II report was released. That is, firms adopted a feature of the 
Continental European (Japanese) model of corporate governance, incorporating both 
shareholding and stakeholding interests, and started to aim at addressing non-financial 
issues, such as Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE), the environment, 
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HIV/AIDS, health and safety, and corporate governance provisions, aside from 
financial goals (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). This makes the South African corporate 
governance model a hybrid and unique in the Anglo-Saxon world (Andreasson, 2011).  
 
Furthermore, King II and III reports acknowledged the important role that institutional 
investors play in corporate governance best practices. Following King III, the Code 
for Responsible Investing in South Africa (CRISA) was released in 2011. CRISA 
provides a guide to institutional investors on how to execute investment and use their 
rights to advance governance. The release of CRISA makes South Africa only the 
second country (the first being the UK) to formally encourage institutional investors 
to integrate ESG considerations into their investment decisions. In addition, the recent 
amendment of Regulation 28 of the Pension Funds Act (No. 24 of 1956), which 
became effective in 2011, states that pension funds need to adopt a prudential and 
responsible investment approach. In the draft King IV where close attentions are also 
paid to responsibility of institutional investors, institutional investors are suggested to 
conform to fiduciary duties by integrating ESG considerations, and support the 
sustainable development of their investee companies. 
 
Consequently, institutional investors in South Africa have gradually embraced RI. 
According to the IFC (2011b), the AuM for professional sustainable investment, with 
ESG integrated, was estimated at USD 111.2 billion in South Africa by the end of 
2010. Within the ESG framework, corporate governance is well defined and disclosed 
in South Africa, and hence receives more attention from institutional investors than 
ES issues (Giamporcaro & Pretorius, 2012; Muzindutsi & Sekhampu, 2013; UNEP FI, 
2007). Institutional investors have been observed to play active roles in corporate 
governance. Examples include the former co-operative OTK’s business restructuring, 
the delisting plans of Energy Africa and Mutual & Federal at Comparex, and the PIC 
challenging executive remuneration at Dorbyl and Aveng (Survé, 2009). Nonetheless, 
institutional investors still seem inactive in general. King II, King III and draft King 
IV highlight the limited role that institutional investors have played in the 
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development of corporate governance in the past, and explicitly call for greater 
involvement in shareholder activism. 
 
1.2.3.2 China 
The development of corporate governance in China is aligned with the shift of the 
Chinese economy (from planned economy to market economy), and this requires the 
evolution of Chinese companies from government-led to market-led. The evolution of 
corporate governance in China can be divided into four phases (Hou, Xie & 
Chatterjee, 2015; OECD, 2011a), which will be discussed in this sub-section. 
 
The focus of the first phase (1979-1983) was decentralisation, because most 
companies in China were stated-owned and administration-driven at the time. When 
entering into the second phase (1984-1992), companies were encouraged to separate 
their ownership from control, which is a means to adapt to the market economy, 
especially for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The third phase started in 1993 with 
the implementation of the company law (1993), which laid a solid foundation for 
China’s corporate governance framework, and made clear the importance of 
establishing a modern company system with clearly defined ownership. China’s first 
company law is always considered to be the starting point of the country’s corporate 
governance reform (Rajagopalan & Zhang, 2008). Later, in 1998, the first securities 
law was issued, and it came into effect in 1999. The Code of Corporate Governance 
of Listed Companies (henceforth the 2002 Code) was issued in early 2002 on the basis 
of the OECD Corporate Governance Principles. The 2002 Code provided references for 
listed companies to develop a well-structured corporate governance framework. 
 
The corporate governance issue was actively addressed from 2004 onwards during the 
fourth phase of the transition. The 2004 Opinions and the completion of the NTS 
Reform provided a favourable regulatory environment for corporate governance 
development. The revised company law (2004, 2013) and the securities law (2005, 
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2014) highlighted the responsibility of the board of directors, the board of supervisors 
and management towards an advancement of corporate governance, especially for 
listed companies and SOEs. 
 
Given the potential positive influence that institutional investors could have on capital 
market stability and corporate governance, the Chinese government places high 
expectations on institutional investors. The 2002 Code states that institutional 
investors should take responsibility for appointing and monitoring directors, and 
exercise their right to vote. Although in recent years, events such as rat trading3 by 
fund managers have cast doubts on the fiduciary responsibility of institutional 
investors, they have, however, gradually shown their active attitudes towards 
participating in corporate governance and minority shareholders’ protection. 
Examples include institutional investors opposing the issuing of H-shares in ZTE, 
intervening in a convertible bond issue of the China Merchants Bank, and rejecting 
the share reform program of Tsinghua Tongfang, Keda, Jinfeng and five other 
companies (Zhang, 2011). 
 
Not limited to corporate governance, institutional investors have realised the 
importance of other ESG practices along with increased attention towards corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) practices by Chinese regulators and Chinese companies 
(especially listed companies and SOEs). By the end of October 2014, a total of 18 
Chinese mutual funds were being managed according to RI approaches, with 
combined assets of over RMB 22 billion under management (China SIF, 2014). 
 
1.3 Theoretical framework 
Corporate governance is viewed to be an attempt to balance interests of corporations 
with that of shareholders and other stakeholders, i.e. to align the interests of 
individuals, corporations and society (Rossouw, 2008). This theme falls within the 
                                                        
3 Rat trading is known as a form of insider trading, where fund managers use confidential information and personal 
accounts to buy shares at a lower price and sell them at a profit after funds they managed have boosted share price. 
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domain of institutional theory of studying organisations on control and coordination 
(Fiss, 2008). Institutional theory is positioned to provide unique perspectives of 
understanding corporate governance. Within the traditional view of institutional 
theory, corporate governance is defined as being concerned with a nexus of contracts, 
where the focus is being placed on agency problem (Fiss, 2008). In this circumstance, 
corporate governance is designed to deal with the relationship between shareholders 
and managers. Besides the contractarian view and the shareholder perspective, 
corporate governance has been increasingly observed to be embedded in a large 
institutional framework over the last decades (Jun, 2016). For instance, neo-institutional 
economics offers an institutional framework of corporate governance analysis with the 
bounded rationality model for corporations (Williamson, 1981). Furthermore, neo-
institutional (NI) theory suggests to incorporate economic, political and social 
institutions to explain corporate governance practices. When dealing with corporate 
governance from a cross-country perspective (or in the case of comparative studies), it 
seems logical to apply the institutional theory framework (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2003). 
 
In the same vein, as the importance of RI and corporate governance increased, 
institutional investors (especially RI investors) consider both financial and social 
considerations when allocating investments. This phenomenon is unlikely to be fully 
understood purely by considering the discipline of economics, and a sociological view 
of the institution is suggested to explain the intention and the thinking of institutional 
investors supporting their RI decisions (Bell, Filatotchev & Aguilera, 2014). Institutional 
theory, and particularly NI in economics and sociology implies that institutional 
forces can interact to shape (restrict or/and facilitate) the diffusion and imposition of 
actors’ practices (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Levy & Spiller, 1994; Scott, 1987). 
 
Actors in institutional theory can be individuals, organisations (such as corporations 
and institutional investors in this study) or states; they pursue their interests within 
institutional constraints, including established laws and accepted social norms 
(Ingram & Clay, 2000; Meyer, Linsenmann & Wessels, 2007). Referring to 
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institutional theory in economics, transaction cost is the core concept (Coase, 1937; 
Furubotn, 2001), which is closely related to another concept, namely rationality. 
Rationality is typically understood as corresponding to utility maximisation (Dequech, 
2006), and this notion is also accepted in agency costs theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, it should be noted that because of incomplete 
information and cognitive limitations, actors are bounded rational during transactions 
(Barros, 2010; Furubotn, 2001; Simon, 1979). At the same time, these actors try to 
use decision-making processes to negotiate a transaction and attempt to be rational. 
Among others, institutions can be viewed as partial solutions, which can mitigate 
problems caused by incomplete information and alleviate the transaction costs 
associated with bounded rationality (Ingram & Clay, 2000; Shapiro & Glicksman, 
2004). Furthermore, institutional constraints also appear to be imposed by property 
rights, which has been viewed as the object of maximising choice (Dequech, 2006; 
Hira & Hira, 2000). In this regard, to follow the laws, rules, standards and other forms 
of institutions when conducting economic activities could be linked to gaining 
economic interests. It is thus understandable that corporations and institutional 
investors are likely to follow these institutions. 
 
Likewise, a variety of groups with varying identities and interests are linked together 
within corporate governance practices. Among others, managers and 
owners/shareholders (extended to stakeholders in recent years) have received 
significant attention, especially in the context of listed companies (Fiss, 2008). Within 
an economic perspective of NI, corporate governance practices and other ES activities 
could contribute to an alleviation of economic, social and political costs and access to 
crucial resources, such as business contracts (Friede, Busch & Bassen, 2015; Ortas, 
Álvarez & Garayar, 2015). This phenomenon is referred to as ‘economic efficiency’ 
(Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013: 468). Put simply, from the efficiency (instrumental) 
perspective the motive for RI is to protect shareholders’ interests, and to make 
financial sense of RI practices with a reduction in agency conflicts through 
information asymmetry mitigation (Chen & Roberts, 2010). Accordingly, the impact 
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of institutional investors on the corporate governance of the investee companies can 
be assessed from efficiency (instrumental) aspects, e.g. financial aspects. 
 
RI is not only engaged for the purpose of wealth maximisation, but also social returns. 
Thus, besides the efficiency (instrumental) perspective, corporate governance 
practices and ES activities are also largely motivated by legitimation (ethical) claims 
of all stakeholders from a sociological standpoint, as companies are also concerned 
with others’ perceptions of their actions (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams & Granapathi, 
2007). That is, aside from resources, companies also compete for social support and 
for the right to exist (Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). In order to demonstrate the expected 
social behaviour, firms are likely to be driven by regulative institutional pressures, 
social norms, as well as the ethics of the actors in the firms (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 
2013). Compliance with corporate governance and social responsibility practices can 
improve organisational legitimacy (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). By doing this, firms 
can maintain and enhance good relationships with various corporate stakeholders and, 
more importantly, win their support (Aguilera et al., 2007). This context provides a 
more comprehensive understanding of firms’ and institutional investors’ responsible 
behaviour. Accordingly, the impact of institutional investors on the corporate 
governance of investee companies can be assessed from a social perspective, e.g. non-
financial aspects. 
 
This study explores institutional investors’ behaviour towards corporate governance 
within the institutional theory framework and based on agency theory, property rights 
theory and stakeholder theory. Institutional investors have a fiduciary duty to protect 
their clients’, as well as a diverse group of other stakeholders’ interests. When they 
select companies to invest in, they are likely to comply with laws, rules, codes and 
standards for a reduction in information asymmetry and bounded rationality. Once 
they have built an investment relationship with a company and have become its 
shareholders, institutional investors have to deal with the agency problem between 
managers and shareholders, as well as with conflicts between majority and minority 
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shareholders in companies with a concentrated ownership structure, while these issues 
can be mitigated to some extent by sound corporate governance (Marks, 2000). 
Institutional investors are thus likely to participate in advancing corporate governance 
to achieve a reduction of agency costs and improve their interests. Given that 
corporate governance not only involves shareholders but also other stakeholders, and 
not only focus on financial concerns but also incorporates social and ethical 
considerations, it is necessary to consider both financial and non-financial views, i.e. 
efficiency (instrumental) and legitimation (ethical) perspectives, when making an 
assessment of the relationship between institutional investors and improved corporate 
governance. Similarly, institutional investors are regulated by many institutional 
forces which constrain their behaviour and guide them to implement RI. According to 
NI analysis framework, institutional investors have financial and non-financial 
responsibilities to improve the financial and non-financial goals of their investee 
companies, by doing so, they are likely to gain social support, i.e. the legitimation 
(ethical) motive, and financial interests, i.e. efficiency (instrumental) motive. 
 
Furthermore, institutional investor groups feature different interests and identities that 
may differ in governance orientation and value maximisation (Fiss & Zajac, 2004). 
South Africa and China present different economic, political, legal and cultural 
environments, where institutional investors and their investee firms are regulated by 
different formal and non-formal institutions. Institutional investors and their investee 
firms are thus expected to have different attitudes towards corporate governance, 
thereby resulting in their relationship with corporate governance varying across 
markets and types of institutional investors. 
 
1.4 Problem statement and research objectives 
1.4.1 Research problem 
The topic of institutional investors and corporate governance has been discussed 
within the context of developed markets for some time (without reaching generally 
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accepted conclusions), but is under-researched using evidence from emerging markets. 
Due to differences in their macro- and micro-environments, findings generated for 
developed markets are unlikely to fit emerging markets well. More importantly, 
corporate governance practice has received increased attention, and institutional 
investors are increasingly becoming important role-players in emerging markets. An 
examination of the relationship between institutional investors and corporate 
governance within emerging markets thus becomes essential. 
 
South Africa and China stand out among emerging markets as particularly interesting 
environments in which to explore the relationship between institutional investors and 
improved corporate governance of their investee companies. As emerging markets 
and members of the BRICS countries, South Africa and China have relatively mature 
capital markets, well-developed corporate governance frameworks and a reasonable 
number of institutional investors, which provides a suitable platform to conduct this 
study. Important differences in terms of regulatory environments, the stages of 
financial liberalisation achieved on their capital markets and the development level of 
institutional investors and RI markets should provide opportunities to compare and 
contrast the influence of institutional investors on corporate governance development 
and implementation. 
 
The influence of institutional investors on corporate governance could be addressed 
from many perspectives. After reviewing a large amount of literature, Wang and Li 
(2007) concluded that these include influences (1) directly on the governance 
mechanism, such as management compensation, takeover proposals and the board of 
directors; (2) on corporate strategy and operation, such as corporate innovation, 
research and development (R&D) expenditure, earnings management and dividend 
policy; and (3) on financial performance. Wang and Li (2007) added that the influence 
of institutional investors on corporate strategy and operational decision-making would 
ultimately reflect in financial performance. This action mechanism highlights the 
research problems, as identified in Figure 1.3. 
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Figure 1.3 The research problem identification. Source: Author’s own construction 
 
By incorporating the theoretical framework introduced in Section 1.3 and considering 
the impact mechanism of institutional investors on corporate governance summarised 
by Wang and Li (2007), Figure 1.3 presents the identified research problems. As 
illustrated in Figure 1.3, it is necessary to have a better understanding of institutional 
investors’ stockholding preferences and more importantly, to gain insight into the 
relationship between institutional investors and improved corporate governance of 
investee companies when their investment relationship has been built in the context of 
South Africa and China. Furthermore, the issue of heterogeneity among institutional 
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investors needs to be thoroughly considered, as not all types of institutional investors 
possess the same attitude towards corporate governance. 
 
1.4.2 Research objectives 
Given the research problems, the primary objective of this study is to investigate the 
role played by institutional investors in the corporate governance of South African and 
Chinese listed companies. More specifically, the secondary objectives of this study 
are in line with the observed research problems indicated in Figure 1.3, and they are 
described as follows: (1) To examine the stockholding behaviour of institutional 
investors; (2) To analyse the association between institutional investors and improved 
corporate governance from the perspective of financial performance; (3) To assess the 
association between institutional investors and improved corporate governance from 
the perspective of earnings management; (4) To explore the association between 
institutional investors and improved corporate governance from the perspective of 
non-financial performance (ESG performance). 
 
1.5 Research design 
This thesis utilises the ‘PhD by article’ structure. In order to address the above-
mentioned research problems and research objectives, the main body of this thesis is 
composed of four individual articles represented by individual chapters (Chapters 2, 3, 
4 & 5). That is, although each article follows a unique line of thought, they are 
interrelated in addressing the established research objectives of this study. Figure 1.4 
shows the structure and logic of the four individual empirical chapters. This section is 
intended to clarify some important issues in terms of the methodology used 
throughout the whole study to avoid repetition in the subsequent chapters. 
 
1.5.1 Measures 
Based on established practices and considering the data accessibility, this sub-section 
briefly introduces measures that are used in this study. 
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Figure 1.4 The research design. Source: Author’s own construction 
 
1.5.1.1 Institutional investors 
Lacking a unified definition, institutional investors are usually considered to be professional 
money managers, other than physical persons, with discretionary control over assets (Binay, 
2005; Çelik & Isaksson, 2014; Koh, 2007; Salehi, Hematfar & Heydari, 2012), such as 
mutual funds, pension funds and insurance companies (Ferreira & Matos, 2008). It should 
be noted that the terms ‘institutional investors’, ‘institutional owners’, ‘institutional 
shareholders’, and ‘non-bank financial institutions’ are used interchangeably in this study. 
 
In South Africa, pension and provident funds, insurance companies and CIS broadly 
make up institutional investors (Nonhlanhla & Nombulelo, 2011; SARB, 2014; 
Sibanda & Holden, 2014). Investors in China are divided into two categories, namely 
physical persons and institutional investors. Within the institutional investors group, 
there are professional institutional investors and non-professional legal persons. In 
this study, institutional investors in the context of China conceptually refer to 
professional institutional investors, which mainly consist of mutual funds, social 
securities funds, insurance companies, securities firms and QFIIs. 
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Considering the heterogeneity among the institutional investor groups, this study 
introduces two different groups of institutional investors, namely pressure-insensitive 
(pressure-resistant) institutional investors (e.g. pension funds, mutual funds) and 
pressure-sensitive institutional investors (e.g. insurance companies, securities 
companies), based on the strength of potential and current business linkages between 
institutional investors and their investee companies. Pressure-insensitive institutional 
investors are more independent and free from conflicts of interest compared to their 
pressure-sensitive counterparts. A similar classification of institutional investors has 
been employed in previous studies, such as Almazan, Hartzell and Starks (2005), 
Brickley et al. (1988), Chung and Wang (2014), and Cornett, Marcus, Saunders and 
Tehranian (2007). 
 
Institutional ownership is measured by the percentage of total shares held by 
institutional investors, which is also referred to as aggregated institutional ownership, 
overall institutional ownership, or institutional ownership as a whole within the 
context of this study. Another measurement for institutional ownership is 
disaggregated institutional ownership. Disaggregated institutional ownership 
distinguishes between pressure-insensitive and pressure-sensitive institutional 
ownership, as measured by the percentage of total shares held by pressure-insensitive 
and pressure-sensitive institutional investors respectively. 
 
1.5.1.2 Financial performance 
Financial performance is generally viewed as a measure of a firm’s ability to generate 
profits. To assess profits, researchers use either market-based measures or accounting-
based measures (Gentry & Shen, 2010). Although these two types of measures are 
widely accepted as valid indicators of financial performance, there are ongoing 
debates about their usage. Considering that China’s stock market is not sufficiently 
efficient, it would be inappropriate to use market-based performance measures in this 
study (Liu, Huang, Tse & He, 2011). Accounting-based measures of corporate 
financial performance (CFP) are thus used. 
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1.5.1.3 Earnings management 
Earnings management occurs when “managers use judgment in financial reporting 
and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers” (Healy 
& Wahlen, 1999: 368). Earnings management is considered one of the important 
indicators of earnings quality; to some extent, a lower degree of earnings management 
represents higher earnings quality, financial reporting quality and reliability of 
indicated financial performance. 
 
Earnings management commonly consists of accrual-based and real earnings 
management (Achleitner, Guenther, Kaserer & Siciliano, 2014; Kuo, Ning & Song, 
2014). Accrual-based earnings management refers to a manipulation of earnings only 
through the exploitation of accounting discretion (Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney, 1995), 
while real earnings management reflects earnings manipulation by altering normal 
business activities (Roychowdhury, 2006). Unfortunately, data relating to levels of 
real earnings management is not available in South Africa, and this study 
consequently employs only accrual-based earnings management.  
 
1.5.1.4 Corporate governance 
There is no generally accepted definition of corporate governance (Gillan, 2006; Nix 
& Chen, 2013), but it is usually recognised as the system by which firms are directed 
and controlled (Cadbury Committee, 1992). Corporate governance encompasses a set 
of relationships between a firm’s management, its board of directors, shareholders and 
other stakeholders (OECD, 2015), and it is viewed as a multi-dimensional construct 
that consists of many aspects (Rossouw, 2008). This study thus employs a 
comprehensive index, i.e. corporate governance score, as the proxy of corporate 
governance. The specific elements of corporate governance are, however, not 
extensively discussed in this study due to the data and length limitations. 
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1.5.1.5 ESG 
ESG is a subset of non-financial performance indicators and refers to environmental, 
social and governance aspects. To measure ESG performance entails the measurement 
of a firm’s performance or behaviour on ESG issues, and is related to the sustainable 
development of corporations and of markets. It should be noted that the terms ‘ESG 
performance’, ‘non-financial performance’ and ‘corporate social performance (CSP)’ 
are used interchangeably in this study. Similar to corporate governance, the overall 
ESG score employed in this study serves as a proxy for overall ESG performance. 
 
1.5.1.6 Responsible investing 
RI is commonly considered an investment process that combines investors’ financial 
objectives with concerns about ESG issues (Eurosif, 2008). In practice, investors (not 
limited to RI investors) increasingly and widely adopt RI strategies which involve 
ESG information. As a result, the adoption of RI strategies was not used as a criterion 
to evaluate if institutional investors are responsible in this study. Instead, this study is 
based on the result-oriented criterion that if institutional investors are associated with 
the fulfilment of financial or non-financial goals of their investee companies, they are 
regarded as responsible in financial and non-financial aspects. 
 
There are different ways of describing investment which take non-financial concerns 
into consideration (Eccles & Viviers, 2011; Scholtens, 2014). ‘Responsible investing’, 
‘ethical investing’, ‘socially responsible investing’ and ‘sustainability/sustainable 
investing’ are used interchangeably in this study. 
 
1.5.2 Data collection and sampling 
To ensure that results would be comparable between South Africa and China, and relevant 
within each article, the data collection and processing needed to be thoroughly considered. 
The sample was selected from all companies listed on the JSE main board in South Africa, 
as well as those companies listed on the SSE and SZSE main boards in China. South 
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African data on institutional investors, ESG information and the FTSE/JSE Top 40 
index constituents were collected from the Bloomberg (2015) database. The INET 
BFA (2015) database was also used to collect financial data. Considering that the 
King III report, introduced in 2009, caused many changes to corporate governance 
practices, the period for this study was chosen to be 2010 to 2013 for South Africa. 
 
Chinese data relating to institutional ownership and ESG were selected from the 
RESSET (2015) and Bloomberg (2015) databases respectively. The CSMAR (2015) 
database was used to collect firms’ financial data. Because the NTS Reform in China 
had basically been completed in 2007, the role of institutional investors started to play a 
prominent role in the Chinese equity market from 2008 onwards. The period 2008 to 
2013 was therefore covered for China. Additionally, an attempt was made to examine 
the anticipated heterogeneity of institutional investors in this study. Given that the data 
on institutional investors’ classification are not available for South African listed firms, 
this could unfortunately only be conducted within the Chinese context. 
 
Within the four articles included in this study, a set of generally consistent criteria was 
used to screen the sample. More specifically, the screening criteria for Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3 are identical, and consequently the sample size in these two chapters is the 
same. In order to appraise earnings management (which has specific data 
requirements), part of the sample was excluded in Chapter 4. Given that the 
Bloomberg ESG database’s coverage of companies is limited, the ESG overall score 
and sub-scores for some of the listed companies were not available. Sample 
companies not covered by the ESG database were therefore excluded in Chapter 5. 
 
1.5.3 Selected estimation methods 
This study employed four estimation methods, namely pooled ordinary least squares 
(OLS), fixed effects (FE), two-stage least squares (2SLS) and system generalized method 
of moments (Sys-GMM) estimations, to ensure that regression results are robust. 
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Given the panel nature of the data used in this study, and in order to control for the 
potential endogeneity problem that may arise from unobserved heterogeneity, 
standard pooled OLS as well as FE estimations were used in all four articles. In 
addition, random effects (RE) estimations were considered where applicable, with the 
commonly used Hausman test employed when deciding between FE and RE 
estimations. Although FE estimation can deal with the endogeneity problem, it is 
effective only against the endogeneity problem caused by unobservable heterogeneity. 
As for endogeneity problems resulting from the intertemporal effect, as demonstrated 
in this study, FE might be not that effective. Sys-GMM estimation was therefore 
employed, since it is likely to improve pooled OLS and FE methods within a set of 
panel data. By using Sys-GMM, the endogeneity problem caused by unobservable 
heterogeneity as well as that caused by reverse causality could be mitigated. This 
method is also applicable to situations where it is difficult to find instruments for the 
endogenous variables (Abdallah, Goergen & O’Sullivan, 2015). 
 
2SLS is another widely used method for addressing the endogeneity issue, but 
instrument variables are needed when adopting this method. The instruments for 
suspected endogenous variables are required to be correlated with endogenous 
variables, but not with the error term. Moreover, in a 2SLS regression, the F-statistic 
is estimated for testing the joint statistical significance of instrument variables. If this 
figure is greater than 10, it suggests that the instruments are not weak (Staiger & 
Stock, 1997). At the same time, a Sargan test for over-identification was also 
performed to examine whether or not the instruments are valid in a 2SLS regression. 
 
Since it was challenging to find appropriate instruments for the analysis performed in 
Chapter 2, Sys-GMM was employed. In the case of Chapters 3, 4 and 5 where 
appropriate instrumental variables are able to be identified for suspected endogenous 
variables (i.e. institutional ownership), 2SLS was thus employed when addressing the 
endogeneity problem. Stata statistical software was used to run all regressions. 
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1.6 Orientation of the study 
Given that this study applies the ‘PhD by article’ format, it is inevitable that there will 
be overlapping areas. The articles are thus written in a concise manner to only portray 
the essential information necessary to achieving the research objectives. 
 
This section briefly introduces the following chapters. Figure 1.5 presents the main 
research questions. The preceding sections have presented why financial performance, 
earnings management and ESG performance were chosen as the unique perspectives 
to discuss the relationship between institutional ownership and improved corporate 
governance. The flow of Figure 1.5 clarifies the sequential development of these four 
articles. 
 
Chapter 2: What types of firms do institutional 
investors invest in?
Chapter 3: Are institutional investors associated with 
improved financial performance?
Financial performance could be 
manipulated
Chapter5: Are institutional investors associated with 
improved non-financial (ESG) performance?
Chapter 4: Are institutional investors associated with 
improved earnings quality?
Financial performance among others 
is a significant factor influencing 
institutional stockholding behaviour
Besides financial goals (financial 
responsibilities) for corporates 
(institutional investors), there exist 
non-financial goals (non-financial 
responsibilities) 
 
Figure 1.5 Development of initial research questions. Source: Author’s own construction 
 
As indicated in Figure 1.5, before discussing the association between institutional 
investors and improved corporate governance, this study explored institutional 
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investors’ prudent stockholding behaviour in order to analyse what type of firms they 
tend to invest in in Chapter 2. Financial performance, among others, is observed as a 
prominent factor influencing institutional investors’ decision-making. At the same 
time, institutional investors are also expected to promote CFP, which constitutes one 
of the major motivations behind the results presented in Chapter 3. In addition, 
assessing the impact of institutional investors on CFP provides a means to explore the 
relationship between institutional investors and improved corporate governance. To 
some extent, Chapters 2 and 3 can be viewed as a unit. 
 
A prominent issue derived from Chapter 3 was that financial performance (financial 
reports) may be manipulated. It thus becomes necessary to consider the reliability of 
financial information and the quality of financial reporting when exploring the 
influence of institutional investors on financial performance. This laid the foundation 
for Chapter 4, which investigates earnings management in listed companies, as well as 
the relationship between institutional investors and earnings management reduction. 
The focus of Chapters 3 and 4 is related to the relationship between institutional 
investors and the financial goals of their investee companies. As previously mentioned, 
corporate governance in a broad sense involves shareholders as well as other 
stakeholders. Institutional investors’ responsibility is not only reflected by financial 
aspects, but also by non-financial (ESG) issues. Chapter 5 evolved from the results 
presented in Chapters 3 and 4; its purpose being to investigate the association between 
institutional investors and improved ESG performance. 
 
The remainder of this section briefly introduces the main focus and research questions 
of each of the chapters to follow, before concluding with a summary of the study’s 
prospective benefits. 
 
1.6.1 Chapter 2: Investigating prudent behaviour of institutional investors 
The fiduciary duty of institutional investors requires them to manage assets in the best 
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interests of their clients or beneficiaries. Ensuring asset security by conforming to 
prudent rules is one approach to address this fiduciary duty. This could be reflected in 
institutional investors’ stockholding preferences. Chapter 2 is therefore used to 
explore institutional investors’ prudent stockholding behaviour. 
 
The primary research question of Chapter 2 is: What types of firms do institutional 
investors tend to invest in? Considering that institutional investors are characterised 
by varying identities and interests, the following secondary research questions are also 
considered: (1) Do institutional investors represent a homogeneous group in terms of 
prudent investment? (2) Is prudent stockholding behaviour presented heterogeneously 
by institutional investors with different investment strategies? 
 
1.6.2 Chapter 3: The impact of institutional ownership on corporate financial performance 
Chapter 3 investigates the relationship between institutional investors and CFP to see 
if institutional investors tend to advance the financial goals of their investee 
companies. The objective is to gain to a deeper understanding of the fiduciary duty 
that institutional investors perform after an investment relationship has been built. In 
addition, Chapter 3 also examines the influence of index investing on the association 
between institutional investors and CFP. 
 
The primary research question of Chapter 3 is: Is institutional ownership related to 
improved CFP? The following secondary research questions were also considered:  
(1) Are institutional investors a homogeneous group in terms of CFP improvement?  
(2) Are there differences in the effectiveness of advancing CFP between institutional 
investors with and without a passive strategy? 
 
1.6.3 Chapter 4: Does institutional ownership matter? Evidence from earnings management 
Chapter 4 assesses the prevalence of earnings management among public companies 
to have a better understanding of firms’ earnings quality. In order to further address 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
37 
 
institutional investors’ impact on firm performance from a financial perspective, this 
chapter investigates the relationship between institutional ownership and earnings 
management reduction. 
 
The primary research question of Chapter 4 is: Does investment by institutional 
investors reduce the problem of earnings management? The secondary research 
questions are: (1) How pervasive is earnings management in South Africa and China? 
(2) Does institutional ownership have different influences on income-increasing 
earnings management versus income-decreasing earnings management? (3) Are 
institutional investors heterogeneous towards earnings management reduction? 
 
1.6.4 Chapter 5: Responsible investment and ESG performance: The institutional 
 ownership effect 
Chapter 5 examines if institutional investors are socially responsible by exploring 
their influence on ESG performance. Additionally, this chapter considers corporate 
governance as a distinct segment, and discusses corporate governance and its 
relationship with institutional ownership separately. Considering that potential 
financial benefits may be brought to a company by implementing ESG practices, this 
chapter also analyses the impact of institutional investors on financial performance in 
the different ESG performance contexts. 
 
The following primary research questions are addressed in Chapter 5: (1) Is 
institutional ownership related to improved corporate governance and corporate ESG 
performance? (2) Can institutional investors address RI issues and still promote 
financial performance? The following secondary research questions aimed to provide 
deeper insight: (1) Do different types of institutional investors promote corporate 
governance and ESG performance in a similar way? (2) Are institutional investors a 
homogeneous group in promoting CFP in different ESG performance contexts? 
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1.6.5 Chapter 6: Conclusions and recommendations 
Chapter 6 provides a summary of the four individual articles based on the findings 
generated from the preceding four chapters. The general and specific contributions of 
the preceding four empirical chapters are highlighted. In addition, the limitations to 
this study and suggestions for further research are also addressed. 
 
1.6.6 Prospective benefits 
The contributions of this study are manifold, as discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
Firstly, this study enriches and contributes to the existing literature on institutional 
investors, corporate governance and RI, especially in the context of South Africa and 
China. This study systematically describes institutional investors’ investment 
behaviour, and the association between institutional investors and improved corporate 
governance from financial and non-financial dimensions. The concerns regarding the 
heterogeneity of institutional investors and potential endogeneity problems, which 
have been deficiencies of many prior studies, are considered and addressed. Secondly, 
the findings of this study do not only provide academic benefits, but also novel 
insights for regulators, which could be used to examine current policies on 
institutional investors, corporate governance and RI. This research also provides 
reference points for practitioners’ investment strategy decisions. Finally, the 
implications of this research could be helpful to foreign institutional investors in 
enhancing competitiveness, especially for those who do not have a proper 
understanding of these two countries’ investment environments. Therefore, in 
addition to domestic sustainable social and economic development, the implications 
also shed light on international investment in sustainable development. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INVESTIGATING PRUDENT BEHAVIOUR OF INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS 
2.1 Introduction 
The increasingly important role that institutional investors are playing in equity 
markets can be linked to their increased responsibility towards the individuals who 
contribute their money to these institutions (Heineman & Davis, 2011). This 
responsibility is reflected in the fiduciary duty of institutional investors, namely the 
obligation to manage their funds in the best interests of their clients or beneficiaries 
(Sandberg, 2011, 2013). In such a fiduciary relationship, institutional investors are 
directed to act prudently to ensure their clients’ and beneficiaries’ capital is secure. 
This background gives rise to the present chapter, which explores the prudent 
investment behaviour of institutional investors. 
 
The gradual shift towards the institutionalisation of equity has attracted the attention 
of academics and practitioners alike. The question of whether institutional investors 
should be considered as part of the solution or part of the problems experienced in 
equity markets has been the topic of heated debates (Heineman & Davis, 2011). On 
the one hand, it is argued that substantial stockholdings by institutional investors with 
long-term investment horizons could be effective in monitoring and disciplining 
managers (Bushee, Carter & Gerakos, 2014; Chung, Firth & Kim, 2002), lowering the 
liquidity risk of stocks (Bekaert & Harvey, 2000; Cao & Petrasek, 2014), and 
improving financial market stability and efficiency (Bohl, Gottschalk & Pal, 2006; De 
Haan & Kakes, 2011; Liao, Lu & Wang, 2014; Schuppli & Bohl, 2010). 
 
On the other hand, however, it has been pointed out that the increased involvement of 
institutional investors also appears to introduce risks, especially those institutional 
investors who pursue short-term returns (Kremer & Nautz, 2013a, 2013b; Sias, 2004). 
During the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, the negative impact institutional investor 
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short-termism had on financial markets was highlighted (Claessens & Kodres, 2014; 
Davis, 2010). As a consequence, the active role that financial institutions play in 
capital markets is being questioned by regulators and researchers. In addition, their 
investment behaviour is also receiving considerable attention from this perspective. 
Following the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, regulatory authorities either have 
already been involved in, or are at the moment reconsidering how to reframe financial 
regulation and the supervision of major market participants, such as institutional 
investors, in order to prevent and to protect investors’ interests. As part of this process, 
enhancing prudential standards and improving consumer protection by means of 
financial regulation are given priority (Allen, Goldstein, Jagtiani & Lang, 2016; 
Hanson, Kashyap & Stein, 2011). 
 
Institutional investors and their investment behaviour are constrained and guided by 
rules. To protect their clients’ interests, institutional investors try to make rational 
decisions and exhibit prudent investment behaviour by conforming to the relevant 
regulations. Although the topic pertaining to the prudent investment preferences of 
institutional investors has been examined in the developed market context for some 
time, the findings seem unlikely to directly apply to emerging markets due to 
differences in economic and regulatory environments, maturity of capital markets and 
the development level of institutional investors. In recent years, South Africa and 
China, as major emerging markets, have witnessed the increased involvement of 
institutional investors in their equity markets. Regulators and policy makers in these 
two countries have released a series of laws, regulations, standards and codes that 
urge institutional investors to behave in a prudent manner, but little is known about 
whether institutional investors conform to these regulations and behave prudently. It 
should be noted that the differences observed between developed markets and 
emerging markets to some extent also exist between South Africa and China (which 
were presented in Section 1.2). There is therefore a motive to investigate the prudent 
investment behaviour of institutional investors within these two countries, which is 
done in this chapter. 
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The chapter further explores the heterogeneity in the stockholding preferences of 
different types of institutional investors. Since their investment behaviour will be 
directly reflected in the composition of their investment portfolios in equity markets, 
an investigation of institutional investors’ stockholding preferences forms the core of 
this chapter. Thus, the primary research question of this chapter is: What types of 
firms do institutional investors tend to invest in? Considering that institutional 
investors are characterised by varying identities and interests, the following secondary 
research questions are also considered: (1) Do institutional investors represent a 
homogeneous group in terms of prudent investment? (2) Is prudent stockholding 
behaviour presented heterogeneously by institutional investors with different 
investment strategies? 
 
This study employed a sample consisting of 183 companies listed on the South 
African equity market and 1 104 companies listed on the Chinese equity market. After 
accounting for potential endogeneity problems, this chapter found that institutional 
investors do not always exhibit investment preferences that correspond to what is 
considered prudent; and observed similarities, but also profound differences between 
the investment preferences of institutional investors in South Africa and their 
counterparts in China. In addition, this chapter noted that institutional investors are 
not a homogeneous group in terms of prudent investment preferences. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the relevant 
literature related to the prudent investment preferences of institutional investors. Section 
2.3 presents the source of the data required for this chapter, describes the sample, 
provides descriptive statistics and introduces the methodology employed in the research. 
Section 2.4 focuses on the results of regressions and a discussion of institutional 
preferences towards prudent stockholding. Section 2.5 offers concluding statements. 
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2.2 Literature review 
2.2.1 Preferences for prudent investment 
Institutional investors manage assets on behalf of their clients and beneficiaries in a trust 
relationship, where the institutional investors act as trustees with fiduciary duties towards 
their clients (Johnson, 2014). Taking into the consideration the bounded rationality of 
institutional investors and to prevent them from engaging in speculation, institutional 
investors are constrained by various rules and required to act prudently (Belghitar, Clark 
& Kassimatis, 2011; Del Guercio, 1996). Amongst others, the prudent man rule and 
prudent investor rule have been extensively discussed in prior studies on this topic. 
 
The prudent man rule was established in the seminal case of Harvard College v. 
Amory (1830), and it directs trustees to “observe how men of prudence, discretion 
and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard 
to the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as well 
as the probable safety of the capital to be invested” (Pickering, 1831: 461). Under the 
prudent man rule, the prudence of investment activities is assessed on an individual 
basis (Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, 2007). Hankins, Flannery and Nimalendran (2008) 
indicated that during the 1990s, most US states replaced the prudent man rule with the 
less-restrictive prudent investor rule of fiduciary responsibility. The prudent investor 
rule considers investment activities as a whole, focusing on risk management instead 
of risk avoidance when conducting fiduciary investment, in line with modern portfolio 
theory (MPT) (Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, 2015), and assesses investments’ prudence 
within an MPT framework (Hankins et al., 2008). 
 
Badrinath, Gay and Kale (1989) proposed a safety-net hypothesis of institutional 
investors. In their study, they indicated that institutional investors have a fiduciary 
duty conducted under both common law and the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act, which ensures that institutional managers act cautiously. They also 
suggested a series of firm-specific factors (e.g. firm size, trading liquidity, market risk, 
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past performance, number of years listed) to examine institutional investor 
preferences. Using the data of listed companies from the New York Stock Exchange, 
their study reported that larger companies with superior past financial performance 
attracted more institutional investors. In addition, institutional investors were found to 
hold stocks with high trading liquidity and long listing histories, while investing less 
in stocks with high volatility. 
 
Numerous subsequent studies report results that are consistent with the idea proposed 
by Badrinath et al. (1989). Del Guercio (1996) found that the prudent man rule 
impacted in different ways on managers’ investment decision-making in the US. Bank 
managers tend to hold stocks with long listing histories, proven profitability and high 
trading liquidity, while mutual fund managers do not significantly tilt their 
investments towards prudent stocks. Eakins, Stansell and Wertheim (1998) adopted a 
prudent investment hypothesis to explain US institutional investors’ stock selection 
behaviour. Their results indicate that institutional investors invest to avoid extremes, 
which is achieved by not holding stocks with very high or very low levels of financial 
performance, betas and debt ratios. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) also concluded that 
institutional investors are subject to the prudent man rule. They observe that pay-out 
policy affected institutional holdings in US public companies, and that institutional 
shareholders preferred to invest in dividend-paying firms. Furthermore, among these 
dividend-paying firms, institutional investors tend to hold the stock of lower-
dividend-paying firms. 
 
In Australia, evidence that institutional investors behave prudently has also been 
reported. Pinnuck (2004) found that Australian fund managers are attracted by large, 
liquid and low-volatility stocks. Brands, Gallagher and Looi (2006) investigated the 
investment preferences of Australian equity managers and concluded that active 
Australian equity managers show strong interest in low transaction costs and large 
market capitalisation stocks. Mishra (2013) reached a similar conclusion to Brands et 
al. (2006), reporting that foreigners prefer investing in large Australian firms. Based 
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on a survey conducted in 11 developed countries, Covrig, Lau and Ng (2006) found 
that mutual funds tilt their portfolios towards firms with high share turnover, sound 
accounting performance and return volatility. Furthermore, they reported that foreign 
investors and domestic investors exhibited different investment preferences. 
 
Institutional investors have also been found to increase their holding in stocks that are 
included in the major market index. By including the Standard & Poor’s 500 (S&P 
500) index as a proxy for institutional investor prudence, Del Guercio (1996) 
observed that institutional investors hold large investments in stocks that form part of 
the S&P 500 index. This result is consistent with those reported by Bushee (2001), 
Bushee et al. (2014), Bushee and Noe (2000), as well as Gompers and Metrick (2001). 
 
2.3.2 Evidence of imprudent investment 
Standard finance theories, such as the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), MPT and 
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), could provide an explanation for institutional 
investor behaviour to some extent. When confronted with market anomalies, such as 
the January effect, the value effect, the size effect, the dividend yield effect, and the 
idiosyncratic volatility puzzle, however, the standard finance theories become less 
convincing. The EMH, for instance, fails to offer an explanation for market anomalies, 
since it is based on the assumption that prices always fully reflect all available 
information in a market (Fama, 1970), and that investors are always rational. In 
reaction to these challenges and the questions standard finance theory faced, 
behavioural finance began to develop during the early 1990s (Shiller, 2003). With its 
emphasis on the behaviour and psychology of market participants, behavioural 
finance contends that markets are not always efficient, and assumes that investors are 
not always rational. 
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Because institutional investors do not always act rationally, their investment decisions 
are unlikely to be made within the confines of prudent rules all the time. Moreover, 
the agency problem that exists between institutional investors (trustees) and asset 
owners (principals) can also lead to imprudent behaviour by institutional investors. 
For instance, Falkenstein (1996) and Gompers and Metrick (2001) observed that some 
US institutional investors preferred stocks with high volatility. Furthermore, Bennett, 
Sias and Starks (2003) examined institutional investors’ preferences over the period 
March 1983 to December 1997 and found that institutional investors shifted their 
preferences towards smaller, riskier securities during this period; in other words, 
institutional investors’ preferences for safer stocks declined (see also Blume & Keim, 
2014; Oak & Dalbor, 2010). Chen, Ho, Lai and Morales-Camargo (2012) suggested 
that institutional investors in Exchange Traded Funds showed a strong demand for 
past losers. Not only in the US, but also in other regions, there is evidence that 
institutional investors prefer to invest in small firms (Chen, Lin, Hung & Wang, 2009; 
Hussain, 2000; Khurshed, Lin & Wang, 2011), stocks with higher volatility (Brands et 
al., 2006), illiquid stocks (Gaspar & Massa, 2007; Khurshed et al., 2011; Liu & Yu, 
2010) and past losers (De Haan & Kakes, 2012). 
 
It should be noted that most existing studies with regard to the prudent stockholding 
preferences of institutional investors have been conducted in the context of developed 
capital markets, especially the US. Evidence from emerging markets, however, is 
limited. Examples of studies that have considered institutional shareholding based on 
samples obtained from emerging markets include Ferreira and Matos (2008) for 
emerging markets in general; Ashraf and Muhammad (2013) and Lai, Tan and Chong 
(2013) for Malaysia; and Deb, Banerjee and Banerjee (2013) for India. The weaknesses 
of these studies are obvious, presented as they are without considering either the 
endogeneity problem between institutional ownership and firm-level characteristics (e.g. 
financial performance) (Ashraf & Muhammad, 2013; Deb et al., 2013; Ferreira & 
Matos, 2008) or the heterogeneity of institutional investors (Lai et al., 2013). 
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In the Chinese context, like in other emerging markets, this topic is under-explored. 
The extant studies (e.g. Hu, 2005; Liu, Bredin, Wang & Yi, 2014; Liu & Yu, 2010; Shi 
& Wang, 2014; Teng & Huang, 2012; Zhai, He, Zhou & Cai, 2010) report 
inconclusive results, with most evidence coming from mutual funds and QFIIs before 
the NTS Reform. Little attention was paid to other types of institutional investors. 
Thus, a systematic discussion at both the aggregated and disaggregated level of 
institutional ownership need to be presented. Since the problem of potential 
endogeneity has also been overlooked or inappropriately treated in previous research 
on institutional investors in China (Hu, 2005; Liu et al., 2014; Liu & Yu, 2010; Zhai et 
al., 2010; Zhang, 2013), an improved method is required. 
 
In terms of research on the topic in South Africa, no other studies besides those by 
Zhang and Erasmus (2015a, 2015b) could be found at the time the literature was 
reviewed for the current study. Zhang and Erasmus (2015a, 2015b) explored the 
preferences of institutional investors towards the board of directors of JSE-listed 
companies. By adopting a series of variables such as firm size, return volatility, share 
turnover ratio, beta, debt ratio, and listing history, they found that institutional 
investors are partially prudent. Although they used one-year lagged variables to 
control for the endogeneity problem, this does not seem sufficient. In this regard, the 
results of this chapter expand the existing literature on prudent investment behaviour 
of institutional investors in the context of South Africa and China. 
 
To summarise, prudent institutional investors are generally expected to invest in firms 
characterised by large sizes, long listing histories, high dividend pay-out ratios and 
adequate trading liquidity, as well as firms that are included in a major market index. 
By contrast, prudent investors’ preferences are expected to be negatively related to 
debt ratios, betas and volatility. Different types of institutional investors are 
furthermore expected to exhibit different investment behaviour. 
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2.3 Data and methods 
This section introduces the sample used in this chapter, the variables and their 
definitions, and reports on the descriptive analysis of the variables. It also provides an 
overview of the methodology employed in this chapter. 
 
2.3.1 Data source and sample 
The sample is selected from all companies listed on the main board of the JSE in 
South Africa, as well as those listed on the main board of the SSE and SZSE in China. 
South African data for aggregated institutional ownership and the FTSE/JSE Top 40 
index (henceforth Top 40 index) constituents were collected from the Bloomberg 
(2015) database, while other data used in this chapter were extracted from the INET 
BFA (2015) database. Considering that the King III report, which was released in 
2009, resulted in many changes to corporate governance practices in South Africa, the 
research period for the current chapter was the years 2010 to 2013. Chinese data related 
to institutional ownership were collected from the RESSET (2015) database, and other 
data were obtained from the CSMAR (2015) database. Because the NTS Reform in 
China had basically been completed by 20074, this chapter covered the six-year period 
from 2008 to 2013 for Chinese institutional investors. The sample was screened 
against the following criteria: (1) Companies should have been listed for at least one 
year before the date of their calendar year-end for 2010 in South Africa and 2008 in 
China, to ensure that their ownership structure, capital structure and financial 
performance had not been affected by their initial public offerings (IPOs). (2) 
Companies in the financial sector were excluded, since those companies have limited 
comparability to those in other sectors. (3) Companies with incomplete data for all 
variables were excluded, since a balanced panel data analysis is used in this chapter. 
                                                        
4The NTS Reform, also known as the Split Share Structure Reform, started in 2005, and it provided the solution to 
the circulation problem of NTS. As a result of the NTS Reform, a large number of shares was released and the 
Chinese stock market gained market liquidity, which created increased opportunities for institutional investors to 
participate in the capital market. Simultaneously, it increased the value of investing in the Chinese stock market 
and provided wider development opportunities for institutional investors. Therefore, it would be meaningful to 
discuss the topic in relation to institutional investors’ behaviour and engagement during the full circulation period, 
i.e. post the NTS Reform. 
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Having eliminated certain firms according to the above-mentioned criteria, the final 
sample consisted of 732 observations for 183 firms in South Africa covering the period 
2010 to 2013, and 6 624 observations for 1 104 firms in China over the period 2008 to 2013. 
 
2.3.2 Variables 
2.3.2.1 Measurements of institutional stockholding preferences 
This chapter examined the stockholding preferences of institutional investors. 
Institutional preference is represented by institutional ownership (IO), measured by 
the proportion of a firm’s total shares held by institutional investors. The same 
measurement was employed in studies by Bennett et al. (2003) and Bushee et al. 
(2014), with a high level of IO reflecting greater institutional investor stockholding 
preference towards an investee company. 
 
Considering the heterogeneity of institutional investors, the overall level of IO 
(IO_TOTAL) was further classified to distinguish between pressure-insensitive 
institutional investors (IO_INSEN) and pressure-sensitive institutional investors 
(IO_SEN) based upon differences in the current or potential business connections 
between institutional investors and their portfolio companies5. Due to data limitations, 
comparable information on institutional investors’ classification in South Africa was 
not available, and this classification thus applies to the Chinese sample only. 
According to Liu and Ni (2015), Peng (2015), Yao and Niu (2015) and Yin, Li and 
Gao (2010), pressure-insensitive institutional investors in the Chinese context include 
mutual funds, social security funds and QFIIs; while pressure-sensitive institutional 
investors consist of insurance companies, trusts, and securities companies. 
 
The descriptive statistics of institutional ownership are reported in Table 2.1. As 
indicated in Panel A of Table 2.1, the mean (median) aggregated institutional 
ownership over the period 2010 to 2013 in South Africa was 40 per cent (36.3 per 
                                                        
5 The same classification of institutional investors was employed in previous studies, such as Almazan et al. (2005), 
Brickley et al. (1988), Chung and Wang (2014), Cornett et al. (2007), Elyasiani and Jia (2010), Ferreira and Matos 
(2008), Jara-Bertina, Lo p´ez-Iturriaga and Lo p´ez-de-Foronda (2012), and Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín 
(2011). 
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cent). It should be noted that South African institutional ownership consistently stayed 
around 30 per cent during the period 2010 to 2012, but subsequently increased to 56 
per cent during 20136. For China, Panel A of Table 2.1 reports that the mean (median) 
shareholding by institutional investors was 16.8 per cent (9.8 per cent) over the period 
2008 to 2013. During the period 2008 to 2010, the percentage of shares held by 
institutional investors declined slightly, while it increased from 2010 to 2013. 
Accordingly, South Africa outperformed China in the institutionalisation of their 
equity markets. This phenomenon is inseparable from South Africa’s advanced 
regulatory environment and financial liberalisation compared to China’s, which was 
discussed in Section 1.2.  
 
Table 2.1 
Descriptive statistics of institutional ownership 
 Mean SD Min Max Med  Mean SD Min Max Med 
Panel A Holdings of aggregated institutional ownership 
 IO_TOTAL (South Africa)  IO_TOTAL (China) 
2008 - - - - -  0.197 0.202 0.000 0.918 0.124 
2009 - - - - -  0.154 0.171 0.000 0.918 0.092 
2010 0.341 0.257 0.000 0.956 0.323  0.151 0.170 0.000 0.918 0.089 
2011 0.376 0.256 0.000 0.956 0.358  0.162 0.180 0.000 0.919 0.095 
2012 0.324 0.234 0.000 0.920 0.297  0.172 0.188 0.000 0.906 0.098 
2013 0.560 0.307 0.000 0.956 0.579  0.173 0.189 0.000 0.905 0.097 
Total 0.400 0.280 0.000 0.956 0.363  0.168 0.184 0.000 0.919 0.098 
Panel B Holdings of pressure insensitive and sensitive institutional investors 
 IO_INSEN (China)  IO_SEN (China) 
2008 0.060 0.103 0.000 0.665 0.008  0.007 0.025 0.000 0.449 0.000 
2009 0.069 0.095 0.000 0.544 0.025  0.008 0.021 0.000 0.206 0.000 
2010 0.065 0.090 0.000 0.543 0.027  0.010 0.021 0.000 0.204 0.000 
2011 0.056 0.084 0.000 0.566 0.020  0.012 0.022 0.000 0.196 0.003 
2012 0.047 0.079 0.000 0.553 0.012  0.014 0.022 0.000 0.219 0.006 
2013 0.039 0.071 0.000 0.448 0.008  0.013 0.026 0.000 0.265 0.003 
Total 0.056 0.088 0.000 0.665 0.016  0.011 0.023 0.000 0.449 0.000 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of aggregated and disaggregated institutional 
ownership. Panel A presents descriptive statistics of IO_TOTAL for 183 South African firms 
over the period 2010 to 2013, and 1 104 Chinese firms over the period 2008 to 2013. Panel B 
presents the descriptive statistics of disaggregated institutional ownership (i.e. IO_INSEN and 
IO_SEN) for 1 104 Chinese firms over the period 2008 to 2013. Variable definitions are 
reported in Appendix 1. 
                                                        
6 This phenomenon is mainly attributed to the significant increase of AuM by institutional investors such as 
retirement funds and CIS during 2013; this year moreover saw a dramatic growth in the net flow of assets for CIS 
in securities, as reported in the FSB Annual Report (2013, 2014). More importantly, the Institute of International 
Finance (2014) reported in a research note that there was a shift in investor preferences from bonds to equities in 
South Africa during 2013. 
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Pressure-insensitive and pressure-sensitive institutional ownership in China displayed 
different trends during the period 2008 to 2013, as reported in Panel B of Table 2.1. In 
general, the average percentage of shares held by pressure-insensitive institutional 
investors decreased over this period, reflected by the means IO_INSEN of 6.0 per 
cent and 6.9 per cent in 2008 and 2009 respectively, compared to a mean of 3.9 per 
cent in 2013. By contrast, pressure-sensitive institutional ownership increased over the 
period, moving from a mean of 0.7 per cent in 2008 to levels of 1.4 per cent and 1.3 per 
cent in 2012 and 2013 respectively. 
 
2.3.2.2 Prudence measurements 
Based on the literature review of institutional investors’ stockholding preferences 
provided in Section 2.2, a set of prudent stockholding variables was identified. 
Variables included as proxies for prudent investment are return on equity (ROE), 
stock return volatility (VOL), beta (BETA), financial leverage (LEV), share turnover 
ratio (TURN), size (SIZE), listing history (AGE) and dividend pay-out ratio (DP). 
 
In addition to the firm-specific characteristics discussed above, this chapter also 
appraises investor prudence by incorporating an indicator variable that reflects 
whether or not a firm is a constituent of a major market index (INDEX), namely the 
Top 40 index (TOP40) in South Africa and the CSI 300 index (CSI300) in China7. 
The descriptive statistics for major variables used in the analysis are shown in Table 2.2. 
 
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 2.2 show that the mean ROE for the selected 
South African companies is 0.026, lower than the mean value of 0.071 reported by their 
Chinese counterparts. While the South African ROE values demonstrate high dispersion, 
with a standard deviation value of 2.119, the comparable figure for China is only 0.187. 
The selected companies in both South Africa and China are highly dependent on debt, 
                                                        
7 The Top 40 index and the CSI 300 index are employed as proxies of large-cap stock and used for indexing 
investing in South African and Chinese markets respectively, consistent with Zhang and Erasmus (2015c). The Top 
40 index represents the 40 largest JSE companies ranked by full market capitalisation (JSE, n.d.), while the CSI 
300 index is comprised of the 300 A-share listed companies on the SSE and SZSE with the largest market 
capitalisation and liquidity (China Securities Index Company Limited, 2015). 
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with mean values for LEV of 0.588 and 0.522 respectively. The descriptive statistics also 
reveal that compared to the South African companies, the Chinese companies are larger in 
size (with a mean SIZE of 22.107 compared to a value of 14.595), but younger in terms 
of listing history (with a mean AGE of 2.450 compared to a value of 2.755), indicating 
that Chinese market started late than South African counterpart, but it is featured with 
rapid development which is consistent with the statement made in Section 1.2. 
 
Table 2.2 
Descriptive statistics of major variables 
Variable Mean SD Min Max Med 
Panel A Descriptive statistics for South Africa 
ROE 0.026 2.119 -17.561 3.610 0.179 
LEV 0.588 0.453 0.002 6.754 0.536 
SIZE 14.595 2.035 7.533 20.420 14.581 
AGE 2.755 0.969 0.000 4.771 2.773 
TURN 0.029 0.027 0.000 0.157 0.021 
BETA 0.550 0.507 -0.563 2.324 0.472 
VOL 0.434 0.338 0.160 2.218 0.320 
DP 0.455 0.432 0.000 4.478 0.356 
TOP40 0.156 0.363 0.000 1.000 0.000 
Panel B Descriptive statistics for China 
ROE 0.071 0.187 -4.891 4.485 0.072 
LEV 0.522 0.192 0.002 1.094 0.536 
SIZE 22.107 1.342 17.467 28.482 21.976 
AGE 2.450 0.394 0.000 3.135 2.485 
TURN 0.392 0.288 0.002 2.586 0.322 
BETA 0.999 0.194 -3.415 1.7648 1.022 
VOL 0.471 0.263 0.125 18.428 0.440 
DP 0.274 0.561 0.000 3.947 0.295 
CSI300 0.193 0.395 0.000 1.000 0.000 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the regressions for 183 
South African firms over the period 2010 to 2013 (732 observations) in Panel A, and 1 104 
Chinese firms over period 2008 to 2013 (6 624 observations) in Panel B. Variable definitions 
are reported in Appendix 1. 
 
The average values of TURN and BETA are higher for the Chinese companies than 
for the South African ones, while the mean values reported for VOL are relatively 
close for the two countries (0.434 for South Africa and 0.471 for China). The South 
African companies exhibit substantially higher average DP values, reflecting average 
dividend pay-outs of 45.5 per cent compared to only 27.4 per cent for the Chinese 
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companies. Such evidence to some extent illustrates equity market and investors in 
South Africa are more mature than their peers in China. The mean value of TOP40 
(CSI300) for the selected South African (Chinese) companies is 0.156 (0.193), 
suggesting that on average, 15.6 per cent (19.3 per cent) of the selected South African 
(Chinese) companies are constituents of the Top 40 index (CSI 300 index). 
 
2.3.3 Methodology 
Regressions were executed to test prudent stockholding behaviour among institutional 
investors, as shown in Equation 2.1. 
 
(2.1) 
 
Furthermore, in order to explore the stockholding preferences towards constituents of 
the market index, this chapter also included the INDEX variable (TOP40 for South 
Africa and CSI300 for China) in regressions, as reflected by Equation 2.2. At the 
same time, institutional investors’ stockholding behaviour in relation to financial 
performance within index and non-index listed companies is examined as well, by 
including ROE*INDEX. 
 
(2.2) 
 
Before conducting the regressions, a correlation analysis of the firm characteristic 
variables was first performed (see Table 2.3). The results in Table 2.3 suggest that the 
variables included in the analysis were not highly correlated within either the South 
African or the Chinese sample. A possible exception was the correlation between SIZE 
and INDEX, where the correlation coefficients exceeded 0.5 in both Panel A and Panel 
B (Table 2.3). However, this was not considered problematic, as the regressions would 
be processed for SIZE by both including and excluding INDEX. 
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Table 2.3 
Correlation matrix 
 
ROE 
1 
LEV 
2 
SIZE 
3 
AGE 
4 
TURN 
5 
BETA 
6 
VOL 
7 
DP 
8 
INDEX 
9 
Panel A Correlation matrix for South Africa 
1 1         
2 -0.086** 1 
       
3 0.057 -0.164*** 1 
      
4 0.014 -0.089** 0.293*** 1 
     
5 0.029 -0.005 0.339*** 0.199*** 1 
    
6 -0.064* 0.158*** 0.190*** 0.123*** 0.230*** 1 
   
7 0.002 -0.090** 0.008 -0.103*** -0.080** 0.022 1 
  
8 0.009 -0.040 0.038 -0.020 0.031 -0.029 -0.173*** 1 
 
9 0.040 -0.031 0.543*** 0.070* 0.437*** 0.238*** -0.037 0.023 1 
Panel B Correlation matrix for China 
1 1         
2 -0.127*** 1 
       
3 0.162*** 0.359*** 1 
      
4 -0.018 0.036*** -0.084*** 1 
     
5 -0.062*** -0.043*** -0.369*** -0.115*** 1 
    
6 -0.076*** -0.009 -0.167*** -0.003 0.373*** 1 
   
7 -0.002 -0.011 -0.165*** -0.147*** 0.254*** -0.014 1 
  
8 -0.138*** 0.006 0.009 -0.096*** -0.005 0.038** 0.063*** 1 
 
9 0.142*** 0.036*** 0.589*** -0.131*** -0.223*** -0.134*** -0.038*** 0.021 1 
This table reports correlation matrix of the firm characteristics variables. Panel A presents 
the Pearson correlation matrix for 183 South African firms over the period 2010 to 2013, 
while Panel B reports the correlations for 1 104 Chinese firms over the period 2008 to 2013. 
***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Variable definitions are 
reported in Appendix 1. 
 
This chapter estimates the regression models with the panel data, and considers both 
pooled OLS and FE estimations. Considering the potential endogeneity problems 
caused by reverse causality, especially the fact that past values of the dependent 
variable (institutional ownership in this study) are likely to influence current prudence 
variables, Sys-GMM estimations are employed to address this endogeneity problem, 
in line with previous studies on dynamic panel data methods (Blundell & Bond, 1998). 
Unlike cross-sectional estimations, FE can deal with the endogeneity problem. It is, 
however, effective only for the endogeneity problem caused by unobservable 
heterogeneity. As for endogeneity problems resulting from an intertemporal effect, as 
demonstrated in this chapter, FE might not be appropriate. 
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Sys-GMM is likely to improve pooled OLS and FE estimation methods within the set 
of panel data considered in this study. By using Sys-GMM, the endogeneity problems 
caused by unobservable heterogeneity as well as reverse causality can be mitigated to 
some extent. Furthermore, this method is applicable to a situation where it is difficult 
to find instruments for the endogenous variables. 
 
The following equations were constructed to execute Sys-GMM estimation. Apart 
from AGE, the other explanatory variables are treated as endogenous, and their lags 
of two and more periods as instruments were obtained. 
 
 
(2.3) 
 
        (2.4) 
 
 
where IOk,it refers to variable k (k = TOTAL, INSEN and SEN) of institutional 
ownership for company i at time t. ROEit, SIZEit, AGEit, LEVit, TURNit, BETAit, 
VOLit and DPit are prudence variables, representing financial performance, size, 
listing history, financial leverage, share turnover, beta, return volatility and dividend 
pay-out level for company i at time t respectively. INDEXit is a dummy variable, 
representing the TOP40it for South Africa and the CSI300it for China. ROEit*INDEXit 
is the interaction item between ROEit and INDEXit. 0 is the intercept; k is the 
regression coefficient for IOk,it-1; j (j = number of prudence variables) is the 
regression coefficient for each prudence variable; and it is the error term. 
 
2.4 Results 
This section reports and discusses the regression results obtained from the 
examination of the prudent stockholding behaviour of institutional investors at the 
aggregated and disaggregated level. Aside from looking at heterogeneous preferences 
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among different types of institutional investors, this section also addresses the 
heterogeneous preferences towards financial performance observed between 
institutional investors who adopt an indexing strategy and those who do not. 
 
2.4.1 Aggregate institutional preferences for prudent investment 
Table 2.4 shows the regression results on the stockholding preferences of institutional 
investors overall. The results, estimated by the pooled OLS (Columns 1 and 4), FE 
(Columns 2 and 5) and Sys-GMM (Columns 3 and 6) approaches, report that 
IO_TOTAL is significantly and positively related to ROE, which indicates that 
institutional investors in both South Africa and China concentrate their portfolios in 
firms with sound financial performance. In addition, IO_TOTAL is positively 
associated with AGE, TURN and DP at a high significance level (see Columns 1 to 3); 
that is, institutional investors as a whole are attracted by high dividend-paying firms 
with long listing histories and high trading liquidity in South Africa. In China, 
institutional investors show preferences toward firms with low financial leverage 
(LEV) and low betas (BETA) (see Columns 4 to 6). These findings are consistent 
with most prior studies, and institutional investors appear to be prudent from this 
point of view. 
 
Nonetheless, institutional investors are interested in companies with high return 
volatility in both South Africa and China, with evidence that IO_TOTAL is positively 
and significantly related to VOL. This behaviour is not in line with what can be 
considered prudent. It is, however, consistent with Bennett et al. (2003), Falkenstein 
(1996) and Gompers and Metrick (2001), who found that US institutional investors 
prefer stocks with high volatility, and Ferreira and Matos (2008), who observed that 
institutional investors tend to hold high idiosyncratic volatility stocks based on 27 
countries’ evidence. Moreover, Brands et al. (2006) observed that there are stronger 
preferences by Australian institutional investors for higher volatility stocks; one 
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possible explanation being that a divergence in opinions among the market 
participants exists about the intrinsic price of a security. 
 
Furthermore, Columns 4 to 6 of Table 2.4 report that IO_TOTAL is significantly and 
negatively related to TURN in the context of China, suggesting that in China, stocks 
with low trading liquidity seem more attractive to institutional investors, which is in 
contrast with most previous studies that support preferences by institutional investors 
for higher trading liquidity. However, this finding provides support to Khurshed et al. 
(2011) who showed that UK institutional investors prefer firms with low trading 
liquidity, and is similar to the Chinese evidence from Liu and Yu (2010) who 
suggested that institutional investors prefer illiquid stocks since the Chinese equity 
market is characterised by high levels of share turnover, the choice of less liquid 
stocks by institutional investors can be interpreted as a means against speculation. 
Hence, it seems inappropriate to unequivocally conclude that Chinese institutional 
investors exhibit imprudent investment behaviour in this case; in contrast, they appear 
to be cautious. 
 
Aside from ROE, AGE, TURN, VOL and DP (ROE, LEV, BETA, TURN and VOL), 
the remaining firm characteristics do not play a significant role in determining 
stockholding preferences of institutional investors as a whole in South Africa (China). 
Note that although some remaining firm characteristics are significantly related to 
IO_TOTAL within pooled OLS estimation, their relationships become insignificant 
when estimated by the FE and Sys-GMM approaches. These findings illustrate the 
importance to address the potential endogeneity problem. 
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Table 2.4  
Regressions of aggregate institutional preferences for stocks 
 IO_TOTAL (South Africa)  IO_TOTAL (China) 
 
Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
Sys-GMM 
3 
 
Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
Sys-GMM 
6 
ROE 0.003*** 0.014*** 0.182*  0.258*** 0.082** 0.729* 
 (2.73) (4.92) (1.90)  (5.58) (2.39) (1.76) 
LEV -0.028 -0.369 -0.496  -0.045** -0.095** -0.151* 
 (-0.35) (-1.50) (-0.70)  (-2.55) (-2.17) (-1.75) 
SIZE 0.042*** 0.016 0.162  0.072*** 0.018 0.102 
 (4.22) (0.16) (0.16)  (3.11) (1.45) (0.47) 
AGE 0.035** 0.275** 0.162**  0.024** 0.023 0.042 
 (2.26) (2.61) (2.45)  (2.53) (0.95) (0.52) 
TURN 0.248*** 0.307*** 0.821***  -0.143*** -0.075*** -0.033* 
 (4.75) (4.07) (3.28)  (-8.52) (-6.02) (-1.96) 
BETA -0.021 -0.076 -0.536  -0.173*** -0.107*** -0.038* 
 (-0.64) (-0.49) (-1.39)  (-7.97) (-6.02) (-1.94) 
VOL 0.339*** 0.486*** 0.658***  0.368*** 0.229*** 0.147*** 
 (2.78) (3.14) (3.70)  (5.78) (7.65) (3.99) 
DP 0.010* 0.008*** 0.082***  -0.002 -0.002 -0.021 
 (1.82) (2.75) (2.76)  (-1.60) (-1.45) (-0.39) 
IO_TOTALt-1   0.593**    0.781*** 
   (2.21)    (10.03) 
Intercept -0.383*** -4.929*** -2.392**  0.179*** -0.209 -0.027 
 (-2.89) (-4.82) (-2.33)  (5.33) (-0.82) (-0.38) 
AR(1) p-value   0.207    0.001 
AR(2) p-value       0.402 
Sargan p-value   0.233    0.282 
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Table 2.4 (continued) 
 IO_TOTAL (South Africa)  IO_TOTAL (China) 
 
Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
Sys-GMM 
3 
 
Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
Sys-GMM 
6 
Hansen p-value   0.633    0.696 
R2 (%) 27.75 65.70   8.77 79.23  
N 732 732 549  6 624 6 624 5 520 
This table presents pooled OLS, FE and Sys-GMM estimations of aggregate institutional preferences for stocks over the period 2010 to 2013 for South Africa, 
and 2008 to 2013 for China. The dependent variable is IO_TOTAL. The results in the context of South Africa and China are reported in Columns 1 to 3, and 4 
to 6 respectively. All variables included in the regressions are winsorised at the 1% and 99% level. The F-test and Hausman test reject null hypotheses, and 
hence FE is more suitable compared to the pooled OLS and RE. For the Sys-GMM, AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Since only four years of data is available for South Africa, only 
AR(1) is reported and AR(2) is not available. The Sargan and Hansen tests of over-identification are carried out under the null hypothesis that all instruments 
are valid. The Sargan test is not robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation; the Hansen test is also reported, which is robust (but weakened by many 
instruments). The regression results indicated in Columns 3 and 6 show that the Hansen test does not reject the null hypothesis, suggesting that instrument 
variables are valid for the Sys-GMM estimation. Year and industry effects are controlled in all regressions. T-statistics are reported in parentheses; ***, **, * 
represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix 1. 
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2.4.2 Prudent preferences of institutional investors: A disaggregated view 
Given that data concerning disaggregated institutional ownership were not available 
for South Africa, the comparison of investment preferences between pressure-
insensitive and pressure-sensitive institutional investors is addressed only in Chinese 
context, which is reported in Table 2.5. IO_INSEN as well as IO_SEN have a 
statistically significant negative association with TURN within pooled OLS, FE and 
Sys-GMM estimations, and an insignificant relationship with DP and AGE, which 
indicate that both pressure-insensitive and pressure-sensitive institutional investors 
tend to hold stocks with low trading liquidity, but care little about dividend pay-out 
and listing history. These observations are the same as those found among 
institutional investors as a whole in the previous section. 
 
Nonetheless, there are heterogeneous preferences between pressure-insensitive and 
pressure-sensitive institutional investors. In terms of financial performance, 
IO_INSEN (IO_SEN) is significantly positively (negatively) related to ROE. 
Pressure-sensitive institutional investors in this case are attracted by poorly 
performing firms. This apparently imprudent behaviour could to some extent be the 
result of the potential or current business relationship between pressure-sensitive 
institutional investors and their portfolio companies. 
 
At the same time, IO_INSEN is significantly and negatively related to SIZE, 
suggesting that pressure-insensitive institutional investors prefer investment in smaller 
firms to investment in large firms. Although this result contradicts the findings from 
the majority of prior studies (e.g. Badrinath et al., 1989; Brands et al., 2006; Mishra, 
2013; Pinnuck, 2004), it is consistent with results reported by Khurshed et al. (2011), 
where the portion of a firm’s shares held by institutional investors is negatively 
associated with firm size. Similarly, Bennett et al. (2003) found that institutional 
investors shift their preferences towards smaller capitalisation stocks. That 
institutional investors prefer the stocks of smaller firms is in accordance with the 
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earlier finding of this chapter about their preferences for stocks with lower levels of 
share turnover. In addition, it seems that smaller stocks provide opportunities to 
exploit informational advantages (Khurshed et al., 2011); as informed investors, 
pressure-insensitive institutional investors can take greater advantage of information 
in smaller stocks than would be the case for large stocks. Furthermore, institutional 
investors may also show greater interest in smaller stocks as they are less expensive 
than larger ones, given that larger capitalisation stocks are regularly over-priced 
(Khurshed et al., 2011). By contrast, large firm seems more attractive to pressure-
sensitive institutional investors. 
 
The heterogeneity between pressure-insensitive and pressure-sensitive institutional 
investors is also presented in their investment preferences towards BETA, LEV and 
VOL. That is, pressure-insensitive institutional investors tilt toward investing in 
stocks with low betas but high return volatility and high financial leverage. By 
contrast, pressure-sensitive institutional investors tend to hold firms with low 
financial leverage and low return volatility, but have weak associations with betas. 
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Table 2.5  
Regressions of institutional preferences for stocks at the disaggregated level  
 IO_INSEN  IO_SEN 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
Sys-GMM 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
Sys-GMM 
6 
ROE 0.430*** 0.259*** 0.380***  -0.023*** -0.017*** -0.032** 
 (16.97) (9.51) (3.37)  (-4.14) (-2.88) (-1.96) 
LEV 0.031*** 0.034* 0.028**  -0.024*** -0.020*** -0.026** 
 (3.14) (1.72) (2.57)  (-3.17) (-3.31) (-2.29) 
SIZE -0.048** -0.029*** -0.009***  0.011*** 0.004** 0.007*** 
 (-2.27) (-4.45) (-4.64)  (3.62) (2.19) (2.61) 
AGE -0.011 -0.013 -0.001  0.001 0.009 0.002 
 (-1.30) (-1.35) (-0.11)  (1.07) (1.12) (0.36) 
TURN -0.058*** -0.024*** -0.050***  -0.004** -0.005** -0.004** 
 (-7.91) (-3.58) (-5.01)  (-2.27) (-2.02) (-2.13) 
BETA -0.133*** -0.094*** -0.104**  -0.001 -0.002 -0.015 
 (-11.46) (-6.00) (-2.29)  (-0.35) (-0.92) (-1.40) 
VOL 0.345*** 0.066*** 0.256***  -0.019** -0.013* -0.016* 
 (11.54) (4.57) (3.56)  (-2.39) (-1.80) (-1.66) 
DP -0.001 -0.001 -0.003  -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
 (-0.41) (-0.69) (-1.21)  (-1.06) (-0.85) (-0.33) 
IO_INSENt-1   0.529***     
   (5.96)     
IO_SENt-1       0.619*** 
       (5.01) 
Intercept 0.043*** 0.801*** 0.188***  0.021*** -0.070 -0.130** 
 (4.13) (5.77) (3.65)  (5.63) (-1.62) (-2.56) 
AR(1) p-value   0.000    0.000 
AR(2) p-value   0.107    0.152 
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Table 2.5 (continued) 
 IO_INSEN  IO_SEN 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
Sys-GMM 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
Sys-GMM 
6 
Sargan p-value   0.230    0.778 
Hansen p-value   0.295    0.827 
R2 (%) 26.52 77.50   2.26 67.99  
N 6 624 6 624 5 520  6 624 6 624 5 520 
This table presents pooled OLS, FE and Sys-GMM estimations of institutional preferences for stocks at the disaggregated level over the period 2008 to 2013 
in China. The dependent variables are IO_INSEN and IO_SEN. The results for IO_INSEN and for IO_SEN are reported in Columns 1 to 3 and 4 to 6 
respectively. All variables included in the regressions are winsorised at the 1% and 99% level. The F-test and Hausman test reject the null hypothesis, and 
hence FE is more suitable compared to pooled OLS and RE. For the Sys-GMM, AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation 
in the first-differenced residuals, under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. The Sargan and Hansen tests of over-identification are carried out under 
the null hypothesis that all instruments are valid. The Sargan test is not robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation; the Hansen test is also reported, 
which is robust (but weakened by many instruments). The regression results indicated in Columns 3 and 6 show that the Hansen test does not reject the null 
hypothesis, suggesting that instrument variables are valid for the Sys-GMM estimation. Year and industry effects are controlled in all regressions. T-statistics 
are reported in parentheses; ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix 1. 
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2.4.3 Attitudes towards indexing strategy 
This chapter evaluates prudent investment by including an indicator variable to reflect 
whether or not a firm is a constituent of the Top 40 index in South Africa or the CSI 
300 index in China. The results indicated in Columns 1 to 3 of Table 2.6 show that 
IO_TOTAL is not significantly related to INDEX, that is, whether companies are 
listed in the Top 40 index or not seems unlikely to influence stockholding decisions 
made by institutional investors in South Africa. Considering the relatively small 
number of stocks listed on the JSE and included in the Top 40 index, exclusively 
focusing on firms included in the Top 40 index may not offer optimal investment 
portfolio diversification. Institutional investors could, however, still be considered 
prudent in this sense based on the insignificant correlation observed between ROE 
and INDEX indicated in Panel A of Table 2.3. 
 
Columns 1 and 3 of Table 2.6 also report that ROE*INDEX is significantly and 
negatively related to IO_TOTAL, indicating that compared to their non-Top 40 index 
counterparts, less attention is paid by institutional investors to the past financial 
performance of companies listed in the Top 40 index. As suggested by Filatotchev 
and Dotsenko (2015), the reliance on an indexing investment strategy illustrates that 
institutional investors believe their portfolio under this strategy is able to generate 
financial returns comparable to market returns. In this regard, the findings of this 
research to some extent demonstrate that institutional investors in South Africa 
believe that Top 40 index listed stocks are high quality stocks and are able to achieve 
sound financial returns. It should be also noted that perhaps this phenomenon occurs 
because the mandates of some institutional investors force them to invest only in Top 
40 index listed companies, regardless of the past financial performance of these 
companies. 
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Table 2.6 
Regressions of aggregate institutional preferences for stocks (including INDEX) 
 IO_TOTAL (South Africa)  IO_TOTAL (China) 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
Sys-GMM 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
Sys-GMM 
6 
ROE 0.004*** 0.013*** 0.039***  0.316*** 0.101* 1.103*** 
 (2.80) (3.83) (2.82)  (6.12) (1.86) (3.20) 
LEV -0.019 -0.339 -1.677  -0.041* -0.082** -0.033* 
 (-0.25) (-1.62) (-1.51)  (-1.88) (-2.06) (-1.73) 
SIZE 0.048*** 0.022 0.735  0.004 0.009 0.018 
 (4.51) (0.21) (1.11)  (0.72) (0.72) (1.60) 
AGE 0.030* 0.386*** 0.095**  0.021** 0.005 0.025 
 (1.92) (3.77) (2.07)  (2.24) (0.19) (0.21) 
TURN 0.255*** 0.273*** 1.021***  -0.143*** -0.081*** -0.039*** 
 (4.99) (3.74) (3.32)  (-8.15) (-4.30) (-2.77) 
BETA -0.021 -0.097 -0.084  -0.177*** -0.106*** -0.037* 
 (-0.66) (-1.33) (-0.32)  (-8.16) (-5.57) (-1.84) 
VOL 0.350*** 0.500*** 0.344***  0.403*** 0.222*** 0.087** 
 (2.92) (3.27) (3.82)  (6.30) (4.41) (2.01) 
DP 0.009* 0.009*** 0.045***  -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 
 (1.88) (3.06) (3.54)  (-0.24) (-0.84) (-0.04) 
INDEX -0.106 -0.123 -0.828  -0.007* -0.025** -0.076*** 
 (-1.36) (-1.12) (-1.60)  (-1.83) (-2.49) (-2.63) 
ROE*INDEX -0.090** -0.005 -3.210***  -0.054 -0.148*** -0.856** 
 (-2.19) (-0.06) (-2.90)  (-0.78) (-2.86) (-2.30) 
IO_TOTALt-1   0.961***    0.731*** 
   (3.48)    (8.06) 
Intercept -0.440*** -4.722*** -1.521***  0.099 0.057 -0.440 
 (-3.21) (-4.59) (-3.12)  (0.86) (0.24) (-1.39) 
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Table 2.6 (continued) 
 IO_TOTAL (South Africa)  IO_TOTAL (China) 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
Sys-GMM 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
Sys-GMM 
6 
AR(1) p-value   0.150    0.000 
AR(2) p-value       0.449 
Sargan p-value   0.009    0.272 
Hansen p-value   0.214    0.558 
R2 (%) 29.08 66.55   7.90 86.93  
N 732 732 549  6 624 6 624 5 520 
This table presents pooled OLS, FE and Sys-GMM estimations of aggregate institutional preferences towards market index stocks (Top40 for South Africa 
and CSI300 for China) and heterogeneous institutional preferences towards the financial performance of index and non-index stocks over the period 2010 to 
2013 for South Africa, and 2008 to 2013 for China. The dependent variable is IO_TOTAL. The results for South Africa and China are reported in Columns 1 
to 3 and 4 to 6 respectively. All variables included in the regressions are winsorised at the 1% and 99% level. The F-test and Hausman test reject the null 
hypothesis, and hence FE is more suitable compared to pooled OLS and RE. For the Sys-GMM, AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order 
serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. South Africa owns only four-year data, thus only AR(1) is 
reported, and AR(2) is not available. The Sargan and Hansen tests of over-identification are carried out under the null hypothesis that all instruments are valid. 
The Sargan test is not robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation; the Hansen test is also reported, which is robust (but weakened by many instruments). 
The regression results indicated in Columns 3 and 6 show that the Hansen test does not reject the null hypothesis, suggesting that instrument variables are 
valid for the Sys-GMM estimation. Year and industry effects are controlled in all regressions. T-statistics are reported in parentheses; ***, **, * represent 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix 1. 
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In the Chinese context, IO_TOTAL is negatively and significantly related to INDEX, 
as shown in Columns 4 to 6 of Table 2.6, suggesting that institutional investors as a 
whole tilt towards companies that are not listed in the CSI 300 index. Furthermore, 
ROE*INDEX is negatively and significantly related to IO_TOTAL, suggesting that 
institutional investors pay less attention to financial performance when they select 
firms listed on the CSI 300 index compared to their non-CSI 300 index counterparts, 
and illustrating that they still believe that CSI 300 stocks represent high-quality stocks, 
consistent with the evidence from South Africa. 
 
Table 2.7 shows stockholding preferences that pressure-insensitive and pressure-
sensitive institutional investors exhibit towards CSI 300 index constituent firms and 
their attitudes towards financial performance when they select these stocks. As shown 
in Columns 1 to 3, IO_INSEN is significantly and positively related to CSI300, 
indicating that pressure-insensitive institutional investors adopt a passive indexing 
strategy, and tend to invest companies which are constituents of the CSI 300 index 
over companies that are not. It is therefore not entirely surprising to see that they pay 
less attention to financial performance when they select CSI 300 index companies, 
with the evidence that ROE*CSI300 is negatively and significantly associated with 
IO_INSEN. For pressure-sensitive institutional investors, their preference towards 
CSI 300 index constituent stocks is insignificant, indicating that there is no significant 
difference in their attitudes towards financial performance whether or not they select 
CSI 300 index constituent companies. 
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Table 2.7 
Regressions of institutional preferences for stocks at a disaggregated level (including INDEX) 
 IO_INSEN  IO_SEN 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
Sys-GMM 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
Sys-GMM 
6 
ROE 0.403*** 0.224*** 0.420***  -0.028*** -0.018** -0.043* 
 (15.74) (6.86) (3.55)  (-4.36) (-2.31) (-1.77) 
LEV 0.022** 0.070*** 0.056***  -0.025*** -0.019*** -0.005* 
 (2.18) (3.31) (2.96)  (-3.21) (-3.29) (-1.73) 
SIZE -0.011*** -0.035*** -0.021***  0.012*** 0.004** 0.001* 
 (-5.77) (-4.76) (-3.62)  (3.67) (2.18) (1.75) 
AGE -0.010 -0.020 -0.002  0.001 0.009 0.006 
 (-1.40) (-1.64) (-0.07)  (1.17) (1.12) (1.10) 
TURN -0.060*** -0.076*** -0.043***  -0.004** -0.005** -0.004*** 
 (-7.70) (-8.43) (-3.66)  (-2.04) (-2.04) (-2.78) 
BETA -0.132*** -0.090*** -0.073***  -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-10.98) (-7.70) (-4.45)  (-0.27) (-0.92) (-0.63) 
VOL 0.312*** 0.296*** 0.194***  -0.019** -0.013* -0.009*** 
 (10.65) (9.78) (4.45)  (-2.42) (-1.77) (-2.61) 
DP -0.000 -0.000 -0.014  -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (-0.76) (-0.10) (-1.60)  (-1.05) (-0.81) (-0.88) 
CSI300 0.035*** 0.010** 0.089**  -0.001 -0.000 -0.004 
 (7.58) (2.03) (2.30)  (-0.64) (-0.22) (-1.14) 
ROE*CSI300 -0.103* -0.071* -0.268*  0.018 0.001 0.056 
 (-1.94) (-1.82) (-1.72)  (1.29) (0.09) (1.12) 
IO_INSENt-1   0.432***     
   (3.53)     
IO_SENt-1       0.438*** 
       (4.75) 
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Table 2.7 (continued) 
 IO_INSEN  IO_SEN 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
Sys-GMM 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
Sys-GMM 
6 
Intercept  0.299*** 0.839*** 0.439***  0.021*** -0.069 -0.002 
 (6.24) (5.59) (3.61)  (5.38) (-1.61) (-0.23) 
AR(1) p-value   0.000    0.000 
AR(2) p-value   0.214    0.183 
Sargan p-value   0.217    0.376 
Hansen p-value   0.472    0.499 
R2 (%) 27.22 81.66   2.33 67.99  
N 6 624 6 624 5 520  6 624 6 624 5 520 
This table presents pooled OLS, FE and Sys-GMM estimations preferences of pressure-insensitive and pressure-sensitive institutional investors towards 
market index stocks (i.e. CSI300) and their heterogeneous preferences towards the financial performance of CSI 300 index and non-index stocks over the 
period 2008 to 2013 for China. The results for IO_INSEN and for IO_SEN are reported in Columns 1 to 3 and 4 to 6 respectively. All variables included in 
the regressions are winsorised at the 1% and 99% level. The F-test and Hausman test reject the null hypothesis, and hence FE is more suitable compared to 
pooled OLS and RE. For the Sys-GMM, AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under 
the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. The Sargan and Hansen tests of over-identification are carried out under the null hypothesis that all instruments are 
valid. The Sargan test is not robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation; the Hansen test is also reported, which is robust (but weakened by many 
instruments). The regression results indicated in Columns 3 and 6 show that the Hansen test does not reject the null hypothesis, suggesting that instrument 
variables are valid for the Sys-GMM estimation. Year and industry effects are controlled in all regressions. T-statistics are reported in parentheses; ***, **, * 
represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix 1. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
69 
 
Although adopting a passive indexing strategy restricts pressure-insensitive 
institutional investors’ trading flexibility to a certain extent, it encourages institutional 
investors to get involved in shareholder activism since this strategy prevents them 
from selling underperforming companies in their portfolios (Wang & Li, 2007). 
Moreover, mutual funds represent the biggest portion of pressure-insensitive 
institutional investors in the Chinese equity market. Mutual fund managers may 
sometimes select stocks in the market indices partly to avoid a reduction in their 
compensation, and to maintain their reputation in response to poor performance. At 
the same time, the possibility that this prudent behaviour is used to please regulators 
and supervisors cannot be excluded. 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
Given the prominent role that institutional investors play in financial markets, their 
behaviour is highly relevant to a variety of stakeholders. Prudent behaviour thus 
becomes critical for them to address their fiduciary responsibilities. Discussions 
regarding the prudent behaviour of institutional investors are continuing to attract 
attention from regulators, policy makers, academics and practitioners. This chapter 
investigated whether the stockholding behaviour of institutional investors conform to 
prudent investment practices. 
 
The results reported in this chapter confirmed some conclusions from prior studies 
conducted within developed markets, as well as extending our understanding of institutional 
investor preferences towards prudent investment by introducing new empirical evidence 
from South Africa and China. The results showed that institutional investors overall 
exhibit strong preferences towards sound financial performance. In addition, they tend 
to invest in firms with high return volatilities and do not show preferences towards 
large firms with low betas, suggesting that there are common preferences shared by 
institutional investors as a whole in both the South African and Chinese stock markets; 
these results however contradict much of the earlier literature for other markets. It 
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should be noted that besides similarities, some differences between institutional investors 
within these two countries were also observed. The impact that country-specific 
factors could have on institutional investor preferences may explain the divergent 
results that were reported when considering debt ratios, listing histories, share 
turnovers, betas, dividend pay-out levels and indexing strategies within South Africa 
and China. 
 
Different kinds of institutional investors are characterised by heterogeneous 
investment preferences. It would be unwise to ignore these differences and generalise 
the preferences of institutional investors across different classifications. This chapter 
therefore makes a distinction between pressure-insensitive and pressure-sensitive 
institutional investors in the context of China. The results show that the two groups 
have different investment preferences in terms of their investee firms’ financial 
performance, debt ratio, firm size, beta, return volatility, and indexing strategy, 
confirming that institutional investors are not homogeneous. It worth noting that the 
preferences for pressure-insensitive institutional investors towards small and illiquid 
firms with high return volatility contradict much of prior studies, which literally 
reveals that pressure-insensitive institutional investors are imprudent, but they seem 
not when considering the Chinese inefficient market. 
 
In addition to the heterogeneous preferences resulting from the attributes of different 
types of institutional investors, institutional investors hold different attitudes towards 
financial performance by adopting different investment strategies (i.e. selecting stocks 
that are constituents of the market index or not). The findings suggest that an 
insignificant (a significantly negative) relationship is demonstrated between a 
company’s inclusion in the Top 40 index (CSI 300 index) and being held by 
institutional investors in South Africa (China). However, past financial performance 
was observed to become a less important indicator for institutional investors who 
invest in index-listed companies compared to those who do not. This chapter thus to 
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some extent confirms that companies included in the market index are considered 
trustworthy from institutional investors’ point of view in both South Africa and China. 
 
In summary, this chapter indicates that although institutional investors exhibit 
behaviour that could be considered prudent, some evidence to the contrary is also 
observed. It is likely that institutional investors are affected by psychological and 
social issues, which aligns with ideas from behavioural finance. The anomalies in 
their behaviour could suggest that institutional investors are only partially prudent. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that prudence is a process, not a result. Imprudent 
behaviour (as reflected by stockholding in firms that do not meet the requirements of 
prudent investment) does not necessarily represent poor performance by an 
institutional investor, and vice versa. Based on these findings, the management of 
listed companies could adjust their corporate strategies to align their financial 
performance with institutional investors’ preferences. Furthermore, the findings could 
assist market authorities in South Africa and China when re-examining policies and 
regulations relating to institutional investors, ultimately contributing to an improved 
institutional investment system. 
 
Meanwhile, responsible ownership has become a popular term in recent years (Hendry, 
Sanderson, Barker & Roberts, 2007; O’Rourke, 2003; Sakuma-Keck & Hensmans, 2013), 
and RI could be a way to address the fiduciary duty of institutional investors by 
considering ESG issues - the core part of RI - as criteria when required to make prudent 
investment decisions. From an NI perspective, socially responsible behaviour can 
enhance legitimacy and social acceptance, in addition to protecting shareholders’ interest 
and corporate performance maximisation (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013). The inclusion 
of ESG concerns is of importance to have a better understanding of the prudent 
investment behaviour of institutional investors, which needs to be further explored. 
 
Having understood the selection behaviour of institutional investors, it is necessary to 
gain further understanding of the role that institutional investors play in their investee 
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companies after their investment relationships are built. In the next chapter, the focus 
is therefore placed on the relationship between institutional ownership and improved 
CFP. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP ON 
CORPORATE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
3.1 Introduction 
The separation of ownership and control in a company results in costs because of 
adverse selection and moral hazard (Marks, 2000). These costs are potentially 
mitigated by a number of mechanisms, such as corporate governance oversight and 
institutional shareholder activism (Marks, 2000). At the same time, institutional 
investors, who are perceived to play an important role in most financial markets 
around the world, have gradually transformed from passive investors into activists, 
and are anticipated to engage in corporate governance (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Bushee 
et al., 2014; Mizuno, 2010). Unlike in the US and the UK, where firms are 
characterised by dispersed ownership, concentrated ownership is often observed in 
emerging markets, such as South Africa and China (Cao, Liu & Tian, 2014; Choi, Lee 
& Williams, 2011; Habbard, 2010; Hu et al., 2010; Ntim, Opong, Danbolt & Thomas, 
2012; Steyn & Stainbank, 2013; Zhang & Erasmus, 2016). Aside from the principal-
agent problem, principal-principal agency conflicts may also be prevalent in firms 
with concentrated ownership structures (Hu et al., 2010; Ntim, 2013). Additionally, 
weak legal protection of minority shareholders’ interests also presents in emerging 
markets like South Africa and China (Chen, Ke & Yang, 2013; Elyasiani & Jia, 2010; 
Fosu, 2013). Thus the importance of institutional investors in corporate governance is 
increasing in those countries (Hu et al., 2010), and institutional investors are 
encouraged to engage in efficient monitoring of management as well as the majority 
or controlling shareholders (Yuan et al., 2008). The question arises whether 
institutional investors could effectively advance corporate governance under a 
concentrated ownership structure. 
 
Given that CFP serves as a means to demonstrate the impact of institutional investors 
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on corporate governance, the answer to whether or not institutional ownership is 
linked to improved corporate governance could be reflected in its association with 
improved CFP. More importantly, as discussed in Chapter 2, institutional investors 
are likely to distribute more of their capital to firms with superior financial 
performance when they select stocks. Yet the question of whether or not they could 
advance CFP and their fiduciary duty after an investment relationship has been 
established is under-researched in South Africa and China. 
 
The existing studies on the impact of institutional ownership on CFP have mostly 
been conducted outside of South Africa and China, and yielded inconclusive results. 
Studies reporting a positive relationship (Aggarwal et al., 2011; Alipour, 2013; Binay, 
2005; Chen, Blenman & Chen, 2008; Lee & Chuang, 2009; McConnell & Servaes, 
1990; Strickland, Wiles & Zenner, 1996; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000; Tsai & Tung, 
2014) are contradicted by others where negative (Charfeddine & Elmarzougui, 2010; 
Florou & Pope, 2008; Liang, Lin & Huang, 2011; Pathak, Ranajee & Pradhan, 2012; 
Phung & Le, 2013; Rose, 2007; Shen, 2015) or insignificant relationships were 
observed (Carvalhal & Almeida, 2014; Dong & Ozkan, 2008; Duggal & Miller, 1999; 
Faccio & Lasfer, 2000; Gillan & Starks, 2007; Karpoff, 2001; Karpoff, Malatesta & 
Walkling, 1996; Romano, 2001; Song & Szewczyk, 2003; Wahal, 1996). These mixed 
results could partly be ascribed to the fact that institutional investors are not a 
homogeneous group. Not only do organisations differ across countries, activities and 
over time (Almazan et al., 2005), but they also operate under different regulations and 
fiduciary mandates (Hankins et al., 2008). Heterogeneity amongst institutional 
investors is furthermore associated with the different monitoring roles they perform. 
Monitoring could take either an active or a passive form; alternatively, it could be 
abused to exploit smaller investors (Elyasiani & Jia, 2010; Pound, 1988; Ruiz-
Mallorquí & Santana-Martín, 2011). The manner in which institutional investors exert 
their monitoring roles could influence CFP. 
 
Whether institutional investors become involved in shareholder activism, performing 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
75 
 
the role of an effective monitor, or pursue their own benefits against their fiduciary 
responsibilities, becoming a ‘grabber’8 is still unclear in South Africa and China. The 
limited evidence for the impact of institutional investors on CFP is in stark contrast 
with the increasingly important role that institutional investors have played in those 
two countries. Furthermore, policy makers and practitioners in these two countries 
foster high expectations for institutional ownership engagement as a channel for 
promoting better corporate governance and CFP (see Chapter 2). Thus, it is necessary 
to have a better understanding of the role institutional investors play in corporate 
governance and financial performance in South African and Chinese firms. In spite of 
the similarities these two countries display as emerging markets, South Africa and 
China demonstrate differences in their institutional investor ownership structure, in 
their regulatory environments for listed companies and institutional investors, and in 
the development levels of their financial markets and corporate governance. These 
differences provide an interesting background to this research. 
 
By employing a sample of 183 South African listed companies and 1 104 Chinese 
listed firms, this chapter investigated the relationship between institutional ownership 
and CFP. More specifically, this chapter addressed the primary research question: Is 
institutional ownership related to improved CFP? The following secondary research 
questions were also considered: (1) Are institutional investors a homogeneous group 
in terms of CFP improvement? (2) Are there differences in the effectiveness of 
advancing CFP between institutional investors with and without a passive strategy? 
 
This results reported in this chapter indicate that, in general, institutional ownership is 
associated with improved CFP in both South Africa and China (after controlling for 
potential endogeneity problems). When distinguishing between pressure-insensitive 
and pressure-sensitive institutional investors, however, the impact of institutional 
ownership on financial performance appears to differ. In particular, pressure-
                                                        
8 According to Tang and Yuan (2010), institutional investors who collude with managers to gain their own benefits 
by sacrificing firm value are defined as grabbers. 
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insensitive institutional investors appear likely to adopt an efficient monitoring role, 
contributing towards improved CFP. By contrast, pressure-sensitive institutional 
investors do not seem effective in promoting CFP, raising questions about the 
efficiency of their monitoring actions. In addition, it is observed that the relationship 
between institutional ownership and CFP is moderated by the CSI 300 index in the 
Chinese context, presented by the evidence that overall and pressure insensitive 
institutional investors in CSI 300 index companies are more likely to advance CFP 
than in their non-CSI 300 index counterparts. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 provides an 
overview of the literature on the relationship between institutional ownership and 
financial performance. Section 3.3 reports on the source of the data required, 
describes the sample, provides descriptive statistics and introduces the methodology 
employed in this chapter. Section 3.4 focuses on the results of the regressions, and a 
discussion of the relationship between institutional ownership and improved CFP. 
Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2 Literature review 
Berle and Means (1932) initiated the investigation on the relationship between ownership 
structure and firm performance, and implied that diffused ownership adversely affects 
firm performance partly because of managers’ opportunism. Shleifer and Vishny (1997), 
however, argued that large shareholders are likely to expropriate minority shareholders 
within a concentrated ownership structure, due to control-cash flow rights differences. 
Although it is argued that institutional investors could act as a mechanism to monitor and 
discipline managers and control a firm’s shareholders, the nature of their impact on CFP 
is not clear from the existing literature on this topic. When considering previous studies, 
the role that institutional investors play in relation to corporate performance can be 
summarised under (1) the efficient monitoring hypothesis, (2) the negative monitoring 
hypothesis, and (3) the insignificant monitoring hypothesis. 
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3.2.1 The efficient monitoring hypothesis 
The efficient monitoring hypothesis provided by Pound (1988) illustrated that 
“institutional investors have greater expertise and can monitor management at a lower 
cost than small atomistic shareholders” (McConnell & Servaes, 1990: 599). Tang and 
Yuan (2010) considered these types of institutional investors as efficient monitors. 
Not only do institutional investors enjoy information advantages (Elyasiani & Jia, 
2010; Kang, Luo & Na, 2013); they are also considered to be more sophisticated than 
individual investors (Ding, Hou, Kuo & Lee, 2013). Institutional investors are 
therefore expected to play an active monitoring role in advancing corporate 
governance (Atiase, Mayew & Xue, 2006; Bushee, 1998; Huang & Zhu, 2015; Nix & 
Chen, 2013), and in reducing firm inefficiency (Chung, Fung & Hung, 2012). 
 
Chung and Zhang (2011) found that the proportion of a company’s shares held by 
institutional investors in the US increased in line with corporate governance quality, 
and at the same time it helped to minimise monitoring and exit costs. In addition, 
institutional investors serve as an external corporate governance mechanism (Yuan et 
al., 2008). Their presence also to some extent provides a solution to the free rider 
problem resulting from dispersed ownership (Fan, 2010); it inhibits earnings 
management (Chan, Ding & Hou, 2014; Chung et al., 2002; Hadani, Goranova & Khan, 
2011; Koh, 2003, 2007); and it curtails managerial opportunism (Noe, 2002). Hartzell 
and Starks (2003) documented that the presence of institutional investors helps to 
mitigate the agency problem between shareholders and managers (see also Elyasiani 
& Jia, 2010; Ozkan, 2007), and protects minority shareholders (Bajo et al., 2013). 
 
Furthermore, the efficient monitoring hypothesis predicts a positive relationship 
between institutional ownership and firm performance. Strickland et al. (1996) found 
that in the US, United Shareholders Association-sponsored proposals are more 
successful in firms with high institutional ownership, and their shareholder activism 
enhances shareholder value. Similarly, Aggarwal et al. (2011) stated that institutional 
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investment contributes to good corporate governance around the world, with evidence 
from 23 countries, and they suggested that the high shareholding owned by 
institutional investors is associated with an improvement in corporate valuation. 
Additionally, by controlling potential portfolio risk, institutional investors are 
successful in managing clients’ assets, leading to greater profitability (Thomsen & 
Pedersen, 2000) and adding value for their portfolio firms (Binay, 2005; Chen et al., 
2008; McConnell & Servaes, 1990). 
 
The efficient monitoring role of institutional investors in corporate performance is 
also confirmed in some developing markets (see Alipour, 2013; Lee & Chuang, 2009; 
Tsai & Tung, 2014). A 2014 investor survey by the Asset Management Association of 
China (AMAC) showed that around 60 per cent of the 56 890 interviewees 
(representing individual investors) stated that fund managers in China are professional, 
and that their engagement could improve corporate governance and corporate 
performance. Yuan et al. (2008) found that equity ownership by mutual funds has a 
positive effect on corporate performance in the Chinese market. Li and Han (2013) 
and Li, Zhao, Cao and Lu (2014) observed that Chinese institutional investors in 
general are related to improved CFP, where stability of institutional ownership plays a 
vital role in such a relationship (Zhu & Xu, 2016). 
 
To some extent, the positive impact of institutional investors on corporate 
performance relies on the level and stability of institutional ownership. High and 
stable shareholding by institutional investors appears to promote corporate 
governance, as well as corporate performance. Brickley et al. (1988) indicated that 
block holders have stronger incentives to participate in corporate governance issues 
than non-block holders (also see Boone, Colombage & Gunasekarage, 2011; Demiralp, 
D’Mello, Schlingemann & Subramaniam, 2011). Helwege, Intintoli and Zhang (2012) 
found that institutional investors with large stockholdings are likely to inhibit voting 
with their feet; they are willing to monitor managers (Ameer, 2010; Chen, Harford & 
Li, 2007; Dong & Ozkan, 2008; Ramalingegowda & Yu, 2012). The findings of Kang 
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et al. (2013) indicated that higher Q-ratios and operating performance can be achieved 
by firms with larger institutional shareholding compared to smaller ones. Furthermore, 
stable and long-term shareholding by institutional investors is positively related to 
corporate performance (Hsu & Wang, 2014). When distinguishing between pressure-
sensitive and pressure-insensitive institutional ownership, the stability of the 
shareholding by the two types of institutional investors also has a vital impact on 
corporate performance (Elyasiani & Jia, 2010). 
 
3.2.2 The negative monitoring hypothesis 
The negative monitoring hypothesis comprises of the conflict-of-interest hypothesis 
and the strategic-alignment hypothesis proposed by Pound (1988). The conflict-of-
interest hypothesis suggests that “in view of other profitable business relationships 
with the firm, institutional investors are coerced into voting their shares with 
management” (McConnell & Servaes, 1990: 599), and the strategic-alignment 
hypothesis indicates that “institutional owners and managers find it mutually 
advantageous to cooperate. This cooperation reduces the beneficial effects on firm 
value” (McConnell & Servaes, 1990: 599). Consequently, the negative monitoring 
hypothesis illustrates that there is a negative relationship between institutional 
ownership and CFP. Tang and Yuan (2010) referred to this kind of institutional 
investor as a ‘grabber’. 
 
Some studies (Bushee, 2001; Burns, Kedia & Lipson, 2010; OECD, 2011b; Wahal, 
1996; Wohlstetter, 1993) argue that institutional investors are unable to improve long-
term corporate development, partly due to their short-term focus, insufficient 
managerial skills and the promotion of their own interests. Short-term institutional 
investors are likely to be well informed about a firm’s near-term future prospects (Yan 
& Zhang, 2009), and they may choose to benefit from the information asymmetry 
from outsiders and avoid the cost of activism (Noe, 2002). At the same time, many 
institutional investors tend to adopt a diversifying investment strategy as a way to 
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meet their fiduciary duty. Such a strategy requires institutional investors to diversify 
investments so as to minimise their risks and to achieve financial liquidity (Brossard, 
Lavigne & Sakinç, 2013; Johnson, 2014). Over-diversifying their portfolio, however, 
may weaken the incentives for institutional shareholders to get involved in 
shareholder activism (OECD, 2011b; Wong, 2010). Findings from the 2014 investor 
survey by AMAC revealed that 24 per cent of interviewees were worried about asset 
managers acting against their fiduciary responsibilities in order to pursue their own 
benefits. 
 
Based on evidence from the UK, Florou and Pope (2008) found that larger 
stockholding by institutional investors could easily lead to lower stock returns and 
accounting performance. Danish evidence presented by Rose (2007) indicated that 
joint ownership by the largest two largest institutional investors of a firm is negatively 
associated with corporate performance. Similarly, the negative influence of 
institutional investors on corporate performance was also observed in France 
(Charfeddine & Elmarzougui, 2010). In developing markets, Liang et al. (2011), 
Pathak et al. (2012) and Phung and Le (2013) argued that institutional investors have 
a negative impact on firm performance. Shen (2015) employed a sample consisting of 
A-share and H-share listed Chinese companies, and found that large institutional 
shareholders are not efficient in monitoring corporate governance and performance. In 
addition, since these large institutional shareholders pursue short-term profits by 
employing frequent trading, they adversely influence financial performance. 
 
3.2.3 The insignificant monitoring hypothesis 
The insignificant monitoring hypothesis predicts that there is no significant 
relationship between institutional ownership and CFP. The studies by Mizuno (2010) 
and Rose (2007) showed that the overall level of institutional ownership has no 
statistically significant positive influence on corporate performance. Some 
institutional investors are unwilling to devote much attention to corporate governance 
at high monitoring costs, or their participation is not sufficient to influence corporate 
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governance. As a result, a weak relationship between institutional ownership and 
corporate performance is often observed (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Jalil & Rahman, 
2010; Mak & Li, 2001). Studies by Duggal and Miller (1999) and Karpoff (2001) 
found that institutional investors’ participation cannot add value to firms. 
 
More specifically, pension funds (which are considered to be more active than other 
kinds of institutional investors) are also found to have a negligible impact on 
corporate performance (Faccio & Lasfer, 2000; Romano, 2001). Karpoff et al. (1996) 
suggested that there is no significant evidence that a firm’s operating performance is 
improved by pension fund proposals. Wahal (1996) also found limited evidence that 
pension funds contribute towards long-term improvement in stock return and firm 
performance (see also Gillan & Starks, 2007). Wahal (1996) further questioned the 
efficacy of pension fund activism (see also Carvalhal & Almeida, 2014; Dong & 
Ozkan, 2008; Song & Szewczyk, 2003). 
 
3.2.4 Impact of institutional ownership heterogeneity 
As indicated by Almazan et al. (2005), not all institutional investors are equally 
willing or able to perform a monitoring role in corporate governance, and hence the 
relationship between institutional ownership and corporate performance cannot be 
generalised. Acknowledging the heterogeneity of institutional investors should 
therefore contribute to addressing the nature of the association between institutional 
ownership and CFP. 
 
According to Pound’s (1988) intuition, Belghitar et al. (2011), Bhattacharya and 
Graham (2009), Brickley et al. (1988), Elyasiani and Jia (2010) and Kochhar and 
David (1996) suggested that institutional investors can be classified as either pressure-
insensitive or pressure-sensitive. As argued by Ryan and Schneider (2002), the 
pressure sensitivity of institutional investors is an important influencing factor to 
determine whether an institutional investor could practice shareholder activism. 
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Pressure-insensitive institutional investors only have an investment relationship with 
the firms they invest in. Cornett et al. (2007) and Ferreira and Matos (2008) stated that 
independent institutions with fewer existing or potential business connections to firms 
are more likely to become involved in corporate governance and serve as monitors; 
consequently, these kinds of institutions stand a good chance of promoting corporate 
performance. 
 
Pressure-sensitive institutional investors hold investment as well as business 
relationships with their investee companies. According to the conflict-of-interest 
hypothesis, these institutional investors are less likely to effectively monitor and 
discipline the management of the companies they invest in; besides, they are unlikely 
to act in the best interest of other shareholders. Increased ownership by this type of 
institutional investor is not related to improved CFP; instead, it ruins corporate value. 
The findings of Almazan et al. (2005), Chung and Wang (2014), Jara-Bertin et al. 
(2012) and Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín (2011) showed that pressure-
insensitive institutional investors are more willing and capable to improve firm value 
than pressure-sensitive ones. 
 
As mentioned previously, pension funds, insurance companies and CIS together 
account for the majority of the South African equity market. The role these three kinds 
of institutional investors play towards CFP is heterogeneous, resulting in an uncertain 
impact on CFP when considering institutional investors as a whole (representing a 
mixture of pressure-insensitive and pressure-sensitive institutional investors). This 
chapter conjectures that from an aggregated perspective, the relationship between 
institutional investors and CFP is uncertain in the context of South Africa. In China, 
pressure-insensitive mutual funds, assumed to be efficient monitors, make up the 
majority of institutional investors. Being affected by mutual funds’ impact, aggregated 
institutional ownership is thus expected to be positively related to improved CFP. 
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3.3 Data and methods 
This sector introduces the data source and the sample used in this chapter, and 
describes the selected variables. Regression models are developed and estimation 
methods are discussed in this section as well. 
 
3.3.1 Data source and sample 
This chapter examines the relationship between institutional ownership and improved 
CFP in the context of South Africa and China. South African data for aggregated 
institutional ownership and Top 40 index constituents were collected from the 
Bloomberg (2015) database, while other data were extracted from the INET BFA 
(2015) database. Chinese data related to institutional ownership were obtained from 
the RESSET (2015) database, and other data were gathered from the CSMAR (2015) 
database. The sample screening criteria are the same as those introduced in Chapter 2 
and will not be repeated here. The final sample consisted of 183 South African firms 
for the period 2010 to 2013, and 1 104 Chinese firms for the period 2008 to 2013. 
 
3.3.2 Variables 
3.3.2.1 Financial performance measures 
Market-based performance measures such as Tobin’s Q ratio are widely used in extant 
studies (e.g. Boone et al., 2011; Charfeddine & Elmarzougui, 2010; Hsu & Wang, 
2014; Kang et al., 2013; Lee & Chuang, 2009; Ruiz-Mallorquí & Santana-Martín, 
2011; Yuan et al., 2008); however they may not be suitable indicators of financial 
performance for Chinese companies (He, Chakrabarty & Eden, 2016; Liu et al., 2011; 
Wang & Xu, 2009), as market-based performance measures assume stock market 
efficiency which may not hold true in the Chinese case (He et al., 2016). Compared to 
market-based measures, accounting-based performance measures are typically more 
stable, less subjective to speculation and less affected by the noise of the market 
(Cosh & Hughes, 1995; Hengartner, 2006). Therefore, it was decided to employ 
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accounting-based performance measures in this chapter9. 
 
Return on equity (ROE), one of the most commonly used accounting-based 
performance measures in ownership literature (Groß, 2007), is used as a proxy for 
finance performance in this chapter. A similar approach was also implemented by 
Alipour (2013), Bhattacharya and Graham (2009), Mizuno (2010), and Tsai and Tung 
(2014). To test the robustness of the results obtained, earnings per share (EPS) is 
adopted as an alternative measure of financial performance. This indicator is also the 
profit figure most widely employed in South Africa10 (Stainbank & Harrod, 2007). 
 
3.3.2.2 Independent variables 
The independent variable is institutional ownership (IO), which is represented by the 
proportion of a firm’s shares held by institutional investors. A similar approach was 
employed in prior studies by Charfeddine and Elmarzougui (2010), Cornett et al. 
(2007) and Yuan et al. (2008). 
 
As discussed in Section 3.2, institutional investors as a group are far from uniform, 
and different types of institutional investors could be heterogeneous in promoting CFP. 
In addition to aggregated institutional ownership (IO_TOTAL), disaggregated 
institutional ownership was therefore also taken into consideration in this chapter. 
Based on their business relationship with their investee firms, institutional investors 
could be classified as either pressure-insensitive or pressure-sensitive. This chapter 
investigates potential heterogeneity in financial performance resulting from the 
                                                        
9 This chapter adopts accounting-based performance measures only. However, due to the concern that accounting-
based measures are more subject to managerial manipulation than market-based measures (Chakravarthy, 1986; 
Gentry & Shen, 2010), Chapter 4 will assess the earnings quality of sample companies. More importantly, it will 
also examine if institutional investors effectively engage in earnings management reduction, thus improving our 
understanding of the role institutional investors play in corporate governance and corporate performance, 
distinguishing between efficient monitors and grabbers. To some extent, this should compensate for the potential 
bias of the performance measures employed in this chapter. 
10 JSE listed companies are required to disclose headline EPS (HEPS). HEPS is viewed as the most important of 
all financial performance measures of a company by financial managers in South Africa (Stainbank & Harrod, 
2007). Therefore, this chapter uses HEPS for South African listed companies. Basic EPS (BEPS) applies to 
Chinese listed companies, as they are not required to publish HEPS. 
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engagement of pressure-insensitive institutional ownership (IO_INSEN) and pressure-
sensitive institutional ownership (IO_SEN); this classification applies to the Chinese 
context only considering that comparable information on institutional investors’ 
classification in South Africa was not available. 
 
3.3.2.3 Control variables 
Based on prior studies, a number of firm-level characteristics are included as control 
variables in the current chapter. These variables are leverage (LEV) (Alipour, 2013; 
Arosa, Iturralde & Maseda, 2010; Bhattacharya & Graham, 2009; Charfeddine & 
Elmarzougui, 2010; Elyasiani & Jia, 2010; Kang & Kim, 2012; Lee & Chuang, 2009; 
Yuan et al., 2008), firm size (SIZE) (Alipour, 2013; Arosa et al., 2010; Bhattacharya 
& Graham, 2009; Charfeddine & Elmarzougui, 2010; Chen, Kao & Lu, 2014; 
Elyasiani & Jia, 2010; Hsu & Wang, 2014; Jiao & Ye, 2013; Lee & Chuang, 2009; 
Yuan et al., 2008), listing history (AGE) (Arosa et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2014; 
Elyasiani & Jia, 2010; Hsu & Wang, 2014; Jiao & Ye, 2013; Kang & Kim, 2012; 
Ruiz-Mallorquí & Santana-Martín, 2011), and sales growth (GROW) (Arosa et al., 
2010; Bhattacharya & Graham, 2009; Elyasiani & Jia, 2010; Hsu & Wang, 2014). In 
addition, when conducting regressions of disaggregated institutional ownership and 
CFP, the aggregated ownership (IO_TOTAL) is also included as a control variable to 
control the potential impact of the unspecified types of institutional investors on CFP. 
 
Companies included in an index (INDEX) are often perceived to be trustworthy. As 
reported in Chapter 2, institutional investors may pay less attention to financial 
performance when they decide to invest in index-listed companies compared to 
investments in non-index listed companies. In this chapter, institutional investors who 
tilt towards investing in companies that are constituents of an index are regarded as 
passive investors (also referred to as passive indexers), consistent with the 
classification employed by Appel, Gormley and Keim (2016) and Elyasiani and Jia 
(2010). These kinds of institutional investors are expected to conduct passive 
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monitoring; Elyasiani and Jia (2010) argued that in such a scenario, institutional 
investors are unlikely to correlate with CFP, but ownership held by them is stable. 
Appel et al. (2016) and Wang and Li (2007) also reported that ownership by 
institutional investors with passive indexing strategies is stable. Although they 
provided evidence that a passive indexing strategy will restrict institutional investors’ 
trading flexibility, they argued that it encourages institutional investors to become 
involved in shareholder activism, since this strategy prevents them from selling 
underperforming companies that are included in their portfolios. From the perspective 
of Appel et al. (2016) and Wang and Li (2007), it therefore seems that passive 
investors could contribute towards improved CFP. 
 
To examine the impact of passive index-based institutional investors on CFP, this 
chapter includes an interaction item between institutional ownership and an index 
(IO*INDEX). More specifically, the interaction item IO_TOTAL*TOP40 is included 
for the South African companies, and IO_TOTAL*CSI300, as well as 
IO_INSEN*CSI300 and IO_SEN*CSI300 for the Chinese companies. The descriptive 
statistics of the major variables are displayed in Table 3.111. 
 
Table 3.1  
Descriptive statistics 
 Mean SD Min Max Med 
Panel A Descriptive statistics for South Africa 
ROE 0.026 2.119 -17.561 3.610 0.179 
EPS 2.888 5.531 -1.640 35.190 0.770 
IO_TOTAL 0.405 0.294 0.000 1.413 0.363 
LEV 0.588 0.453 0.002 6.754 0.536 
SIZE 14.595 2.035 7.533 20.420 14.581 
AGE 2.755 0.969 0.000 4.771 2.773 
GROW 0.145 0.442 -0.741 3.410 0.092 
TOP40 0.156 0.363 0.000 1.000 0.000 
                                                        
11 All the data, except EPS and GROW, were presented and discussed in Chapter 2 and will not be repeated here 
for brevity. The mean EPS (i.e. HEPS) of 183 South African listed companies was 2.888 over the period 2010 to 
2013, while the reported relatively high standard deviation of HEPS suggests its high variation or dispersion 
among sample companies. The mean (median) EPS (i.e. BEPS) of the sample Chinese companies was 0.304 
(0.200). The average value of GROW was 0.145 and 0.191 for the South African and Chinese sample companies 
within their respective research periods, suggesting that Chinese sample companies were characterised by a higher 
growth rate than their South African peers. 
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Panel B Descriptive statistics for China 
ROE 0.071 0.187 -4.891 4.485 0.072 
EPS 0.304 0.446 -0.776 2.170 0.200 
IO_TOTAL 0.168 0.184 0.000 0.919 0.098 
IO_INSEN 0.056 0.088 0.000 0.665 0.016 
IO_SEN 0.011 0.023 0.000 0.449 0.000 
LEV 0.522 0.192 0.002 1.094 0.536 
SIZE 22.107 1.342 17.467 28.482 21.976 
AGE 2.450 0.394 0.000 3.135 2.485 
GROW 0.191 0.539 -0.615 3.868 0.107 
CSI300 0.193 0.395 0.000 1.000 0.000 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the regressions for 183 
South African firms over the period 2010 to 2013 (732 observations) in Panel A, and 1 104 
Chinese firms over the period 2008 to 2013 (6 624 observations) in Panel B. Variable 
definitions are reported in Appendix 1. 
 
3.3.3 Methodology 
To assess the relationship between institutional ownership and improved CFP, the 
following regression model was established. 
 
, 0 , 1 ,
n
m it k k it j j j it itCFP IO CON                                             (3.1) 
 
Additionally, the interaction between institutional ownership and the market index is 
introduced in this chapter, as reflected in Equation 3.2 below. 
 
(3.2) 
 
where CFPm,it refers to one of the measures of financial performance (ROEit or EPSit) 
(m = 1, 2) for company i at time t. IOk,it refers to variable k (k = TOTAL, INSEN and 
SEN) of institutional ownership. INDEXit is a dummy variable, representing the 
TOP40it for South Africa and the CSI300it for China. IOk,it*INDEXit is the interaction 
item between IOk,it and INDEXit. CONj,it represents control variables j (j = 1, 2,…n). 
0 is the intercept, k, 1 and k are the regression coefficients of IOk,it, INDEXit and 
IOk,it*INDEXit. j denotes the regression coefficients of CONj,it, and it is the error 
term.  
, 0 , 1 , ,1
*
n
m it k k it it k k it it j j it itj
CFP IO INDEX IO INDEX CON     

     
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Before conducting the regressions, a correlation analysis was first performed (see 
Table 3.2). The results suggest that the variables included in the analysis are not 
highly correlated with each other for either the South African or the Chinese sample. 
A possible exception is the correlation between SIZE and INDEX, where the 
correlation coefficients exceed 0.5 in both Panel A and Panel B of Table 3.2. However, 
this is not considered problematic, since the regressions will be processed for SIZE by 
both including and excluding INDEX. 
 
Table 3.2  
Correlation matrix 
Panel A Correlation matrix for South Africa 
 
IO_TOTAL 
1 
LEV 
2 
SIZE 
3 
AGE 
4 
GROW 
5 
TOP40 
6 
1 1      
2 -0.041 1 
    
3 0.393*** -0.164*** 1 
   
4 0.219*** -0.089** 0.293*** 1 
  
5 -0.023 0.018 -0.084** -0.117*** 1 
 
6 0.194*** -0.031 0.543*** 0.070* -0.019 1 
Panel B Correlation matrix for China 
 
IO_TOTAL 
1 
IO_INSEN 
2 
IO_SEN 
3 
LEV 
4 
SIZE 
5 
AGE 
6 
GROW 
7 
CSI300 
8 
1 1 
       
2 0.395*** 1 
      
3 0.152*** 0.052*** 1 
     
4 -0.034*** -0.020* 0.005 1 
    
5 0.069*** 0.220*** 0.086*** 0.359*** 1 
   
6 0.009 -0.074*** 0.045*** 0.036*** -0.084*** 1 
  
7 0.035*** 0.058*** -0.008 0.064*** 0.063*** -0.004 1 
 
8 0.082*** 0.296*** 0.046*** 0.036*** 0.589*** -0.131*** 0.004 1 
This table reports the correlation matrix for the independent and control variables included in 
the regressions. Panel A presents the Pearson correlation matrix for 183 South African firms 
over the period 2010 to 2013, while Panel B reports the correlation for 1 104 Chinese firms 
over the period 2008 to 2013. ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix 1. 
 
To examine the impact of institutional ownership on CFP, regressions in which the 
firm’s ROE or EPS in each year is a function of firm-specific and ownership variables 
are estimated by using pooled OLS and FE approaches. Several prior studies (e.g. 
Bhattacharya & Graham, 2009; Bruton, Filatotchev, Chahine & Wright, 2010; Cho, 
1998; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Kapopoulos & Lazaretou, 2007; Liang et al., 2011) 
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warn against a potential endogeneity problem when considering the relationship 
between ownership structure and financial performance. To address the endogeneity 
issue, this study also applied the 2SLS estimation method as recommended by 
Charfeddine and Elmarzougui (2010), Jiao and Ye (2013) and Lappalainen and 
Niskanen (2012). Therefore, instrument variables for institutional ownership are 
included in the analysis. These instruments should be correlated with institutional 
ownership, while not correlated with CFP, except indirectly through other independent 
variables. In this regard, the instrument variables employed are trading liquidity 
(TURN) and return volatility (VOL) for the South African as well as the Chinese data. 
This choice of instruments was motivated by the results reported in Chapter 212, as 
well as the findings of existing studies such as Yuan et al. (2008). 
 
For the 2SLS regression, this chapter reported the F-statistic for testing the joint 
statistical significance of instrument variables; this figure was higher than the critical 
value of 10 in all cases, suggesting that the instruments are not weak (Staiger & Stock, 
1997). At the same time, a Sargan test was performed. The results did not reject the 
null hypothesis, suggesting that the instruments are valid in all 2SLS regressions. 
 
3.4 Results 
This section presents the regression results obtained from the different estimation 
methods, and discusses the relationship between institutional ownership and improved 
CFP, as well as the role that a firm’s inclusion in a market index played in this relationship. 
 
3.4.1 Aggregated institutional ownership and financial performance 
Panel A and Panel B of Table 3.3 report the regression results on relationships between 
institutional ownership and financial performance in the South African and Chinese 
contexts respectively. Columns 1 to 3 (4 to 6) of both panels show the relationship between 
aggregated institutional ownership and ROE (EPS). 
                                                        
12 As indicated in prior studies (see Section 2.2), institutional ownership is related to return volatility (VOL) and 
turnover ratio (TURN); at the same time, the findings of Chapter 2 also confirmed that institutional ownership is 
significantly associated with VOL and TURN in both South Africa and China. 
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Table 3.3  
Regressions of relationships between aggregated institutional ownership and financial performance 
 ROE  EPS 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
2SLS 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
2SLS 
6 
Panel A Relationship between aggregated institutional ownership and financial performance (South Africa) 
IO_TOTAL 0.549** 0.189* 0.857***  0.693* 0.520* 1.406* 
 (2.05) (1.68) (3.37)  (1.74) (1.92) (1.77) 
LEV -0.723* -0.404 -0.543  -1.305*** -2.440** -1.715*** 
 (-1.69) (-1.61) (-1.04)  (-2.59) (-2.38) (-2.66) 
SIZE 0.129** 0.672*** 0.312**  0.963*** 0.868*** 0.869*** 
 (2.25) (3.81) (2.46)  (15.44) (2.81) (11.84) 
AGE 0.605 0.117 0.662  0.415*** 0.508 0.353*** 
 (0.82) (1.22) (1.32)  (3.50) (0.29) (2.99) 
GROW 0.472** 0.455* 0.492**  1.836** 0.959* 1.840** 
 (2.04) (1.82) (2.51)  (2.50) (1.83) (2.49) 
Intercept -1.810** -10.510*** -0.065  -12.600*** -7.490 -11.390*** 
 (-2.25) (-4.31) (-0.44)  (-13.37) (-1.43) (-11.37) 
F-statistic   110.903    88.784 
Sargan p-value   0.600    0.404 
R2 (%) 6.54 80.07 12.31  40.99 92.20 37.50 
N 732 732 732  732 732 732 
Panel B Relationship between aggregated institutional ownership and financial performance (China) 
IO_TOTAL 0.077*** 0.020* 0.105***  0.377*** 0.120*** 0.593*** 
 (12.37) (1.71) (13.69)  (14.87) (2.89) (12.99) 
LEV -0.150*** -0.121*** -0.147***  -0.439*** -0.530*** -0.603*** 
 (-10.32) (-10.60) (-10.11)  (-15.96) (-8.94) (-6.15) 
SIZE 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.011***  0.139*** 0.225*** 0.124*** 
 (12.71) (5.41) (12.10)  (34.23) (15.00) (15.84) 
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Table 3.3 (continued) 
 ROE  EPS 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
2SLS 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
2SLS 
6 
AGE -0.010*** -0.082*** -0.011***  -0.031** -0.225*** -0.050** 
 (-3.11) (-10.88) (-3.31)  (-2.47) (-6.88) (-2.52) 
GROW 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.029***  0.105*** 0.102*** 0.104*** 
 (14.45) (16.21) (14.32)  (12.34) (12.23) (7.16) 
Intercept -0.143*** -0.076 -0.135***  -2.493*** -3.815*** -2.369*** 
 (-6.55) (-1.29) (-6.18)  (-26.93) (-13.72) (-13.74) 
F-statistic   4 604.040    4 613.560 
Sargan p-value    0.524     0.812 
R2 (%) 11.32 57.37 11.02  22.00 66.15 13.76 
N 6 624 6 624 6 624  6 624 6 624 6 624 
This table presents the pooled OLS, FE and 2SLS estimations of the relationship between aggregated institutional ownership and financial performance over 
the period 2010 to 2013 for South Africa, and 2008 to 2013 for China. The results in the context of South Africa and China are reported in Panel A and Panel 
B respectively. The dependent variables are ROE and EPS in both Panels A and B. All variables included in the regressions are winsorised at the 1% and 99% 
level. The F-test and Hausman test reject the null hypothesis, and hence FE is more suitable compared to pooled OLS and RE. For the 2SLS, the F-statistic 
for testing the joint statistical significance of instrument variables and the Sargan statistic for testing overidentifying restrictions are also reported, and the 
results show that instruments are not weak, and are valid. The regression results over the period 2010 to 2013 for China (see Appendix 2) are similar to those 
presented in Panel B. Year and industry effects are controlled in all regressions. T-statistics are reported in parentheses; ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix 1. 
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In the South African context, IO_TOTAL was found to be significantly and positively 
related to ROE and EPS within pooled OLS, FE and 2SLS estimations, suggesting 
that in South Africa, firms with greater aggregated institutional ownership are likely 
to achieve improved financial performance. Panel B of Table 3.3 displays that 
IO_TOTAL is statistically significant and positively related to ROE and EPS when 
using pooled OLS, FE and 2SLS estimations for the Chinese data. Given this 
evidence, institutional investors as a whole are likely to advance CFP in China. 
Considering the potential negative effect of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis on 
firm performance, this chapter also ran the same regressions by using 2010-2013 data 
only, and the results remained robust (see Appendix 2). 
 
3.4.2 Pressure sensitivity and heterogeneous impact 
Prior studies (e.g. Cornett et al., 2007; Ferreira & Matos, 2008) suggest that pressure-
insensitive institutional investors are considered to have greater incentives to monitor 
management, and that they are more likely to achieve improved financial performance 
than pressure-sensitive institutional investors. To some extent, these findings were 
also confirmed in this chapter when examining the impact of pressure-insensitive and 
pressure-sensitive institutional ownership on financial performance. The regression 
results presented in Panel A and Panel B of Table 3.4 were obtained after separating 
the institutional investor variable into pressure-insensitive and pressure-sensitive 
components. Given that data concerning disaggregated institutional ownership were 
not available for South Africa, the heterogeneous impact on financial performance 
between pressure-insensitive and pressure-sensitive institutional investors is 
addressed only in the Chinese context. 
 
Panel A of Table 3.4 reports that IO_INSEN is significantly and positively related to 
ROE, suggesting that pressure-insensitive institutional ownership is associated with 
improved financial performance. As discussed in Section 2.3.2, ownership by 
pressure-insensitive institutional investors in the Chinese stock market declined 
during the period 2010 to 2013, in line with the decreasing trend in the ROE of listed 
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companies during this period13. Thus, it would be more appropriate for the findings to 
be interpreted as a sign that firms with lower levels of pressure-insensitive 
institutional ownership are associated with financial performance declining. 
Considering that pressure-insensitive institutional investors tend to invest less in 
poorly performing companies (as shown in Chapter 2), the results reported in Table 
3.4 could point towards a situation where their exit from a firm could be an expression 
of their dissatisfaction with its financial performance. This behaviour could explain 
the poor financial performance of the companies they divested from14. Similar results 
were found when financial performance was proxied by EPS. Pressure-insensitive 
institutional investors, irrespective of whether they are involved in active or passive 
monitoring, therefore appear to be efficient in positively impacting on financial 
performance; their behaviour, to some extent, can be explained by the efficient 
monitoring hypothesis. 
 
Panel B of Table 3.4 shows that IO_SEN is negatively but insignificantly associated 
with ROE and EPS; in other words, pressure-sensitive institutional investors are 
unlikely to promote the financial performance of their investee companies. As 
illustrated in Section 3.2.4, pressure-sensitive institutional investors always pursue 
business relationship maintenance and enhancement due to business connections with 
their investee companies. This behaviour results in inefficient monitoring, or 
colluding with the management or controlling shareholders in some situations. Such 
behaviour could offer an explanation for the situation observed during the period 2010 
to 2013 when, in contrast to the fact that the financial performance of Chinese listed 
companies was constantly decreasing, pressure-sensitive institutional investors 
increased their levels of ownership. 
                                                        
13 The means of ROE (EPS) for the 1 104 Chinese listed companies were 0.102, 0.105, 0.119, 0.111, 0.093, 0.090 
(0.332, 0.357, 0.406, 0.430, 0.376, 0.386) during the years 2008 to 2013. 
14 Although the NTS Reform had basically been completed by 2007, there are still some restrictions on trading in 
the original NTS. For instance, in order to maintain market stability, shareholders who own more than 5 per cent of 
the original NTS are only allowed to trade less than 5 per cent of the total shares outstanding within one year, and 
10 per cent within two years. Since the newly released tradable shares were largely held by legal persons or 
corporations, the proportion of outstanding shares held by professional institutional investors decreased 
accordingly. That is, besides the exit, the decrease in the proportion of outstanding shares held by professional 
institutional investors was also because of an increase in the number of outstanding shares. 
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Table 3.4  
Regressions of relationships between disaggregated institutional ownership and financial performance 
 ROE  EPS 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
2SLS 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
2SLS 
6 
Panel A Relationship between pressure insensitive institutional ownership and financial performance 
IO_INSEN 0.380*** 0.322*** 0.437***  1.874*** 1.279*** 2.650*** 
 (28.85) (10.63) (26.38)  (25.53) (9.12) (19.40) 
LEV -0.156*** -0.151*** -0.154***  -0.474*** -0.615*** -0.645*** 
 (-11.57) (-8.47) (-11.37)  (-13.56) (-10.15) (-6.65) 
SIZE 0.009*** 0.034*** 0.007***  0.132*** 0.218*** 0.098*** 
 (8.66) (5.68) (7.22)  (25.10) (11.34) (13.64) 
AGE -0.003 -0.057 -0.002  -0.005 -0.085 -0.004 
 (-0.92) (-1.37) (-0.68)  (-0.33) (-0.55) (-0.24) 
GROW 0.028*** 0.021*** 0.027***  0.109*** 0.099*** 0.097*** 
 (14.90) (7.38) (14.67)  (10.09) (7.24) (6.97) 
IO_TOTAL YES YES YES  YES  YES YES 
Intercept -0.117*** 0.091*** -0.095***  -2.423*** 0.299*** -1.979*** 
 (-4.89) (25.96) (-3.92)  (-20.44) (17.21) (-12.33) 
F-statistic   2 914.770    2 952.680 
Sargan p-value    0.850     0.829 
R2 (%) 23.94 54.40 23.43  24.94 78.12 22.47 
N 6 624 6 624 6 624  6 624 6 624 6 624 
Panel B Relationship between pressure sensitive institutional ownership and financial performance 
IO_SEN -0.272 -0.108 -0.440  -0.365 -0.237 -0.912 
 (-1.60) (-0.68) (-0.99)  (-1.48) (-1.19) (-1.42) 
LEV -0.151*** -0.122*** -0.164***  -0.436*** -0.533*** -0.611*** 
 (-10.36) (-10.67) (-10.73)  (-15.92) (-6.28) (-6.66) 
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Table 3.4 (continued) 
 ROE  EPS 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
2SLS 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
2SLS 
6 
SIZE 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.014***  0.139*** 0.226*** 0.125*** 
 (12.83) (5.47) (13.69)  (34.19) (8.47) (22.45) 
AGE -0.010*** -0.081*** -0.007**  -0.030** -0.223*** -0.049*** 
 (-3.03) (-10.69) (-1.99)  (-2.39) (-4.69) (-2.74) 
GROW 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.030***  0.105*** 0.102*** 0.103*** 
 (14.43) (16.20) (14.26)  (12.30) (9.25) (8.07) 
IO_TOTAL YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Intercept -0.146*** -0.081 -0.183***  -2.504*** -3.852*** -2.391*** 
 (-6.69) (-1.36) (-7.76)  (-26.94) (-7.27) (-17.80) 
F-statistic   134.729    804.425 
Sargan p-value    0.452     0.896 
R2 (%) 11.35 57.34 10.68  21.98 66.15 13.77 
N 6 624 6 624 6 624  6 624 6 624 6 624 
This table presents the pooled OLS, FE and 2SLS estimations of the relationship between disaggregated institutional ownership and financial performance 
over the period 2008 to 2013 for China. The results of the relationship between financial performance and pressure-insensitive and pressure-sensitive 
institutional ownership are reported in Panel A and Panel B respectively. The dependent variables are ROE and EPS in both Panels A and B. All variables 
included in the regressions are winsorised at the 1% and 99% level. The F-test and Hausman test reject the null hypothesis, and hence FE is more suitable 
compared to pooled OLS and RE. For the 2SLS, the F-statistic for testing the joint statistical significance of instrument variables and the Sargan statistic for 
testing overidentifying restrictions are also reported, and the results show that the instruments are not weak, and are valid. The regression results over the 
period 2010 to 2013 (see Appendix 2) are similar to those presented in this table. Year and industry effects are controlled in all regressions. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses; ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix 1 
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The findings of this chapter are in keeping with the evidence from Chapter 2 that 
pressure-sensitive institutional investors choose past losers when they select stocks. Thus, 
to some degree, the companies that pressure-sensitive institutional investors select to 
invest in may not be in a good financial condition. Furthermore, as stated in Section 3.2.1, 
institutional investors who hold concentrated ownership in their investee companies are 
likely to serve as effective monitors of management and the controlling shareholders. A 
large proportion of the pressure-sensitive institutional investors in China, however, are 
non-block holders, and they have few incentives to engage in costly monitoring activities. 
These factors make it easy to explain why pressure-sensitive institutional ownership has 
an insignificant relationship with CFP. Their role therefore corresponds to the 
insignificant monitoring hypothesis. To investigate whether the difference in research 
periods influenced the results, the same regressions were also conducted using only the 
2010-2013 data. As reported in Appendix 2, similar results were found. 
 
3.4.3 The effectiveness of passive institutional investors 
A comparison between passive and non-passive investors and their impact on 
financial performance is presented in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. 
 
Panel A of Table 3.5 shows that in South Africa, companies included in the Top 40 index 
are unlikely to achieve better financial performance than non-Top 40 index companies. In 
addition, the interaction between IO_TOTAL and TOP40 is insignificantly related to 
financial performance, illustrating that there is no significant difference in the impact of 
institutional investors on financial performance within Top 40 index constituent 
companies compared to that within non-Top 40 counterparts. For China, CSI 300 index 
companies in all cases generated better financial performance than non-CSI 300 index 
companies. In contrast to institutional investors in South Africa, IO_TOTAL*CSI300 
reflects a significantly positive relationship with ROE and EPS (see Panel B of Table 3.5). 
This indicates that in China, institutional ownership of CSI 300 index companies has a 
more significant impact on financial performance than that of non-CSI 300 companies. 
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The finding generated for institutional investors as a whole also applies to pressure-
insensitive institutional investors (see Panel A of Table 3.6). Panel A of Table 3.6 
shows that IO_INSEN*CSI300 is positively and significantly related to ROE and EPS, 
suggesting that lower levels of pressure-insensitive institutional ownership lead to less 
favourable financial performance for CSI 300 index companies compared to non-CSI 
300 companies. One possible explanation is that passive pressure-insensitive 
institutional investors are likely to become involved in shareholder activism, and they 
are stable in their stockholdings, as discussed earlier in this chapter. A decrease in 
passive pressure-insensitive institutional ownership is likely to lower investors’ 
willingness to perform a monitoring role in their investee firms. Thus, firms 
experiencing a decline in their level of passive pressure-insensitive institutional 
ownership may suffer the loss of the active monitoring and the various resources that 
these institutional investors bring to the firm. As a result, their financial performance 
would decrease much more compared to companies that are not experiencing 
monitoring by this type of institutional shareholder. This finding is inconsistent with 
Elyasiani and Jia (2010), but supports Appel et al. (2016). Additionally, pressure-
sensitive institutional ownership is not significantly related to CFP, no matter if the 
investors hold shares in index constituent firms or not (see Panel B of Table 3.6). In 
this respect, the impact of passive index-based institutional investors on CFP cannot 
be generalised; it depends on at least which type the institutional investors are. 
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Table 3.5  
Regressions of relationships between aggregated institutional ownership and financial performance (including INDEX) 
 ROE  EPS 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
2SLS 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
2SLS 
6 
Panel A Relationship between aggregated institutional ownership and financial performance (including TOP40, South Africa) 
IO_TOTAL 0.546** 0.202* 0.881***  0.722* 0.568** 1.432*** 
 (2.10) (1.72) (3.14)  (1.78) (2.24) (2.91) 
LEV -0.718* -0.399 -0.543  -1.332*** -2.374** -1.573** 
 (-1.67) (-1.59) (-1.04)  (-2.63) (-2.30) (-2.41) 
SIZE 0.154** 0.674*** 0.316**  0.965*** 0.870*** 0.826*** 
 (2.28) (3.81) (2.47)  (15.40) (2.78) (2.59) 
AGE 0.666 0.118 0.642  0.361*** 0.552 0.489*** 
 (0.87) (1.24) (1.29)  (3.09) (0.30) (5.90) 
GROW 0.484** 0.466* 0.496**  1.788** 0.986* 1.103* 
 (2.08) (1.84) (2.54)  (2.42) (1.85) (1.84) 
TOP40 0.063 0.130 0.144  0.790 0.537 0.547 
 (0.11) (0.38) (0.34)  (0.57) (1.00) (0.31) 
IO_TOTAL*TOP40 -0.266 -0.162 -0.267  -1.314 -0.524 -0.115 
 (-0.46) (-0.39) (-0.36)  (-0.61) (-0.78) (-0.03) 
Intercept 0.064 -10.580*** -0.073  -12.480*** -10.520** -0.495* 
 (0.59) (-4.31) (-0.48)  (-13.16) (-2.21) (-1.79) 
F-statistic   38.095    45.131 
Sargan p-value    0.731    0.474 
R2 (%) 6.58 80.08 8.76  40.78 92.19 17.42 
N 732 732 732  732 732 732 
Panel B Relationship between aggregated institutional ownership and financial performance (including CSI300, China) 
IO_TOTAL 0.062*** 0.032** 0.085***  0.282*** 0.201** 0.413*** 
 (9.02) (2.28) (9.90)  (7.42) (2.53) (7.65) 
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Table 3.5 (continued) 
 ROE  EPS 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
2SLS 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
2SLS 
6 
LEV -0.148*** -0.116*** -0.145***  -0.467*** -0.450*** -0.474*** 
 (-10.28) (-10.84) (-10.10)  (-12.43) (-6.80) (-11.35) 
SIZE 0.005*** 0.016*** 0.005***  0.127*** 0.212*** 0.125*** 
 (4.64) (5.34) (4.39)  (18.41) (12.36) (16.20) 
AGE -0.008** -0.076*** -0.008***  -0.034** -0.295*** -0.038* 
 (-2.37) (-10.69) (-2.58)  (-2.00) (-7.33) (-1.72) 
GROW 0.030*** 0.025*** 0.030***  0.120*** 0.091*** 0.111*** 
 (15.06) (16.47) (14.94)  (10.58) (10.48) (8.87) 
CSI300 0.023*** 0.011*** 0.021***  0.068** 0.052** 0.059* 
 (5.00) (2.60) (4.00)  (2.56) (2.19) (1.80) 
IO_TOTAL*CSI300 0.060*** 0.042* 0.071***  0.462*** 0.279** 0.558*** 
 (3.89) (1.73) (3.87)  (5.37) (2.06) (4.79) 
Intercept -0.015 -0.066 -0.012  -2.211*** -3.413*** -2.171*** 
 (-0.62) (-1.19) (-0.46)  (-14.96) (-10.65) (-12.84) 
F-statistic   2 147.190    2 134.510 
Sargan p-value   0.122    0.578 
R2 (%) 13.41 59.10 13.21  18.04 71.59 17.64 
N 6 624 6 624 6 624  6 624 6 624 6 624 
This table presents the pooled OLS, FE and 2SLS estimations of the relationship between aggregated institutional ownership and financial performance, considering the 
interaction between INDEX (i.e. TOP40 for South Africa and CSI300 for China) and IO_TOTAL over the period 2010 to 2013 for South Africa, and 2008 to 2013 for 
China. The results in the context of South Africa and China are reported in Panel A and Panel B respectively. The dependent variables are ROE and EPS in both Panels A 
and B. All variables included in the regressions are winsorised at the 1% and 99% level. The F-test and Hausman test reject the null hypothesis, and hence FE is more 
suitable compared to pooled OLS and RE. For the 2SLS, the F-statistic for testing the joint statistical significance of instrument variables and the Sargan statistic for 
testing overidentifying restrictions are also reported, and the results show that the instruments are not weak, and are valid. Year and industry effects are controlled in all 
regressions. T-statistics are reported in parentheses; ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix 1. 
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Table 3.6  
Regressions of relationships between disaggregated institutional ownership and financial performance (including INDEX) 
 ROE  EPS 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
2SLS 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
2SLS 
6 
Panel A Relationship between pressure insensitive institutional ownership and financial performance (including CSI300) 
IO_INSEN 0.339*** 0.304*** 0.387***  1.651*** 1.221*** 2.266*** 
 (22.64) (10.34) (20.41)  (17.12) (10.12) (28.61) 
LEV -0.153*** -0.150*** -0.152***  -0.461*** -0.461*** -0.490*** 
 (-11.42) (-7.70) (-11.27)  (-11.90) (-7.06) (-11.96) 
SIZE 0.006*** 0.034*** 0.005***  0.121*** 0.184*** 0.109*** 
 (6.85) (4.53) (5.41)  (19.48) (12.99) (18.74) 
AGE -0.002 -0.053 -0.002  -0.001 -0.022 -0.005 
 (-0.75) (-0.68) (-0.58)  (-0.04) (-0.16) (-0.05) 
GROW 0.028*** 0.021*** 0.028***  0.102*** 0.093*** 0.137*** 
 (15.15) (6.80) (14.94)  (8.59) (10.88) (10.55) 
CSI300 0.018*** 0.008** 0.015***  0.104*** 0.045** 0.029* 
 (3.67) (2.08) (3.03)  (3.24) (2.03) (1.76) 
IO_INSEN*CSI300 0.109*** 0.084* 0.121***  0.997*** 0.321** 0.364* 
 (5.02) (1.73) (4.82)  (7.04) (2.01) (1.89) 
IO_TOTAL YES  YES YES   YES YES YES 
Intercept -0.057*** 0.090*** -0.038*  -2.211*** -3.527*** -1.969*** 
 (-2.64) (19.52) (-1.74)  (-14.35) (-11.51) (-16.62) 
F-statistics   1 642.240    1 599.460 
Sargan p-value    0.643     0.626 
R2 (%) 24.70 54.49 24.30  26.11 78.26 34.14 
N 6 624 6 624 6 624  6 624 6 624 6 624 
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Panel B Relationship between pressure sensitive institutional ownership and financial performance (including CSI300) 
IO_SEN -0.208 -0.064 -0.370  -0.471 -0.313 -0.874 
 (-1.14) (-0.40) (-1.59)  (-1.56) (-1.46)  (-1.41) 
LEV -0.149*** -0.122*** -0.142***  -0.469*** -0.465*** -0.462*** 
 (-10.33) (-10.63) (-10.54)  (-12.50) (-5.14) (-7.17) 
SIZE 0.005*** 0.017*** 0.005***  0.125*** 0.217*** 0.117*** 
 (4.45) (5.40) (4.70)  (18.15) (6.59) (11.80) 
AGE -0.006* -0.080*** -0.006*  -0.026 -0.304*** -0.052* 
 (-1.95) (-10.61) (-1.92)  (-1.56) (-5.25) (-1.93) 
GROW 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.028***  0.119*** 0.091*** 0.110*** 
 (14.96) (16.28) (14.59)  (10.50) (7.92) (7.55) 
CSI300 0.039*** 0.016*** 0.038***  0.159*** 0.073*** 0.173*** 
 (9.77) (3.99) (8.86)  (7.29) (3.76) (5.18) 
IO_SEN*CSI300 -0.304 -0.154 -0.317  0.210 0.249 0.364 
 (-1.64) (-1.43) (-1.45)  (0.31) (0.42) (0.21) 
IO_TOTAL YES YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Intercept -0.015 -0.078 -0.018  -2.210*** -3.466*** -1.975*** 
 (-0.61) (-1.30) (-0.78)  (-14.88) (-5.21) (-10.25) 
F-statistics   255.243    195.726 
Sargan p-value    0.124    0.667 
R2 (%) 13.25 57.50 13.52  17.63 71.51 17.32 
N 6 624 6 624 6 624  6 624 6 624 6 624 
This table presents the pooled OLS, FE and 2SLS estimations of the relationship between disaggregated institutional ownership and financial performance considering 
the interaction between INDEX (i.e. CSI300) and IO_INSEN (IO_SEN) over the period 2008 to 2013 for China. The results of relationship between financial 
performance and pressure-insensitive and pressure-sensitive institutional ownership with interaction item are reported in Panel A and Panel B respectively. The dependent 
variables are ROE and EPS in both Panels A and B. All variables included in the regressions are winsorised at the 1% and 99% level. The F-test and Hausman test reject 
the null hypothesis, and hence FE is more suitable compared to pooled OLS and RE. For the 2SLS, the F-statistic for testing the joint statistical significance of instrument 
variables and the Sargan statistic for testing overidentifying restrictions are also reported, and the results show that the instruments are not weak, and are valid. Year and 
industry effects are controlled in all regressions. T-statistics are reported in parentheses; ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Variable 
definitions are reported in Appendix 1. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
102 
 
Except for listing history (AGE), the impact of the control variables on financial 
performance in the context of South Africa was similar to that in the Chinese setting. 
More specifically, large firms with low financial leverage and high sales growth were 
likely to achieve greater financial performance. In terms of listing history, South 
African firms with long listing histories are associated with sound financial 
performance15, but this statement does not hold true in the context of China. This 
evidence could offer an explanation for the findings in Chapter 2, where it was found 
that institutional investors in South Africa invest more in firms with long listing 
histories, while in China they do not. 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
Employing a sample of 183 listed South African companies over the period 2010 to 
2013 and 1 104 listed Chinese companies over the period 2008 to 2013, and after 
accounting for the potential endogeneity problem, this chapter explored the 
relationship between institutional ownership and improved CFP. The findings 
revealed that institutional ownership as a whole has a significant relationship with 
improved CFP (as measured by ROE and EPS) in both South Africa and China. Aside 
from a number of similarities between the results reported for the two countries, 
institutional investors in South Africa demonstrate differences in promoting CFP from 
their counterparts in China when considering the interaction between CFP and the 
market index. In China, institutional ownership appears likely to have a greater impact 
on the financial performance of the CSI 300 index listed companies compared to non-
CSI 300 companies, while this finding does not hold true in South Africa. 
 
In addition, this chapter confirmed that pressure sensitivity is an important force in 
determining whether institutional investors conduct monitoring or not. In the Chinese 
                                                        
15 The results indicated in Panels A of Tables 3.3 and 3.5 report an insignificant (a significant) relationship between 
LEV and ROE (EPS), between AGE and ROE (EPS), partly suggesting that EPS (more specifically, HEPS) is 
more related to firm characteristics than ROE in South Africa. It is not surprising that HEPS is considered to be 
one of the most important financial performance measurements in South Africa. 
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market, monitoring and inefficient participation co-exist within institutional investor 
groups. More specifically, pressure-insensitive institutional ownership is positively 
related to CFP, as opposed to pressure-sensitive institutional ownership, which 
inefficiently affects CFP. These findings remain consistent when excluding the 
potential impact of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis by only considering 2010-
2013 data. Similarly, the evidence remains consistent after taking into consideration 
the interaction between institutional ownership and inclusion in a market index. This 
chapter suggests that pressure-insensitive institutional investors could, to some extent, 
be performing an efficient monitoring role. However, pressure-sensitive institutional 
investors appear to be inefficient in monitoring. Their potential alignment with 
managers or controlling shareholders acts against their fiduciary interests. 
 
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that aggregated institutional ownership is 
significantly and positively related to ROE and EPS in China. This relationship is 
inconsistent with the distribution trends observed during the study period; that is, 
aggregated institutional ownership (as well as pressure-sensitive institutional 
ownership) slightly increased from 2008 to 2013, while ROE and EPS (as well as 
pressure-insensitive institutional ownership) declined during this period. Given this 
evidence, the findings suggest that the positive relationship between institutional 
investors as a whole and financial performance may be largely attributed to the impact 
of pressure-insensitive institutional investors, which account for the largest percentage 
of institutional investors in the Chinese equity market. 
 
When combined, the findings of this chapter highlight the importance of considering 
the heterogeneity of institutional investors. For South Africa, the question of whether 
different types of institutional investors play heterogeneous roles towards improving 
CFP was not covered in this chapter due to data limitations. Thus, within the South 
African setting, the impact of institutional investors at the disaggregated level on 
corporate performance needs to be further investigated. Additionally, prior studies 
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suggest that stable and long-term-focused institutional investors are more likely to 
promote corporate performance, but this chapter was unable to corroborate this given 
the limited period covered. Moreover, the question of whether or not the efficient role 
some institutional investors play in promoting CFP was achieved by directly 
influencing management with voting rights (exercising their voice) or in a more 
indirect way by selling their shares (voting with their feet) needs to be further 
explored. 
 
Given the fact that accounting earnings are frequently manipulated, the impact of 
institutional investors on corporate governance from a financial perspective could 
perhaps be better reflected by an advancement in earnings to demonstrate the actual 
performance of a firm. The focus of the next chapter is thus placed on the relationship 
between institutional ownership and earnings management reduction. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DOES INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP MATTER? EVIDENCE 
FROM EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
4.1 Introduction 
In modern corporations characterised by the separation of ownership and control  
(Berle & Means, 1932; Claessens, Djankov & Lang, 2000; Fama & Jensen, 1983), 
owners rely extensively on financial reports, which are used by managers to convey 
underlying corporate financial information to external parties that are interested in 
corporate performance (Hong & Andersen, 2011). The costliness of monitoring, the 
nature of accrual accounting as well as imperfect auditing are likely to provide 
managers with a great deal of discretion to manipulate the accounting earnings reported 
in the financial statements. This phenomenon, also known as earnings management, 
occurs “when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring 
transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes 
that depend on reported accounting numbers” (Healy & Wahlen, 1999: 368). 
Furthermore, in firms with concentrated ownership structures, besides management, 
controlling shareholders also become involved in financial statement preparation, and 
they are likely to manage reported earnings artificially (Chen & Zhang, 2014). 
 
Earnings management is a commonly recognised practice among public companies 
across the globe (Dechow, Hutton, Kim & Sloan, 2012; Dechow & Skinner, 2000). It 
is perceived to adversely affect the quality of financial reports, accelerate information 
asymmetry between shareholders and managers (Ascioglu, Hegde, Krishnan & 
McDermott, 2012; Hadani et al., 2011), and mislead market participants, thereby 
decreasing market efficiency (Ascioglu et al., 2012; De Jong, Mertens, Van der Poel 
& Van Dijk, 2014). Prior studies have found that firms with high levels of earnings 
management are more likely to experience declines in subsequent earnings 
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performance (Alhadab, Clacher & Keasey, 2013; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; DuCharme, 
Malatesta & Sefcik, 2001). Earnings management is also positively related to 
subsequent earnings restatement (Ettredge, Scholz, Smith & Sun, 2010; Firth, Rui & 
Wu, 2011; Harris & Bromiley, 2007; Richardson, Tuna & Wu, 2002). Therefore, 
unsurprisingly, the phenomenon of earnings management has attracted attention from 
academics, practitioners, policy makers and regulators alike. 
 
Prior studies (e.g. Cormier, Houle & Ledoux, 2013; Cornett, Marcus & Tehranian, 
2008; Hazarika, Karpoff & Nahata, 2012; Jiambalvo, 1996; Lo, Wong & Firth, 2010; 
Xie, Davidson & Dadalt, 2003) have highlighted the importance of corporate 
governance on mitigating earnings management. Representing an essential element of 
corporate governance mechanisms, institutional investors are sophisticated market 
participants who are generally willing to engage in shareholder activism (Aggarwal et 
al., 2011; Bushee et al., 2014; Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney, 1996; Gillian & Starks, 
2003; Mizuno, 2010; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Engaging in earnings management 
mitigation could be a way for institutional investors to address their fiduciary 
responsibilities as well as a means to advance corporate governance. 
 
The existing literature presents ambiguous views on the role institutional investors 
play in earnings management. Institutional investors can lower the level of earnings 
management (Chung et al., 2002; Cornett et al., 2008; Hadani et al., 2011; Velury & 
Jenkins, 2006), but they are not always able to monitor the managers or controlling 
shareholders. In extreme cases, institutional investors may collude with these parties 
and increase their incentives to engage in manipulative activities (see Burns et al., 
2010; Siregar & Utama, 2008). Few studies appear to have been conducted on this 
topic in emerging markets, including South Africa and China. 
 
South Africa maintains a satisfactory level of accounting transparency and disclosure  
(Patel, Balic & Bwakira, 2002); it was an early adopter of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) (Coetzee & Schmulian, 2013), with listed companies required to fully 
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comply with IFRS since 2005. However, earnings quality does not appear to have 
significantly improved post IFRS adoption (Ames, 2013). South Africa is also considered  
a pioneer in corporate governance practices within Africa (see the King III Report), but 
whether this has contributed to an improvement in firms’ earnings quality is still unclear. 
 
Compared to South Africa, China lacks established accounting standards and an 
effective corporate governance framework (Kuo et al., 2014), although this situation has 
been improving in recent years. To achieve convergence with IFRS, for instance, the 
New Accounting Standard (NAS) was introduced in China in 2007, although increased 
earnings management has been observed since (Zhang et al., 2013). In addition to the 
NAS, the NTS Reform in China created conditions to advance improvements in 
corporate governance (Beltratti, Bortolotti & Caccavaio, 2011). According to Jiang and 
Habib (2012), earnings management practices are partially constrained by the NTS 
Reform. Nonetheless, there is not sufficient evidence to prove that the quality of firms’ 
financial information has substantially improved in the post-reform period. 
 
Given the paucity of research on this topic and the above-mentioned differences in 
regulatory environment between South Africa and China, an examination on the 
impact of institutional investors on earnings management in a South African and 
Chinese setting is essential. The primary research question this chapter tried to answer 
is as follows: Does investment by institutional investors reduce the problem of 
earnings management? The secondary research questions are: (1) How pervasive is 
earnings management in South Africa and China? (2) Does institutional ownership 
have different influences on income-increasing earnings management versus income-
decreasing earnings management? (3) Are institutional investors heterogeneous 
towards earnings management reduction? 
 
By employing a sample of 174 South African and 1 069 Chinese listed firms, this 
chapter found evidence that accrual-based earnings management widely occurred 
among the listed companies from both countries. The influence of institutional 
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investors on earnings management is context-dependent: it varies by country, by the 
type of institutional investor involved, by the percentage of ownership that is held by 
institutional investors, as well as by the nature of the earnings management. More 
specifically, institutional investors could play an efficient monitoring role when 
dealing with income-decreasing earnings management in South Africa, but seem 
inefficient in mitigating income-increasing earnings management. Institutional 
investors in China, however, have the opposite effect: they are effective in reducing 
income-increasing earnings management, but seem unable to deal with income-
decreasing earnings management. When distinguishing between different types of 
institutional ownership, pressure-insensitive and pressure-sensitive institutional 
investors exercise similar influences on income-increasing earnings management; 
while they deal differently with income-decreasing earnings management. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 provides a review 
of the relevant literature on earnings thresholds and the relationship between 
institutional ownership and earnings management. Section 4.3 reports on the source of 
the data required, describes the sample, provides descriptive statistics and introduces 
the methodology employed in this chapter. Section 4.4 presents the earnings 
distribution and discretionary accruals statistics and the results of the regressions, 
while Section 4.5 concludes. 
 
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 Earnings management and earnings thresholds 
Earnings management practices are considered a means to meet certain profit 
thresholds, especially in the literature that focuses on earnings distribution. The 
incentive behind earnings thresholds is referred to as the threshold mentality 
(Degeorge, Patel & Zeckhauser, 1999; Hsu & Koh, 2005), and is to some extent 
explained by prospect theory and transaction theory. This incentive reflects the 
psychological effect of engaging in earnings management. 
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Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) examined the management of earnings to meet two 
thresholds, namely to report a positive profit and to sustain recent performance, and 
indicated that companies are likely to manage their financial statements in such a way 
as to report small profit increases or avoid reporting losses. Degeorge et al. (1999) 
identified three thresholds that help drive earnings management. Aside from the two 
thresholds mentioned in Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), they suggested another 
threshold, namely to meet analysts’ expectations. The threshold theory has been widely 
cited in studies on earnings distribution (e.g. Amar & Abaoub, 2010; Bollen & Pool, 
2009; Burgstahler & Chuk, 2015; Christodoulou & Mcleay, 2009; El-Sayed Ebaid, 
2012; Lahr, 2014; Li, 2014; Li et al., 2011; Yu, Du & Sun, 2006). Bollen and Pool 
(2009), Christodoulou and Mcleay (2009) and Lahr (2014) identified discontinuities in 
the distribution of the earnings of listed companies in South Africa. Similarly, Li et al. 
(2011) and Yu et al. (2006) found that Chinese listed companies use such techniques to 
meet or beat earnings thresholds set by the CSRC for regulations related to IPOs, rights 
issues and delisting. 
 
Previous studies largely focused on income-increasing earnings management (which 
increases income in the current year at the expense of income in future years); firms 
with non-discretionary earnings below a certain threshold set by them are usually 
expected to use income-increasing earnings management (Hsu & Koh, 2005). Similarly, 
the type of earnings management discussed in studies investigating the relationship with 
institutional ownership mainly refers to income-increasing earnings management. 
Earnings management can also be used to decrease current earnings in order to increase 
future income, i.e. income-decreasing earnings management or taking an earnings 
bath16, as reflected in Figure 4.1. Income-decreasing earnings management, however, is 
not widely discussed; the relationship between institutional ownership engagement and 
income-decreasing earnings management therefore remains unknown (Hsu & Koh, 
2005).
                                                        
16 Taking an earnings bath refers to “reducing earnings when latent earnings are disappointing” (Degeorge et al., 
1999: 11). 
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Figure 4.1 Earnings management patterns. Source: Degeorge et al. (1999: 12) 
 
4.2.2 Institutional ownership and earnings management 
Although a considerable body of research has focused on earnings management 
(especially within the context of the US), the impact of institutional ownership 
engagement on earnings management received less attention, and most references are 
observed in literature regarding the relationship between corporate governance and 
earnings management. A number of studies (e.g. Cormier et al., 2013; Cornett et al., 
2008; Hazarika et al., 2012; Jiambalvo, 1996; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005; Lo et al., 
2010; Xie et al., 2003; Lakhal, 2015) have stated that improved corporate governance 
mechanisms (including institutional ownership) are expected to mitigate 
management’s opportunistic behaviour, as well as tunnelling behaviour by controlling 
shareholders17. 
                                                        
17 Tunneling refers to “the transfer of resources out of a company to its controlling shareholders” (Johnson, La 
Porta, Lopez–de–Silanes & Shleifer, 2000: 22). According to Johnson et al. (2000), it could be presented in two 
forms: that is, controlling shareholders could transfer resources by conducting self-dealing transactions, or they 
could increase their shareholding of the companies to discriminate against minority shareholders. 
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Institutional investors (especially large ones) that have a large amount of capital and 
superior access to timely and relevant information have the ability and incentive to 
efficiently monitor management (Bajo et al., 2013; Chung & Zhang, 2011; Elyasiani 
& Jia, 2010; Jiambalvo, Rajgopal & Ventkatachalam, 2002; Yuan et al., 2008). 
According to the efficient monitoring hypothesis posited by Pound (1988), 
“institutional investors have greater expertise and can monitor management at a lower 
cost than small atomistic shareholders” (McConnell & Servaes, 1990: 599), which 
suggests that institutional investors are likely to engage in shareholder activism and 
may inhibit managers from manipulating earnings. Jung and Kwon (2002) suggested 
that the information content of earnings is improved with an increase in institutional 
ownership in Korea. Cornett et al. (2008) found that increased monitoring of accrual 
management by institutional investors is associated with lower levels of earnings 
management. Similarly, Hashim and Devi (2012) and Velury and Jenkins (2006) 
demonstrated a significant and positive relationship between institutional ownership 
and the quality of reported earnings. Evidence from Chung et al. (2002) and Hadani et 
al. (2011) furthermore indicated that only large institutional investors are likely to be 
effective in inhibiting managers from manipulating reported profits. 
 
In contrast, some researchers argue that institutional investors are not always actively 
involved in the corporate governance of their portfolio companies, and instead may 
focus on short-term financial outcomes (e.g. Chen et al., 2008; Liang et al., 2011; 
Webb, Beck & Mckinnon, 2003). In accordance with the conflict-of-interest 
hypothesis, which documents that in view of “other profitable business relationships 
with the firm, institutional investors are coerced into voting their shares with 
management” (McConnell & Servaes, 1990: 599), and the strategic-alignment 
hypothesis, which states that “institutional owners and managers find it mutually 
advantageous to cooperate” (McConnell & Servaes, 1990: 599), institutional investors 
may be short-term oriented and unable to monitor management. Consequently, 
managers are likely to pursue short-term earnings to meet earnings expectations. In 
this regard, institutional ownership is not always efficient to mitigate earnings 
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management; in extreme cases, institutional investors may even collude with 
managers and controlling shareholders and increase their incentive to engage in 
manipulative activities (Burns et al., 2010; Siregar & Utama, 2008; Velury & Jenkins, 
2006; Wang, 2014). 
 
Siregar and Utama (2008) indicated that there is no significant relationship between 
institutional investors’ engagement and earnings quality. Furthermore, Burns et al. 
(2010) found that institutional investors, especially institutional investors with short-
term horizons, are positively associated with financial misreporting. Along the same 
line they also suggested that corporate earnings management is even worse when 
transient institutional investors, who are inactive and have little incentive to serve as 
monitors, increase their ownership holdings in a firm. In addition, the large proportion 
of shares held by institutional investors provides them with opportunities to access 
private information, which may be exploited to further their own benefits (Koh, 2003). 
Concentrated institutional ownership may therefore be negatively associated with 
earnings quality (Velury & Jenkins, 2006). 
 
Furthermore, the association between institutional investors and earnings management 
may be complex (Hsu & Koh, 2005). Simply concluding that a positive or a negative 
relationship exists between the level of institutional ownership and earnings 
management is questionable. Koh (2003) explored the relationship between institutional 
investors and earnings management in Australian firms, and found that firms 
characterised by lower levels of institutional ownership are less likely to eliminate 
earnings management than those firms where institutional ownership levels are 
relatively high. That is, there is a non-linear relationship between institutional 
ownership and earnings management. These findings are similar to those of Burns et al. 
(2010), who suggested that only concentrated institutional ownership has a negative 
relationship with misreporting by firms. Hsu and Koh (2005) extended the work of Koh 
(2003) and found that long-term oriented institutional investors are able to function as a 
corporate governance mechanism to mitigate accrual management, while transient 
institutional investors are not. Wang (2014) surmised that active institutional investors 
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with ownership levels of 10 to 20 per cent significantly limit income-increasing 
abnormal accruals; however, these institutional investors enhance income-decreasing 
abnormal accruals. Velury and Jenkins (2006) found that there is a positive relationship 
between institutional ownership and earnings quality; this relationship, however, 
appears to be negative when institutional ownership is largely concentrated. 
 
4.3 Data and methods 
This section introduces that data source and sample used in this chapter, as well as the 
regression equations and the variables. 
 
4.3.1 Data source and sample 
The sample used in this chapter was selected from all companies listed on the JSE main 
board in South Africa, as well as companies listed on the SSE and SZSE main boards in 
China. South African data on institutional ownership and FTSE/JSE Top 40 index 
constituents were collected from the Bloomberg (2015) database, and the other data 
were obtained from the INET BFA (2015) database. Chinese data on institutional 
ownership was collected from RESSET (2015) database, while other data were 
gathered from the CSMAR (2015) database. The period covered in this chapter is 2010 
to 2013 for the South African context and 2008 to 2013 for the Chinese context18. 
 
In calculating discretionary accruals, firms with fewer than 15 observations in an 
industry group for any specific year were excluded in order to ensure a sufficiently 
large pool to estimate expected core earnings, as suggested by McVay (2006) and 
Roychowdhury (2006), as well as firms in the financial sectors and those with missing 
data for any variables. In addition, all companies should have been listed for at least 
one year before the date of their calendar year end for 2010 in South Africa and 2008 
in China in order to be included. The final sample consisted of 174 firms in South 
Africa over the period 2010 to 2013 and 1 069 firms in China over the period 2008 to 
2013. 
                                                        
18 The reasoning behind the sample was discussed in Chapter 2 and will not be repeated here. 
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4.3.2 Variables 
4.3.2.1 Earnings management 
Earnings management can be divided into accrual-based and real earnings management. 
Only accrual-based earnings management (the manipulation of earnings through the 
exploitation of accounting discretion) will be discussed in this chapter. Unlike cash 
flows, accruals are more subject to managerial incentives, and are thus potentially more 
useful for assessing the quality of earnings (Andreou, Louca & Panayides, 2014). This 
chapter used discretionary accruals to measure accrual-based earnings management by 
means of a modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney, 1995), which is 
considered the most effective way to detect earnings management (Hadani et al., 2011), 
and has been widely used in prior studies (e.g. Hu, Li, Liu, Qi & Tian, 2012; Jiang, Zhu 
& Huang, 2013; Kuo et al., 2014; Njah & Jarboui, 2013). 
 
The modified Jones model (1995) is defined as follows: 
1 2 3
1 1 1 1
1
( ) ( ) ( )it it it it it
it it it it
TA REV REC PPE
A A A A
   
   
 
                             (4.1) 
 
where TAit reflects total accruals (TA) of firm i for year t. TA is calculated as the 
difference between reported net earnings and operating cash flow. Ait-1 represents the total 
assets for year t-1. △REVit is the change in sales revenue between year t-1 and year t, 
while △RECit is the change in account receivables between year t-1 and year t. PPEit 
refers to gross property, plant and equipment. 
 
TA has two components, namely non-discretionary accruals (NA) and discretionary 
accruals (DA). The following equation was applied to estimate NA: 
1 2 3
1 1 1 1
1
( ) ( ) ( )it it it it
it it it it
NA REV REC PPE
A A A A
  
   
 
                             (4.2) 
 
where the estimates for coefficients 1, 2 and 3 were obtained from Model 4.1, and 
were estimated for cross-sectional data within each year and industry. The specific 
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estimate for every year was run for industrial sectors with more than 15 firms. DA 
was then measured as the difference between TA and NA, according to Equation 4.3. 
it it itDA TA NA                                                                 (4.3) 
 
Thus, DA as the proxy for earnings management was considered the dependent 
variable, with a distinction being made between the absolute value of DA (|DA|), 
positive DA (DA+) and negative DA (DA-). 
 
4.3.2.2 Other variables 
Institutional ownership (IO) variables are employed as independent variables, which 
include the aggregated institutional ownership (IO_TOTAL), as well as the disaggregated 
institutional ownership (pressure-sensitive institutional ownership, IO_SEN, and 
pressure-insensitive institutional ownership, IO_INSEN)19. The distinction between 
pressure-insensitive and pressure-sensitive institutional ownership is used to detect 
their heterogeneous impacts on opportunistic earnings manipulation behaviour. 
 
Based on previous studies (e.g. Chung et al., 2002; Emamgholipour, Bagheri, 
Mansourinia & Arabi, 2013; Hadani et al., 2011; Hsu & Koh, 2005; Hutchinson & 
Leung, 2007; Jalil & Rahman, 2010; Jiang & Habib, 2012; Jiang et al., 2013; Koh, 
2003, 2007; Zhang et al., 2013), the following variables were included as control 
variables: leverage (LEV), firm size (SIZE), listing history (AGE), return on assets 
(ROA), cash flow from operations (CFO) and sales growth (GROW). In addition, 
when conducting regressions of relationships between disaggregated institutional 
ownership and earnings management, the aggregated institutional ownership 
(IO_TOTAL) was also controlled for the impact of the unspecified types of 
institutional investors on earnings management. The descriptive statistics of the major 
variables included in the chapter are presented in Table 4.120. 
                                                        
19  This classification is applied to the Chinese context only. For the definitions of pressure-insensitive and 
pressure-sensitive institutional ownership, as well as the reason for adopting this classification of institutional 
ownership, please see Chapter 1. For brevity, this chapter will not repeat them here. 
20 All the data except for DA, ROA and CFO have been presented and discussed in Chapter 3. Although the sample 
used in this chapter is not exactly the same as that used in Chapter 3, the value is close. Also, the descriptive 
statistics of DA are provided in Section 4.4.1 of this chapter. For brevity, the descriptive statistics of those data are 
not repeated here. For ROA, the mean (median) is 0.086 (0.093) for the 174 South African firms, which performed 
better than the 1 069 Chinese companies with 0.036 (0.030). The mean (median) CFO is 0.095 (0.087) for the 174 
South African firms, which is higher than the 0.045 (0.043) of the 1 069 Chinese firms. 
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Table 4.1 
Descriptive statistics 
 Mean SD Min Max Med 
Panel A Descriptive statistics for South Africa 
DA 0.000 0.111 -0.322 0.361 0.001 
IO_TOTAL  0.415 0.295 0.000 1.413 0.373 
LEV 0.581 0.346 0.005 3.772 0.544 
SIZE 14.652 1.973 7.533 20.420 14.589 
AGE 2.780 0.959 0.000 4.771 2.773 
ROA 0.086 0.184 -1.099 0.630 0.093 
CFO 0.095 0.351 -1.818 1.590 0.087 
GROW 0.145 0.442 -0.741 3.410 0.092 
Panel B Descriptive statistics for China 
DA -0.002 0.096 -0.782 0.874 -0.003 
IO_TOTAL  0.166 0.183 0.000 0.919 0.096 
IO_INSEN 0.055 0.088 0.000 0.665 0.015 
IO_SEN 0.011 0.023 0.000 0.449 0.000 
LEV 0.528 0.191 0.007 1.094 0.542 
SIZE 22.140 1.331 18.367 28.482 21.979 
AGE 2.448 0.392 0.000 3.135 2.485 
ROA 0.036 0.055 -0.155 0.216 0.030 
CFO 0.045 0.069 -0.088 0.183 0.043 
GROW 0.142 0.283 -0.321 0.888 0.106 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the regressions for  
174 South African firms over the period 2010 to 2013 (696 observations) in Panel A,  
and 1 069 Chinese firms over the period 2008 to 2013 (6 414 observations) in Panel B. 
Variable definitions are reported in Appendix 1. 
 
4.3.3 Methodology 
This chapter takes the direction of DA into account. Thus, before conducting 
regressions to examine whether institutional ownership is associated with the absolute 
value of earnings management (|DA|), this chapter first assessed the associations 
between positive DA (DA+) and institutional ownership, and between negative DA 
(DA-) and institutional ownership, as reflected in Equation 4.4. 
 
, 0 , ,1
n
m it k k it j j it itj
DA IO CON   

                                   (4.4) 
 
Since Hsu and Koh (2005) and Koh (2003) suggested that a concave relationship 
exists between institutional ownership and discretionary accruals, this chapter also 
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considered Equation 4.5, to assess whether such an association is observed. 
 
2
0 , , ,1
n
it k k it k k it j j it itj
DA IO IO CON    

                            (4.5) 
 
where DAm,it refers to DA variables m (m = positive, negative and absolute) for 
company i at time t. IOk,it refers to institutional ownership variable k (k = TOTAL, 
INSEN and SEN). CONj,it represents control variables j (j = 1, 2,…n). 0 is the 
intercept; k and k are the regression coefficients of IOk,it and IO2k,it respectively. j is 
the regression coefficients of CONj,it. it is the error term. The correlation matrix for 
the major variables is presented in Table 4.2. The correlation results suggest that the 
variables included in the analysis are not highly correlated with each other (the 
correlation coefficients do not exceed 0.5) within both the South African, as well as 
the Chinese sample. 
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Table 4.2  
Correlation matrix 
Panel A Correlation matrix for South Africa 
 
IO_TOTAL 
1 
LEV 
2 
SIZE 
3 
AGE 
4 
ROA 
5 
CFO 
6 
GROW 
7 
1 1 
      
2 -0.032 1 
     
3 0.384*** -0.099*** 1 
    
4 0.188*** -0.110*** 0.265*** 1 
   
5 0.063* -0.171*** 0.305*** 0.063* 1 
  
6 0.144*** -0.036 0.306*** 0.020 0.452*** 1 
 
7 -0.023 0.018 -0.084** -0.117*** -0.004 -0.082** 1 
Panel B Correlation matrix for China 
 
IO_TOTAL 
1 
IO_INSEN 
2 
IO_SEN 
3 
LEV 
4 
SIZE 
5 
AGE 
6 
ROA 
7 
CFO 
8 
GROW 
9 
1 1         
2 0.401*** 1 
    
 
  
3 0.146*** 0.049*** 1 
   
 
  
4 -0.041*** -0.037*** -0.011 1 
  
 
  
5 0.068*** 0.222*** 0.070*** 0.320*** 1 
 
 
  
6 0.001 -0.083*** 0.034*** 0.032** -0.086*** 1  
  
7 0.195*** 0.405*** 0.036*** -0.347*** 0.136*** -0.038*** 1   
8 0.100*** 0.225*** -0.034*** -0.161*** 0.063*** -0.094*** 0.367*** 1 
 
9 0.067*** 0.140*** 0.002 0.088*** 0.126*** -0.047*** 0.277*** 0.087*** 1 
This table reports the correlation matrix for the independent and control variables included in regressions. Panel A presents the Pearson correlation matrix for 
174 South African firms over the period 2010 to 2013, while Panel B reports the correlations for 1 069 Chinese firms over the period 2008 to 2013. ***, **, * 
represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix 1. 
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The association between institutional ownership and earnings management is complex 
and context-dependent. Based upon their earnings distribution, companies can be 
divided into profit-making companies (non-discretionary earnings greater than zero, i.e. 
NNI>0) and loss-making companies (NNI<0). Furthermore, a distinction is also made 
between companies with NNI exceeding the prior year’s (DNNI>0) and those with NNI 
below the prior year’s (DNNI<0). This chapter conducted regressions by considering 
firms’ earnings threshold (zero earnings and prior year’s earnings) to explore the 
influence of institutional investors on earnings management in different settings. 
 
In line with the methodology employed in the majority of prior studies, regressions 
were estimated by means of pooled OLS and FE approaches. Furthermore, to address 
the potential endogeneity problem between institutional ownership and earnings 
management, 2SLS estimations were also employed, as proposed by Chi, Yang and 
Young (2014). Trading liquidity (TURN) and return volatility (VOL) were used as 
instrument variables for institutional ownership; these instruments were correlated 
with institutional ownership, while not correlated with discretionary accruals except 
indirectly through other independent variables21. 
 
In case of the 2SLS regressions, the F-statistic for testing the joint statistical 
significance of the instrument variables is reported. For all regressions, this figure was 
greater than 10, suggesting that the instruments are not weak (Staiger & Stock, 1997). 
Simultaneously, a Sargan test was performed where the results did not reject the null 
hypothesis, indicating that the instruments are valid in all 2SLS regressions. 
 
4.4 Results 
This section reports the descriptive statistics of earnings management and the regression 
results in terms of the influence of institutional ownership on accrual-based earnings 
management. 
                                                        
21 This choice of instruments for institutional ownership is consistent with the approach discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
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4.4.1 Descriptive statistics of earnings management 
4.4.1.1 Earnings distribution 
In earnings distribution literature, the threshold theory suggests that companies 
involved in earnings management are expected to observe a discontinuity in the 
distribution of their earnings or earnings changes around zero; if firms manage their 
earnings to meet or beat a threshold, there will be more than the expected number of 
earnings observations just above the threshold and less than the expected number just 
below it. Consistent with Burgstahler and Chuk (2015) and Burgstahler and Dichev 
(1997), who used histograms and frequencies to test for a discontinuity in the 
distribution of earnings and earnings changes, this chapter employs a similar method 
to assess whether such phenomena (i.e. avoiding negative earnings and earnings 
decreases) are observed among South African and Chinese listed companies. 
 
This chapter uses ROE to display firms’ earnings distribution, consistent with Li, Niu, 
Zhang and Largay (2011), Yao and Niu (2015) and Yu et al. (2006), and also in line 
with Chapters 2 and 3. Figure 4.2 demonstrates the distribution of ROE with 
histogram interval widths of 0.02 for the range -1 to 1. Panel A shows the distribution 
of ROE for South African listed firms with an irregularity near zero; such a 
distribution is consistent with earnings management to avoid earnings loss. Similarly, 
Panel B displays the distribution of ROE for Chinese listed companies, with a 
discontinuity in the distribution of earnings at zero. The frequency interval [0, 0.02) is 
much greater than in interval (-0.02, 0], suggesting that Chinese firms exhibit negative 
earnings avoidance behaviour. 
 
Figure 4.3 depicts a histogram of ROE changes. Panels A and B demonstrate a single 
peaked, bell-shaped distribution. Panel A indicates that JSE-listed companies manage 
earnings to avoid decreases with the irregularity near zero, but the frequency of ROE 
changes above zero more than those below. In China, however, listed firms tend to 
manage earnings towards a small decrease, as Panel B shows that the peak frequency 
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is located in interval (-0.02, 0]. This phenomenon suggests that instead of income-
increasing earnings management, firms are more likely to engage in income-
decreasing earnings management in China. 
 
Panel A ROE for South Africa                                 Panel B ROE for China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Distribution of ROE. This figure presents the ROE distribution of a sample of 174 
listed companies in South Africa (Panel A) and 1 069 listed companies in China (Panel B). 
The distribution interval widths are 0.02, and the location of zero on the horizontal axis is 
marked by the solid red line. For instance, the first interval to the right of zero contains all 
ROE in the interval [0, 0.02), and so on. The vertical axis labelled Frequency represents the 
number of observations in each ROE interval. Additionally, a few observations outside the 
scale of [-1, 1] are not displayed in this figure. 
 
Panel A DROE for South Africa                            Panel B DROE for China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Distribution of changes in ROE (DROE). This figure presents the DROE 
distribution of a sample of 174 listed companies in South Africa (Panel A) and 1 069 listed 
companies in China (Panel B). The distribution interval widths are 0.02, and the location of 
zero on the horizontal axis is marked by the solid red line. For instance, the first interval to 
the right of zero contains all changes in ROE in the interval [0, 0.02), and so on. The vertical 
axis labelled Frequency represents the number of observations in each change in ROE interval. 
Additionally, a few observations outside the scale of [-1, 1] are not displayed in this figure. 
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4.4.1.2 Accrual-based earnings management 
Earnings management is represented by DA. Using the modified Jones model 
introduced in Section 4.3.2.1, DA was computed as the difference between TA and 
NA. Table 4.3 and Figure 4.4 present the descriptive statistics of DA over the study 
period. 
 
Table 4.3  
Descriptive statistics of discretionary accruals (DA) 
 Mean SD Min Max Med 
Panel A DA for South Africa 
2010 0.000 0.102 -0.211 0.253 -0.015 
2011 0.000 0.103 -0.322 0.241 0.012 
2012 0.000 0.117 -0.272 0.361 -0.007 
2013 0.000 0.122 -0.307 0.311 0.002 
Total 0.000 0.111 -0.322 0.361 0.001 
Panel B DA for China 
2008 0.001 0.110 -0.692 0.807 -0.002 
2009 -0.004 0.110 -0.782 0.874 -0.002 
2010 -0.001 0.096 -0.558 0.651 -0.006 
2011 -0.001 0.101 -0.583 0.500 -0.002 
2012 -0.002 0.076 -0.469 0.413 -0.002 
2013 -0.004 0.076 -0.392 0.491 -0.004 
Total -0.002 0.096 -0.782 0.874 -0.003 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of DA for 174 South African firms over the period 
2010 to 2013 in Panel A, and 1 069 Chinese firms over the period 2008 to 2013 in Panel B. 
Variable definitions are reported in Appendix 1. 
 
Table 4.3 reflects that the mean values of DA for the South African firms are 
approximately zero for each year of the study period. The range of DA values was not 
narrowed down during the period 2010 to 2013 (following the release of the King III 
report)22, to some extent indicating that earnings quality has not been improved in this 
respect. The signs of the median DA values for the South African firms alternate 
between positive and negative during subsequent years, suggesting that South African 
firms are motivated to smooth earnings by altering their earnings from one period to 
another, which can be more directly observed in Panel A of Figure 4.4. 
                                                        
22 For more details on the DA distribution, please see Appendix 3. 
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Panel A DA for South Africa                                Panel B DA for China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Overall distribution of discretionary accruals (DA). This figure presents the 
overall distribution of DA for a sample of 174 South African listed firms over the period 2010 
to 2013 (Panel A) and 1 069 Chinese listed firms over the period 2008 to 2013 (Panel B). 
 
When considering the DA distribution of the Chinese companies, Table 4.3 shows that 
the mean DA value is close to zero, while the median value is negative over the entire 
study period. Consequently, it seems as if the Chinese firms are more likely to engage 
in income-decreasing than income-increasing earnings management. This finding is 
consistent with the evidence presented in Section 4.4.1.1, where it was shown that 
firms manage earnings to achieve small decreases (as reflected by the peak of the 
ROE changes being located on the left side of zero). These results would suggest that 
instead of ‘borrowing’ money against their future earnings, Chinese listed companies 
prefer saving some of their current earnings for the future. These results also support 
the findings by Li, Selover and Stein (2011) that Chinese companies are inclined to 
manage their earnings towards zero. Chinese firms therefore employ income-
increasing earnings management if earnings are negative, and vice versa. Given that 
more than 90 per cent of the Chinese firms included in the sample are profit-making 
firms (not reported), it is not difficult to understand why these companies appear to 
exhibit income-decreasing discretionary accruals, i.e. negative DA. 
 
Furthermore, Figure 4.4 shows that a wider range of earnings management is 
observed in China (-0.782 to 0.874) compared to South Africa (-0.322 to 0.361), 
suggesting that accrual-based earnings management is much more pronounced in the 
case of the Chinese firms. This difference in the level of DA observed between South 
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Africa and China could be affected by institutional factors such as laws, market 
mechanisms and regulations. For instance, corporate earnings management seems 
more serious in countries with weak investor protection (Gopalan & Jayaraman, 2012; 
Haw, Hu, Hwang & Wu, 2004; Leuz, Nanda & Wysocki, 2003). South Africa is a 
common-law country, where investors are always better protected than in civil-law 
countries, such as China. Besides, Chinese regulations in terms of accounting 
standards and corporate governance are not as well established as those in South 
Africa. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the range of DA values among the 
Chinese listed companies seems to have narrowed down during the study period23, 
potentially suggesting that reported earnings quality improved after the release of the 
NAS and the completion of the NTS Reform24. 
 
Figure 4.5 compares the DA distributions of companies that are included in the market 
index (the Top 40 index for South Africa, and the CSI 300 index for China) with non-
index companies. Overall, the index companies displayed lower levels of DA than 
non-index ones. One possible explanation is that the index companies have superior 
corporate governance. This finding supports the evidence that institutional investors 
pay less attention to financial performance when they select index companies 
compared to non-index ones, as reported in Chapter 2. Nonetheless, in South Africa, 
the finding only applies to the income-decreasing earnings management situation; for 
income-increasing earnings management, it is not entirely correct, as the difference in 
negative DA between Top 40 index and non-Top 40 index companies is not that 
obvious. 
                                                        
23 For more details on the DA distribution, please see Appendix 3. 
24 Note that this conclusion is drawn based on accrual-based earnings management. It cannot be denied that some 
companies reduce accrual-based earnings management only to turn to real earnings management, but this chapter 
discusses accrual-based earnings management only. 
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Panel A DA for South Africa                                Panel B DA for China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Distribution of discretionary accruals (DA) by index. This figure presents the 
distribution of DA of index and non-index companies in South Africa over the period 2010 to 
2013 (Panel A) and in China over the period 2008 to 2013 (Panel B). 
 
4.4.2 Regression results 
Based on the equations introduced in Section 4.3.3, this section conducts the 
regressions and discusses the results in terms of the influence of institutional 
ownership on accrual-based earnings management. 
 
4.4.2.1 Income-increasing versus income-decreasing earnings management 
Table 4.4 summarises the relationships between IO_TOTAL and DA+ and IO_TOTAL 
and DA-. Panel A of Table 4.4 reports an insignificant and negative relationship 
between IO_TOTAL and DA+ for the South African sample, signifying that the 
increased presence of institutional investors failed to mitigate income-increasing 
earnings management. However, Panel B of Table 4.4 shows that IO_TOTAL is 
negatively and significantly related to DA+ for the sample of Chinese firms. Similarly, 
the results reported in Table 4.5 show that both IO_INSEN and IO_SEN exhibit 
negative and significant relationships with DA+. These findings suggest that 
institutional investors as a whole are able to engage in monitoring, and help to inhabit 
managers or controlling shareholders from conducting earnings manipulation 
activities in Chinese listed companies. Pressure-insensitive and pressure-sensitive 
institutional investors to some extent perform a similar function in income-increasing 
earnings management reduction. 
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Table 4.4  
Regressions of relationships between aggregated institutional ownership and earnings management 
 DA+  DA- 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
2SLS 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
2SLS 
6 
Panel A Relationships between aggregated institutional ownership and earnings management (South Africa) 
IO_TOTAL -0.040 -0.036 -0.036  0.060* 0.136** 0.118** 
 (-1.64) (-1.47) (-1.11)  (1.89) (2.24) (2.05) 
LEV 0.044* 0.061** 0.066**  -0.014 -0.091 -0.013 
 (1.66) (2.50) (2.44)  (-0.57) (-0.62) (-0.51) 
SIZE -0.006* -0.007* -0.008**  -0.012** -0.083* -0.017*** 
 (-1.66) (-1.88) (-2.21)  (-2.39) (-1.68) (-2.69) 
AGE -0.007 -0.007 -0.006  -0.018* -0.668*** -0.020** 
 (-1.14) (-1.19) (-1.00)  (-1.88) (-6.78) (-1.96) 
ROA 0.238** 0.235*** 0.263***  0.666*** 0.699*** 0.665*** 
 (2.20) (3.21) (2.61)  (7.54) (3.68) (7.02) 
CFO -0.252*** -0.254*** -0.265***  -0.466*** -0.313* -0.429*** 
 (-3.53) (-3.94) (-3.88)  (-5.12) (-1.78) (-4.45) 
GROW -0.039 -0.048 -0.061  -0.117** -0.131* -0.132** 
 (-0.91) (-1.35) (-1.63)  (-2.26) (-1.73) (-2.37) 
Intercept 0.178*** 0.176*** 0.190***  0.055 2.945*** 0.112 
 (3.23) (3.40) (3.54)  (0.77) (4.22) (1.33) 
F-statistic    53.847    84.050 
Sargan p-value   0.229    0.571 
R2 (%) 19.14 15.59 17.98  15.59 7.29 15.83 
N 298 298 298  398 398 398 
Panel B Relationships between aggregated institutional ownership and earnings management (China) 
IO_TOTAL -0.023* -0.050* -0.031**  -0.000 -0.014 -0.000 
 (-1.69) (-1.69) (-2.16)  (-0.01) (-0.85) (-0.01) 
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Table 4.4 (continued) 
 DA+  DA- 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
2SLS 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
2SLS 
6 
LEV 0.030* 0.059*** 0.030*  -0.033*** -0.223*** -0.033*** 
 (1.90) (4.74) (1.94)  (-3.47) (-9.12) (-3.45) 
SIZE 0.000 0.024 0.000  0.009*** 0.045*** 0.009*** 
 (0.02) (0.51) (0.03)  (6.81) (6.47) (6.72) 
AGE -0.006 -0.202*** -0.005  -0.012*** -0.069*** -0.012*** 
 (-0.76) (-6.17) (-0.91)  (-2.65) (-4.29) (-2.58) 
ROA 1.173*** 1.258*** 1.180***  0.691*** 0.728*** 0.689*** 
 (15.13) (9.52) (11.64)  (14.72) (10.19) (14.53) 
CFO -1.077*** -1.186*** -1.077***  -0.730*** -0.792*** -0.728*** 
 (-21.84) (-13.82) (-12.69)  (-23.85) (-19.64) (-23.76) 
GROW 0.039*** 0.029** 0.040**  -0.052*** -0.036*** -0.051*** 
 (4.41) (2.43) (2.35)  (-9.47) (-5.71) (-9.31) 
Intercept 0.019 -0.792*** 0.017  -0.172*** -0.706*** -0.171*** 
 (0.36) (-3.51) (0.47)  (-5.60) (-5.32) (-5.56) 
F-statistic   2 012.600    2 445.480 
Sargan p-value   0.672    0.443 
R2 (%) 18.79 15.12 18.63  20.89 33.31 20.63 
N 3 084 3 084 3 084  3 330 3 330 3 330 
This table presents pooled OLS, FE and 2SLS estimations of the relationship between aggregated institutional ownership and accrual-based earnings 
management over the period 2010 to 2013 for South Africa, and 2008 to 2013 for China. The results in the context of South Africa and China are reported in 
Panel A and Panel B respectively. The dependent variables are DA+ and DA- in both Panels A and B. All variables included in the regressions are winsorised at 
the 1% and 99% level. The F-test and Hausman test reject the null hypothesis, and hence FE is more suitable compared to pooled OLS and RE. For the 2SLS, 
the F-statistic for testing the joint statistical significance of instrument variables and the Sargan statistic for testing overidentifying restrictions are also 
reported, and the results show that the instruments are not weak, and are valid. Year and industry effects are controlled in all regressions. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses; ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix 1. 
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Table 4.5  
Regressions of relationships between disaggregated institutional ownership and earnings management 
 DA+  DA- 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
2SLS 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
2SLS 
6 
Panel A Relationships between pressure insensitive institutional ownership and earnings management 
IO_INSEN -0.051* -0.140** -0.112***  -0.004 -0.067 -0.003 
 (-1.87) (-2.24) (-3.38)  (-0.21) (-1.57) (-0.13) 
LEV 0.023* 0.060*** 0.027**  -0.033*** -0.222*** -0.033*** 
 (1.68) (4.84) (2.18)  (-3.75) (-9.13) (-3.41) 
SIZE 0.001 0.022 0.000  0.009*** 0.045*** 0.009*** 
 (0.69) (0.47) (0.17)  (7.45) (6.48) (6.68) 
AGE -0.007 -0.206*** -0.007  -0.013*** -0.070*** -0.012*** 
 (-1.10) (-6.27) (-1.22)  (-3.27) (-4.39) (-2.59) 
ROA 1.205*** 1.290*** 1.221***  0.690*** 0.744*** 0.691*** 
 (17.48) (9.70) (18.85)  (15.96) (10.28) (13.76) 
CFO -1.081*** -1.199*** -1.023***  -0.687*** -0.796*** -0.728*** 
 (-26.03) (-13.98) (-27.40)  (-25.20) (-19.73) (-23.67) 
GROW 0.035*** 0.031*** 0.027***  -0.049*** -0.036*** -0.051*** 
 (4.68) (2.62) (4.02)  (-9.67) (-5.66) (-9.32) 
IO_TOTAL YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Intercept -0.004 -0.809*** 0.018  -0.174*** -0.699*** -0.172*** 
 (-0.09) (-3.59) (0.46)  (-6.30) (-5.27) (-5.54) 
F-statistic   1 516.490    2 107.680 
Sargan p-value   0.176    0.451 
R2 (%) 20.80 15.23 25.98  19.76 33.38 20.64 
N 3 084 3 084 3 084  3 330 3 330 3 330 
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Panel B Relationships between pressure sensitive institutional ownership and earnings management 
IO_SEN -0.154** -0.416** -0.333*  0.061 0.005 0.155 
 (-1.99) (-2.33) (-1.92)  (1.10) (0.05) (1.49) 
LEV 0.021* 0.053** 0.028*  -0.033*** -0.221*** -0.033*** 
 (1.76) (2.23) (1.76)  (-3.77) (-9.07) (-3.43) 
SIZE 0.001 0.037 0.000  0.009*** 0.044*** 0.009*** 
 (0.50) (0.58) (0.07)  (7.44) (6.41) (6.54) 
AGE -0.005 -0.165*** -0.006  -0.013*** -0.067*** -0.012*** 
 (-1.17) (-4.11) (-0.77)  (-3.28) (-4.20) (-2.63) 
ROA 1.164*** 1.297*** 1.160***  0.684*** 0.724*** 0.683*** 
 (14.07) (7.23) (15.10)  (16.73) (10.15) (14.75) 
CFO -1.086*** -1.206*** -1.088***  -0.686*** -0.792*** -0.724*** 
 (-14.61) (-10.27) (-22.03)  (-25.15) (-19.66) (-23.55) 
GROW 0.035** 0.030* 0.040***  -0.049*** -0.036*** -0.051*** 
 (2.47) (1.89) (4.50)  (-9.61) (-5.65) (-9.22) 
IO_TOTAL YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Intercept 0.006 -0.772* 0.019  -0.171*** -0.700*** -0.168*** 
 (0.16) (-1.69) (0.38)  (-6.28) (-5.28) (-5.45) 
F-statistic   736.778    895.666 
Sargan p-value   0.678    0.393 
R2 (%) 20.97 47.60 18.73  19.78 33.29 20.63 
N 3 084 3 084 3 084  3 330 3 330 3 330 
This table presents pooled OLS, FE and 2SLS estimations of the relationship between disaggregated institutional ownership and accrual-based earnings management 
over the period 2008 to 2013 for China. The results of the relationship between earnings management and pressure-insensitive and pressure-sensitive institutional 
ownership are reported in Panel A and Panel B respectively. The dependent variables are DA+ and DA- in both Panel A and B. All variables included in the regressions 
are winsorised at the 1% and 99% level. The F-test and Hausman test reject the null hypothesis, and hence FE is more suitable compared to pooled OLS and RE. For 
the 2SLS, the F-statistic for testing the joint statistical significance of instrument variables and the Sargan statistic for testing overidentifying restrictions are also 
reported, and the results show that the instruments are not weak, and are valid. Year and industry effects are controlled in all regressions. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses; ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix 1. 
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The regression results on the relationship between institutional ownership and 
earnings management with a negative direction are shown in Columns 4 to 6 of Tables 
4.4 and 4.5. Panel A of Table 4.4 reports a significant positive relationship between 
IO_TOTAL and DA-, suggesting that in contrast to income-increasing earnings 
management, institutional investors in general are linked to a reduction of income-
decreasing earnings management in the South African context. In this regard, 
institutional investors in South Africa are unlikely to prevent their investee firms from 
meeting or beating the financial expectations of stakeholders. This could be linked to 
the larger number of positive DA and lower number of negative DA observations 
observed for the JSE-listed companies. 
 
In contrast to the South African results, the Chinese evidence indicates that none of 
IO_TOTAL, IO_INSEN or IO_SEN is significantly related to DA-. Institutional 
investors in China may therefore be ineffective in preventing income-decreasing 
earnings management. This could be linked to the phenomenon that more negative DA 
but fewer positive DA observations were observed for the Chinese companies. More 
importantly, this finding illustrates that Chinese firms tend to manage earnings towards 
zero; similar to individual investors, they may prefer to ‘keep quiet and make money’ 
(‘men-sheng fa-da-cai’ in Chinese), an old-fashioned Chinese maxim (Li et al., 2011). 
 
In terms of the control variables, financial leverage (LEV) is significantly and 
positively related to income-increasing earnings management, but is insignificantly 
associated with income-decreasing earnings management in the context of South 
Africa; similarly, it is significantly positively (negatively) related to income-
increasing (decreasing) earnings management for the Chinese sample. Listing history 
(AGE) is negatively and insignificantly (significantly) related to income-increasing 
(income-decreasing) earnings management for the South African firms, with similar 
associations also observed for the Chinese sample. In addition, return on assets (ROA) 
(cash flow (CFO)) exhibit significant positive (negative) associations with income-
increasing and income-decreasing earnings management for both the South African 
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and the Chinese sample. Besides these similarities, the relationships between the 
remaining control variables and earnings management observed for the South African 
firms differ from those obtained in the case of China. More specifically, firm size 
(SIZE) demonstrates a significant negative relationship with income-decreasing as 
well as income-increasing earnings management for the South African firms, while 
the relationships are positive for the Chinese sample. Firm growth (GROW) is 
negatively associated with income-decreasing earnings management for the South 
African and Chinese firms; while it is positively and significantly associated with 
income-increasing earnings management within the Chinese setting. 
 
4.4.2.2 Non-linear relationship between institutional ownership and earnings management 
The regression results shown in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 display the associations between 
institutional ownership and the absolute value of DA. Panel A of Table 4.6 reports a 
significant negative relationship between IO_TOTAL and |DA|, illustrating that for the 
sample of South African firms, institutional ownership has a negative impact on earnings 
expropriation. To a large extent, this relationship can be attributed to institutional 
investors’ impact on DA-, which is evident from Panel A of Table 4.4. 
 
The regression results reported in Panel B of Table 4.6 show a statistically significant 
negative relationship between IO_TOTAL and |DA|, that is, in China, increased 
stockholding by institutional investors as a whole is associated with lower levels of 
earnings management, predominantly attributable to their impact on DA+. 
Furthermore, both IO_INSEN and IO_SEN are significantly and negatively associated 
with |DA|, implying that both pressure-insensitive and pressure-sensitive institutional 
investors are effective in detecting earnings management in general, although it was 
shown earlier that their monitoring role is only effective in constraining income-
increasing earnings management, and fails to curb income-decreasing earnings 
management.
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Table 4.6  
Regressions of non-linear relationships between aggregated institutional ownership and earnings management 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
2SLS 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
2SLS 
6 
Panel A Non-linear relationships between aggregated institutional ownership and earnings management (South Africa) 
IO_TOTAL -0.063** -0.113** -0.110**  -0.139* -0.125*** -2.171*** 
 (-2.50) (-2.39) (-2.51)  (-1.70) (-3.01) (-4.10) 
IO_TOTAL2     0.272*** 0.229*** 2.353*** 
     (3.17) (7.39) (4.34) 
LEV 0.014 0.005 0.002  0.006 0.028 0.003 
 (0.70) (0.16) (0.08)  (0.32) (0.57) (0.05) 
SIZE 0.007* 0.107** 0.012**  0.020 0.075** 0.013* 
 (1.87) (2.54) (2.40)  (0.66) (2.14) (1.91) 
AGE 0.007 0.457*** 0.009  0.002 0.365*** 0.011 
 (0.94) (5.78) (1.10)  (0.29) (5.50) (1.06) 
ROA -0.516*** -0.615*** -0.519***  -0.238*** -0.537*** -0.191*** 
 (-8.32) (-4.81) (-7.88)  (-6.07) (-4.63) (-3.32) 
CFO 0.313*** 0.233** 0.296***  0.204*** 0.170* 0.179** 
 (4.88) (2.08) (4.39)  (3.34) (1.72) (2.00) 
GROW 0.067* 0.053 0.070*  0.018*** 0.007 0.019** 
 (1.70) (0.97) (1.67)  (3.04) (1.06) (2.20) 
Intercept 0.051 -2.644*** 0.013  0.123*** -1.988*** 0.245*** 
 (0.93) (-4.58) (3.94)  (4.57) (-4.13) (2.96) 
F-statistic   117.152    30.087 
Sargan p-value   0.188    0.315 
R2 (%) 12.67 13.39 2.36  14.16 25.66 8.63 
N 696 696 696  696 696 696 
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Panel B Non-linear relationships between aggregated institutional ownership and earnings management (China) 
IO_TOTAL -0.017** -0.023* -0.025**  -0.028** -0.026* -0.061* 
 (-1.97) (-1.67) (-2.03)  (-2.21) (-1.78) (-1.88) 
IO_TOTAL2     0.025 0.018 0.064 
     (1.21) (0.64) (1.30) 
LEV 0.055*** 0.162*** 0.054***  0.055*** 0.163*** 0.054*** 
 (5.46) (8.73) (5.44)  (5.49) (8.75) (5.46) 
SIZE -0.009*** -0.061*** -0.009***  -0.009*** -0.062*** -0.009*** 
 (-6.56) (-12.84) (-6.45)  (-6.61) (-12.85) (-6.38) 
AGE 0.005 0.040*** 0.005  0.004 0.039*** 0.005 
 (0.97) (3.29) (1.05)  (0.85) (3.22) (0.96) 
ROA 0.238*** 0.115*** 0.243***  0.239*** 0.115*** 0.249*** 
 (5.43) (3.14) (5.48)  (5.44) (3.13) (5.58) 
CFO -0.128*** -0.082*** -0.128***  -0.128*** -0.082*** -0.128*** 
 (-5.37) (-3.89) (-5.39)  (-5.38) (-3.89) (-5.41) 
GROW 0.047*** 0.004*** 0.048***  0.047*** 0.004*** 0.048*** 
 (8.45) (22.22) (8.52)  (8.41) (22.20) (8.56) 
Intercept 0.223*** 1.324*** 0.220***  0.226*** 1.326*** 0.221*** 
 (6.95) (14.35) (6.85)  (7.03) (14.36) (6.87) 
F-statistic   4 115.570    1 543.080 
Sargan p-value   0.603    0.778 
R2 (%) 3.31 28.82 3.33  3.32 26.81 3.30 
N 6 414 6 414 6 414  6 414 6 414 6 414 
This table presents pooled OLS, FE and 2SLS estimations of the non-linear relationship between aggregated institutional ownership and aggregated accrual-
based earnings management over the period 2010 to 2013 for South Africa, and 2008 to 2013 for China. The results in the context of South Africa and China 
are reported in Panel A and Panel B respectively. The dependent variable is |DA| in both Panels A and B. All variables included in the regressions are 
winsorised at the 1% and 99% level. The F-test and Hausman test reject the null hypothesis, and hence FE is more suitable compared to pooled OLS and RE. 
For the 2SLS, the F-statistic for testing the joint statistical significance of instrument variables and the Sargan statistic for testing overidentifying restrictions 
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are also reported, and the results show that the instruments are not weak, and are valid. Year and industry effects are controlled in all regressions. T-statistics 
are reported in parentheses; ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix 1. 
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Table 4.7  
Regressions of non-linear relationships between disaggregated institutional ownership and earnings management 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
2SLS 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
2SLS 
6 
Panel A Non-linear relationships between pressure insensitive institutional ownership and earnings management 
IO_INSEN -0.041** -0.074** -0.044*  -0.067** -0.088* -0.299* 
 (-2.20) (-1.97) (-1.92)  (-2.53) (-1.76) (-1.90) 
IO_INSEN2     0.109 0.045 1.011 
     (1.38) (0.41) (1.55) 
LEV 0.055*** 0.186*** 0.052***  0.054*** 0.186*** 0.050*** 
 (5.50) (8.42) (6.03)  (5.37) (8.42) (5.77) 
SIZE -0.009*** -0.089*** -0.009***  -0.008*** -0.089*** -0.008*** 
 (-6.03) (-15.93) (-7.48)  (-5.71) (-15.87) (-4.79) 
AGE 0.004 0.077*** 0.005  0.004 0.077*** 0.003 
 (0.84) (5.14) (1.10)  (0.82) (5.14) (0.63) 
ROA 0.257*** 0.285*** 0.248***  0.254*** 0.285*** 0.269*** 
 (5.61) (4.64) (5.98)  (5.53) (4.64) (6.20) 
CFO -0.127*** -0.090*** -0.102***  -0.129*** -0.090*** -0.103*** 
 (-5.34) (-3.72) (-4.96)  (-5.42) (-3.73) (-5.03) 
GROW 0.048*** 0.024*** 0.041***  0.048*** 0.024*** 0.041*** 
 (8.48) (4.06) (8.41)  (8.48) (4.06) (8.43) 
IO_TOTAL YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Intercept 0.211*** 1.727*** 0.223***  0.205*** 1.724*** 0.195*** 
 (6.47) (16.64) (7.98)  (6.22) (16.57) (6.06) 
F-statistic   3 613.890    262.341 
Sargan p-value   0.661    0.333 
R2 (%) 3.33 17.90 3.58  3.34 17.88 3.10 
N 6 414 6 414 6 414  6 414 6 414 6 414 
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Panel B Non-linear relationships between pressure sensitive institutional ownership and earnings management 
IO_SEN -0.117** -0.211* -0.236**  -0.173** -0.213* -0.556* 
 (-2.04) (-1.76) (-2.52)  (-2.13) (-1.76) (-1.66) 
IO_SEN2     0.144 0.080 2.396 
     (0.25) (0.13) (1.00) 
LEV 0.050*** 0.079*** 0.049***  0.053*** 0.080*** 0.048*** 
 (5.69) (3.89) (5.74)  (5.34) (3.89) (5.51) 
SIZE -0.009*** -0.006 -0.009***  -0.009*** -0.006 -0.009*** 
 (-7.04) (-1.15) (-7.62)  (-6.45) (-1.15) (-6.69) 
AGE 0.006 0.055 0.006  0.005 0.055 0.006 
 (1.49) (1.01) (1.34)  (1.05) (1.01) (1.48) 
ROA 0.211*** 0.115*** 0.216***  0.225*** 0.115*** 0.220*** 
 (5.65) (3.06) (5.82)  (5.21) (3.06) (5.89) 
CFO -0.144*** -0.091*** -0.109***  -0.131*** -0.091*** -0.112*** 
 (-6.97) (-4.18) (-5.34)  (-5.51) (-4.18) (-5.42) 
GROW 0.042*** 0.005*** 0.041***  0.048*** 0.005*** 0.041*** 
 (8.45) (24.15) (8.42)  (8.49) (24.14) (8.45) 
IO_TOTAL YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Intercept 0.213*** 0.142 0.225***  0.219*** 0.142 0.215*** 
 (7.67) (1.35) (8.13)  (6.81) (1.35) (7.31) 
F-statistic   1 620.090    159.432 
Sargan p-value   0.668    0.479 
R2 (%) 3.17 21.90 3.66  3.33 21.89 3.55 
N 6 414 6 414 6 414  6 414 6 414 6 414 
This table presents pooled OLS, FE and 2SLS estimations of the non-linear relationship between disaggregated institutional ownership and aggregated 
accrual-based earnings management over the period 2008 to 2013 for China. The results of the relationship between aggregated earnings management and 
pressure-insensitive and pressure-sensitive institutional ownership are reported in Panel A and Panel B respectively. The dependent variable is |DA| in both 
Panels A and B. All variables included in the regressions are winsorised at the 1% and 99% level. The F-test and Hausman test reject the null hypothesis, and 
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hence FE is more suitable compared to pooled OLS and RE. For the 2SLS, the F-statistic for testing the joint statistical significance of instrument variables 
and the Sargan statistic for testing overidentifying restrictions are also reported, and the results show that the instruments are not weak, and are valid. Year and 
industry effects are controlled in all regressions. T-statistics are reported in parentheses; ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Variable definitions are reported in Appendix 1. 
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The regression results obtained from investigating whether a non-linear relationship 
exists between institutional ownership and earnings management are shown in 
Columns 4 to 6 of Tables 4.6 and 4.7. Panel A of Table 4.6 reports a significant 
positive relationship between IO_TOTAL2 and |DA|, implying a U-shaped 
relationship instead of the anticipated inverted U-shaped relationship within the South 
African context. That is, within a certain level of institutional ownership 
concentration, earnings management declines as institutional ownership increases, 
whereas beyond that level, institutional ownership appears to be positively associated 
with earnings management. This finding is inconsistent with the inverted U-shaped 
relationship reported by Hsu and Koh (2005) and Koh (2003), but in line with Velury 
and Jenkins (2006). As suggested by Fan and Wong (2002) and Firth, Fung and Rui 
(2007), concentrated ownership is associated with reduced earnings information 
content. Thus, institutional investors with concentrated ownership are likely to lower 
earnings quality. According to Wang (2014), institutional investors with more than 20 
per cent shareholding in a firm may become insiders and collude with management to 
pursue their own interests by sacrificing those of the minority shareholders. In such a 
situation, institutional investors no longer efficiently monitor managers or other 
majority shareholders. This behaviour is consistent with the negative monitoring 
hypothesis discussed in Chapter 3. In contrast to the South African results, no 
evidence that would imply a non-linear relationship between institutional ownership 
and earnings management is reported for the sample of Chinese firms, as reflected by 
the non-significant coefficients reported for IO_TOTAL2, IO_INSEN2 and IO_SEN2 
in Tables 4.6 and 4.7. 
 
In terms of control variables, SIZE and CFO present a significant positive relationship 
with absolute value of DA (|DA|) in South Africa, and ROA is found to be negatively 
related to |DA|. In this regard, opposite results were observed in China. While GROW 
is positively associated with |DA| in both countries. Moreover, Chinese firms with 
high financial leverage (LEV) demonstrate high earnings management in absolute 
value, while this phenomenon is not significant in South Africa. 
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4.4.2.3 Impact on earnings management within different earnings distribution contexts 
This section reports on regressions conducted to investigate the impact of institutional 
ownership on earnings management in companies with NN1>0 and NNI<0, and 
companies with DNNI>0 and DNNI<0. Because of the small sample size for South 
Africa, this chapter does not proceed to compare the impact of institutional ownership 
on income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management for the different 
earnings thresholds. 
 
Panel A of Table 4.8 displays a significant (insignificant) negative relationship 
between IO_TOTAL and |DA| when NNI>0 (NNI<0). Furthermore, Columns 3 and 4 
of Panel A show that irrespective of whether DNNI>0 or DNNI<0, the impact of 
institutional ownership on earnings management reduction is significant. In Section 
4.4.2.2, a significant negative relationship between institutional ownership overall and 
|DA| is reported for the South African sample. Based on the results reported in Table 
4.8, however, this relationship only applies within profit-making companies (NNI>0) 
and not in loss-making companies (NNI<0). 
 
Similarly, aggregated institutional ownership is likely to curb earnings management 
within profit-making companies in China, but less likely to perform such a function in 
loss-making companies. However, contrary to institutional investors in South Africa, 
institutional investors in China reduce earnings management only in companies with 
earnings above the prior year’s earnings, i.e. when DNNI>0, as reflected in Columns 
3 and 4 of Panel B, Table 4.8. 
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Table 4.8  
Regressions of relationships between institutional ownership and earnings management (including earnings threshold consideration) 
 NNI>0 
1 
NNI<0 
2 
DNNI>0 
3 
DNNI<0 
4 
Panel A Relationships between aggregated institutional ownership and earnings management (South Africa) 
IO_TOTAL -0.130*** -0.002 -0.096* -0.164** 
 (-2.73) (-0.03) (-1.86) (-1.99) 
F-statistic 96.969 19.585 71.311 39.307 
Sargan p-value 0.377 0.704 0.919 0.212 
R2 (%) 4.68 33.34 2.42 5.25 
N 605 91 319 197 
Panel B Relationships between aggregated institutional ownership and earnings management (China) 
IO_TOTAL -0.028*** 0.008 -0.036*** 0.009 
 (-2.79) (0.31) (-2.71) (0.71) 
F-statistic 3 976.600 361.806 2 766.090 1 512.780 
Sargan p-value 0.571 0.744 0.144 0.609 
R2 (%) 6.10 21.33 6.30 3.93 
N 5 736 678 3 158 2 055 
Panel C Relationships between pressure insensitive institutional ownership and earnings management 
IO_INSEN -0.093*** 0.090 -0.119*** 0.082** 
 (-3.93) (0.85) (-3.98) (2.16) 
F-statistic 3 173.000 197.524 2 244.760 1 055.410 
Sargan p-value 0.656 0.896 0.194 0.708 
R2 (%) 6.06 21.18 6.28 4.10 
N 5 736 678 3 158 2 055 
Panel D Relationships between pressure sensitive institutional ownership and earnings management 
IO_SEN -0.216** -0.099 -0.254* -0.139 
 (-2.22) (-0.38) (-1.86) (-1.24) 
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Table 4.8 (continued) 
 NNI>0 
1 
NNI<0 
2 
DNNI>0 
3 
DNNI<0 
4 
F-statistic 1 545.370 88.282 974.664 593.785 
Sargan p-value 0.772 0.771 0.267 0.704 
R2 (%) 6.18 21.17 6.40 3.87 
N 5 736 678 3 158 2 055 
This table presents 2SLS estimations of the relationship between institutional ownership and aggregated accrual-based earnings management by considering 
earnings thresholds (zero and last year’s earnings) over the period 2010 to 2013 for South Africa and 2008 to 2013 for China respectively. The results of the 
relationship between aggregated earnings management and aggregated institutional ownership in the context of South Africa and China are reported in Panel 
A and Panel B respectively; the results of the relationship between aggregated earnings management and pressure-insensitive and pressure-sensitive 
institutional ownership are reported in Panel C and Panel D respectively. Columns 1 and 2 of each panel report the results by considering zero earnings as a 
threshold; Columns 3 and 4 of each panel report the results by considering the prior year’s earnings as a threshold. The dependent variable is |DA| in each 
panel. All variables included in the regressions are winsorised at the 1% and 99% level. The F-test and Hausman test reject the null hypothesis, and hence FE 
is more suitable compared to pooled OLS and RE. For the 2SLS, the relationships between earnings management and control variables are similar to those 
indicated in the tables above; for brevity, they are not displayed in this table. The F-statistic for testing the joint statistical significance of instrument variables 
and the Sargan statistic for testing overidentifying restrictions are also reported, and the results show that the instruments are not weak, and are valid. Year and 
industry effects are controlled in all regressions. T-statistics are reported in parentheses; ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Variable definitions are reported in Appendix 1. 
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In this regard, institutional investors overall appear to be linked to reduced accrual-
based earnings management in both South Africa and China. Additionally, the 
relationship between institutional ownership and earnings management within loss-
making companies and companies with earnings below their prior year’s earnings 
suggests that institutional investors as a whole in both countries do not engage in 
taking an earnings bath when firms report poor earnings. However, this finding is not 
applicable to disaggregated institutional ownership. 
 
It is observed that IO_INSEN as well as IO_SEN are negatively and significantly 
related to |DA| when NNI>0 and DNNI>0. However, IO_INSEN has a significant 
positive association with |DA| when DNNI<0, indicating that for firms with earnings 
above the prior year’s earnings, pressure-insensitive institutional ownership is 
unlikely to curb earnings management; on the contrary, it appears to accelerate it. 
More specifically, when disaggregating |DA|, it is shown that the significant positive 
relationship between IO_INSEN and |DA| is the result of the impact IO_INSEN has 
on negative DA (i.e. DA-) 25 . This finding suggests that pressure-insensitive 
institutional investors may have incentives to take an earnings bath. 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
By employing a sample of 174 South African and 1 069 Chinese listed firms, the 
research reported in this chapter found that earnings management is a pervasive 
practice among the sample firms, and that it is more pronounced for the Chinese firms 
than the South African firms. Furthermore, the South African companies appear more 
likely to smooth earnings than their Chinese counterparts. The regression results show 
that the relationship between institutional ownership and earnings management is 
complex and appears to be context-dependent, varying by country, the types of 
institutional investors involved, the percentage of ownership that is held by 
                                                        
25 This chapter ran OLS and 2SLS regressions between IO_INSEN and DA- in DNNI<0 firms by controlling all 
the control variables, and found that IO_INSEN is negatively and significantly related to DA- at the 5 per cent 
significance level (but not report here). 
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institutional investors, as well as the nature of the earnings management. Overall, 
institutional investors are confirmed to have a positive relationship with aggregated 
earnings management mitigation. More specifically, when considering earnings 
management in different scenarios, this chapter found that in the South African 
context, institutional investors are more likely to restrain income-decreasing earnings 
manipulation than income-increasing earnings management. In China, institutional 
ownership is associated with reduced earnings management that takes place in the 
form of income-increasing earnings management, while this relationship becomes 
insignificant when dealing with income-decreasing earnings management. 
 
When distinguishing between different types of Chinese institutional investors, 
increased ownership concentration by pressure-insensitive institutional investors was 
found to be significantly and negatively related to income-increasing earnings 
management, while they do not comply with the efficient monitoring hypothesis when 
considering income-decreasing earnings management. They appear to accelerate 
management incentives to engage in income-decreasing earnings management, 
especially in firms with current earnings below the prior year’s earnings. Pressure-
sensitive institutional investors seem to be active in mitigating manipulation 
behaviour as well; they have a significant relationship with income-increasing 
earnings management. Thus, the Chinese evidence suggests that institutional investors 
are not strictly homogeneous in terms of their reactions to earnings management. In 
addition, institutional investors exhibit a U-shaped relationship with earnings 
management in the South African setting, while a similar relationship is not observed 
in the Chinese context. The results remain robust when adopting different estimation 
methods. 
 
Considering that real earnings management is increasingly being used by firms since 
it is not so easily detected, investigating the impact of institutional ownership 
engagement on this alternative form of earnings management becomes important to 
improve our understanding of the impact that institutional ownership has on 
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mitigating earnings management. Unfortunately, data relating to levels of real 
earnings management was not available for South Africa, limiting this study to an 
investigation of accrual-based earnings management. 
 
Together with Chapter 3, this chapter provides a better understanding of the 
relationship between institutional investors and improved corporate governance from 
a financial perspective. However, this relationship is not only demonstrated in 
financial aspects, but also in non-financial practices. The focus of Chapter 5 will 
therefore be on whether institutional investors can provide an advancement towards 
ESG performance. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT AND ESG PERFORMANCE: THE 
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP EFFECT 
5.1 Introduction 
Non-financial factors, such as ESG issues, have been brought to the forefront of 
institutional investors’ consideration when making investment decisions. Investment 
by incorporating ESG concerns is labelled socially responsible investing (SRI), or RI 
as it is more commonly known, and is becoming part of the mainstream investment 
landscape (Cerin & Scholtens, 2011; Eurosif, 2014; US SIF, 2014). The development 
of ESG practices and RI can be explained within an NI theory context (Ntim & 
Soobaroyen, 2013). For listed companies, the legitimation (ethical) view of NI theory 
suggests that regulative institutional pressures compel companies to conform to social 
norms and ESG standards so as to enhance their social acceptance, and to win support 
from stakeholders. From its efficiency (instrumental) perspective, regulative 
institutional forces also encourage companies to compete for critical resources to 
protect shareholders’ interests and maximise CFP. Likewise, legitimation (ethical) and 
efficiency (instrumental) motives also apply to institutional investors’ RI behaviour. In 
this regard, it is not surprising to observe that companies and institutional investors 
are likely to conform to regulations, norms, codes and standards to engage in ESG 
practices. 
 
South Africa and China are no exception to the phenomenon that a growing number of 
institutional investors have been embracing the concept of RI. Like most emerging 
markets, South Africa and China attract numerous investors through their high 
potential for growth; these investors at the same time have to bear higher risks (e.g. 
political, currency and liquidity risks) than in developed markets. It is furthermore 
necessary to consider the additional risks regarding the ESG disclosure of their 
investee companies (Rosenthal, 2014). An emerging markets report conducted by 
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EIRIS found that poor corporate ESG disclosure is one of the biggest challenges to 
investment in emerging markets (EIRIS, 2012). Thus, there is no doubt that the 
materiality of ESG considerations in South Africa and China needs to be improved. 
Whether it is environmental pollution and labour conflicts in China, or HIV/AIDS and 
B-BBEE in South Africa, it is clear that corporate ESG issues are related to 
shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ benefits. In this regard, South Africa and China 
are expected to improve ESG performance (e.g. ESG disclosure), as well as increase 
participation by market participants such as institutional investors, to positively affect 
ESG performance and mitigate the negative impact of corporate operations, in line 
with the legitimation (ethical) and efficiency (instrumental) purposes set out in NI 
theory. 
 
In the context of listed companies, the RI practices of institutional investors can to 
some extent be assessed by their impact on the ESG performance of their investee 
companies. This impact is unclear, however, in the context of South Africa and China, 
since limited previous research has been conducted. Therefore, this chapter attempts 
to advance the literature on this topic by exploring the relationship between 
institutional investors and improved corporate ESG performance in these two 
countries. In addition, corporate governance in emerging markets, just as in developed 
markets, is given priority over other responsibility concerns (EIRIS, 2012). The 
quality of reporting on corporate governance considerations is currently much better 
than that of reporting on ES criteria - a situation which becomes evident when 
considering companies’ annual reports, sustainability reports or integrated reports. 
Accordingly, this chapter considers corporate governance as a distinct segment of a 
company’s overall ESG considerations, and discusses corporate governance and its 
relationship with institutional ownership separately. 
 
Apart from ESG performance, institutional investors also pursue the economic returns 
of their RI practices, given that one of the RI focus areas entails the financial 
materiality of ESG issues. Chapter 3 examined the impact of institutional investors on 
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CFP, and found that increased levels of institutional ownership are linked to improved 
CFP (except among pressure-sensitive institutional investors in China). This chapter 
extends this analysis by investigating if institutional investors are more effective in 
advancing CFP through their contribution towards improved corporate ESG 
performance. The primary research questions addressed in this chapter are: (1) Is 
institutional ownership related to improved corporate governance and corporate ESG 
performance? (2) Can institutional investors address RI issues and still promote 
financial performance? The following secondary research questions are aimed at 
providing deeper insight to these questions: (1) Do different types of institutional 
investors promote corporate governance and ESG performance in a similar way? (2) 
Are institutional investors a homogeneous group in promoting CFP in different ESG 
performance contexts? 
 
By employing a sample of 81 and 435 listed firms from South Africa and China 
respectively, the results reported in this chapter reveal that, contrary to their positive 
association with improved CFP, institutional investors are unlikely to advance overall 
ESG performance. In addition, only institutional investors in South Africa were found 
to be associated with improved corporate governance. Furthermore, in China good 
overall ESG performance and corporate governance are likely to positively moderate 
institutional investors’ (i.e. pressure-insensitive institutional investors) effectiveness in 
promoting financial performance; while the opposite results were detected in South 
Africa. These results are robust to different estimations. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 offers an overview 
of RI in South Africa and China, after which Section 5.3 reviews the relevant 
literature on RI and ESG performance. Section 5.4 presents the source of the data 
required, describes the sample, provides descriptive statistics and explains the 
methodology employed in this chapter. This is followed by the regression results 
analysis and discussion in Section 5.5, and conclusions in Section 5.6. 
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5.2 Overview of RI in South Africa and China 
RI in emerging markets has gained momentum in recent years (MERCER & IFC, 
2009), which can in part be attributed to increased concerns over CSR on stock 
markets (Managi, Okimoto & Matsuda, 2012; Ortas, Moneva & Salvador, 2012), as 
well as the development of SRI equity indices (Muzindutsi & Sekhampu, 2013; Ortas 
et al., 2012). This section reviews the literature on RI in South Africa and China, with 
special focus on corporate governance practices within the two countries. 
 
5.2.1 RI in South Africa 
South Africa was the first country to mandate the disclosure of integrated reporting 
(starting from the 2011 financial year). This was done as part of the principles 
recommended by the King III report (Chapter 9: Integrated reporting and disclosure) 
in 2009. An integrated report is a single document that presents the financial and non-
financial performance of a company. The JSE has made integrated reporting 
mandatory for all JSE-listed companies on an ‘apply or explain’ basis (i.e. either 
disclose or explain why it could not provide any disclosure) (see JSE Listings 
Requirements, Section 8.63 (a)). South Africa has gone one step further, with 
companies also being required to submit sustainability information in a separate 
document or as part of their annual reports during the past few years. Despite having 
developed a good corporate governance enforcement and disclosure framework, the 
South African situation is still considered insufficient in terms of disclosure on 
environmental aspects (Giamporcaro & Pretorius, 2012), and there is no uniform 
implementation made by companies towards integrated reporting - something which 
may improve with the forthcoming King IV report. The facts indicate that the levels 
of disclosure provided by integrated reports still need to be further improved, and it is 
thus not surprising to see that in practice, institutional investors’ attitudes towards 
integrated reporting to a large extent have not been transformed, and that they still 
predominantly rely on financial information (Atkins & Maroun, 2014). Table 5.1 
presents a list of selected regulations on ESG issues in South Africa. 
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Table 5.1  
Selected regulations relevant to ESG issues in South Africa 
Environment Society Governance 
 National Environmental 
Management Act (1998) 
 Environmental 
Conservation Act (1989) 
 National Water Act (1998) 
 National Environmental 
Management: Protected 
Areas Act (2003) 
 Air Quality Act (2004) 
 The Constitution: Section 
24 
 Polluter Pays Principle 
 National Energy Regulator 
of South Africa feed-in 
tariffs 
 Broad-based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act (2003) 
 Labour Relations Act (1995) 
 Skills Development Act (1998) 
 Housing Protection Measures Act 
(1998) 
 Unemployment Insurance Act 
(2001) 
 Basic Conditions of Employment 
Act (1997) 
 Promotion of Equity and 
Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act (2000) 
 Preferential Procurement Policy 
Framework Act (2000) 
 Companies Act 
(2008) 
 National Credit Act 
(2005) 
 Insider Trading Act 
(1998) 
 Consumer Protection 
Act (2008) 
 
Source: Mans-Kemp and Viviers (2016: 106) 
 
The origins of RI practices in South Africa can be traced back to the 1980s 
(Giamporcaro, Pretorius & Visser, 2010). As only the second country (the first being 
the UK) to formally encourage institutional investors to integrate ESG considerations 
into their investment decisions, South Africa had its first RI fund launched in 1992. 
Although the RI sector was not attractive to investors for some time, it increasingly 
attracted attention with initiatives such as the UNPRI and the JSE SRI Index. 
According to Viviers (2014a), RI funds in South Africa have experienced four phases, 
namely an establishment phase (1992-1998), decline phase (1999-2003), resurgence 
phase (2004-2008) and strong growth phase (2009-present). 
 
Since the launch of the UNPRI in 2006, there has been increasing awareness of RI in 
South Africa. South African signatories of the UNPRI (by July 2016) include seven 
asset owners, 37 asset managers and 10 professional service partners. It should be 
however noted that the market has seen limited growth in the number of RI funds and 
their AuM, according to an examination of 21 years of RI practice in South Africa by 
Viviers (2014b). 
 
The JSE SRI Index was first released in 2004, and represented the first emerging 
market sustainability index. It started with 51 companies, and had developed to 
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include 82 constituents by the end of 2014. The JSE SRI Index is becoming a useful 
tool for institutional investors to increase their involvement in RI (Muzindutsi & 
Sekhampu, 2013). Some of the latest developments in support of RI include the 
amendment of Regulation 28 of the Pension Funds Act (No. 24 of 1956) (in 2011), the 
introduction of CRISA in 2011 and the announcement of the ESG partnership with 
FTSE Russell from 2015 and the launch of the FTSE/JSE Responsible Investment 
Index Series in 2015, as well as PIC Corporate Governance Rating Matrix released in 
2010. The forthcoming King IV report is also believed to strengthen the support of 
institutional investors implementing RI. 
 
5.2.2 RI in China 
In China, companies historically had low levels of sustainability reporting prior to the 
release of regulations on RI (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2014). These regulations include (but 
are not limited to) the Shenzhen Stock Exchange Social Responsibility Instructions to 
Listed Companies, released by the SZSE in 2006; the Guide on Environmental 
Information Disclosure for Companies Listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and the 
Notice on Strengthening Social Responsibility of Listed Companies released by the SSE 
in 2008. At the end of 2008, the SSE further mandated three types of companies to 
disclose ESG issues, namely those companies included in the SSE Corporate 
Governance Index, companies listing their shares overseas, and financial companies. 
Table 5.2 presents selected regulations that are relevant to ESG considerations in China. 
 
Consequently, CSR practices are developing and have achieved some levels of success, 
as observed by the growing number of CSR reports being released. The 2015 Chinese 
CSR White Paper (henceforth the White Paper) reported that 1 703 CSR reports were 
released in addition to financial reports in 2015, while the number was only 32 in 2006. 
Three quarters of these reports were released by state-owned and listed companies. 
However, this is far from enough. CSR reports covering more than 50 pages only 
accounted for 26 per cent of the total number of reports, while more than 60 per cent of 
the CSR reports consisted of less than 30 pages and provided limited information. 
According to the White Paper, CSR reports are becoming more comprehensive, but 
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their disclosure coverage and depth are still inadequate. 
 
Table 5.2  
Selected regulations relevant to ESG issues in China 
Environment Society Governance 
 Article 26 of the 
Constitution (2004) 
 Environmental Protection 
Law (2014) 
 Cleaner Production 
Promotion Law (2012) 
 Water Pollution Prevention 
and Control Law (2008) 
 Atmospheric Pollution 
Prevention and Control Law 
(2015) 
 Renewable Energy Law 
(2009) 
 Energy Conservation Law 
(2007) 
 Circular Economy 
Promotion Law (2008) 
 Labour Law of the 
People's Republic of 
China 
 Labour Contract Law 
 Social Insurance Law 
 Law on the Protection of 
Rights and Interests of 
Women 
 Production Safety Law 
 Law on Prevention and 
Control of Occupational 
Diseases 
 Company Law 
 Securities Law 
 Criminal Law Amendment 
Act (Specific provisions, 
Chapter 3) 
 Law on the State-Owned 
Assets of Enterprises 
 Provisions on Strengthening 
the Protection of the Rights 
and Interests of Public 
Shareholders 
 Code of Corporate 
Governance of Listed 
Companies 
 Regulations on Information 
Disclosure of Listed 
Companies 
Source: Author’s own construction 
 
Regarding SRI indices, there have also been some developments in recent years. The 
Taida Environmental Index (including 40 companies listed on either the SSE or the 
SZSE), which was released in 2008, is considered the first themed SRI index focusing 
on Chinese companies. In 2008, the SSE Corporate Governance Index and the SSE 
180 Corporate Governance Index, with their focus on corporate governance, were 
released by the SSE. In 2009, the SSE and the SZSE also launched the SSE Social 
Responsibility Index and the SZSE CSR Index. During the same year, the CNI-CBN-
AEGON-INDUSTRIAL CSR Index was released, containing listed companies from 
both the SSE and the SZSE. In addition, some carbon-related SRI indices, such as the 
CNINFO LOW-CARBON 50 index, have subsequently been established. A 
comparison between the South African JSE SRI Index and the Chinese SSE Social 
Responsibility Index can be found in Table 5.326. 
                                                        
26 Among the established RI-related indices in China, only the SSE Social Responsibility Index has been used as 
an investment target by institutional investors. In South Africa, the JSE SRI Index was replaced by the FTSE/JSE 
Responsible Investment Index Series in 2015; and the FTSE/JSE Responsible Investment Top 30 Index was 
launched in October 2015; while the basic foundation and some indicators of its rating methodology overlap with 
the JSE SRI Index, its overall theme and indicators are more comprehensive compared to the JSE SRI Index 
(Trialogue, 2016). For more details on the FTSE/JSE Responsible Investment Index Series, please refer to the JSE 
website. 
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Table 5.3  
Comparison of the JSE SRI Index and the SSE Social Responsibility Index 
 South Africa- JSE SRI Index China- SSE Social Responsibility Index 
Launch date 2004 2009 
Original constituents 51 100 
Constituents (Dec 2013) 72 100 
Commitment Automatic evaluation Voluntary application 
Cap All qualifying All qualifying 
Evaluator EIRIS and University of Stellenbosch Business School’s 
Unit for Corporate Governance in Africa 
SSE and China Securities Index Co., Ltd. 
Evaluation process Prior to 2013, publicly available information and 
company feedback; only publicly available information 
for now 
Publicly available information 
Benchmark criteria 90 ESG indicators Social contribution value per share 
Qualifying threshold 50 percent of all indicators, 1/3 of core indicators Ranking Top 100 
Rating disclosure Index constituents include best performers Only index constituents 
Compliance monitoring frequency Annual Annual 
Exclusion procedure Annual review and immediate for grave criteria violation Annual review and immediate for grave criteria violation 
This table provides general information on the JSE SRI Index in South Africa and the SSE Social Responsibility Index in China. The information was 
collected from the JSE website, the SSE website and a report titled Raising the bar on corporate governance: A study of eight stock exchange indices by IFC 
in 2013. It should be noted that the constituents of SSE Social Responsibility Index are selected from the SSE Corporate Governance Index, which discloses 
the social responsibility report, and are ranked under the Top 100 by social contribution value per share. At the same time, the constituents of the SSE 
Corporate Governance Index are the all stocks listed on the SSE Corporate Governance Board (the Board). The Board accepts voluntary application. There 
are 20 questions for self-evaluation, and the final sample included in the Board also needs to be examined by the public and the SSE. The idea of using the 
social contribution value per share was put forward by the SSE in 2008, and is calculated by “adding the tax revenues paid to the state, salaries paid to 
employees, loan interest paid to creditors (including banks), and donations to and other value for stakeholders, minus any social costs that arise from 
environmental pollution and other negative factors” (Eccles & Krzus, 2014: 298). 
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In line with the considerable attention that CSR has been receiving and the development 
of the Chinese SRI indices, RI is evolving as an exciting new area for investors in 
China. Although RI practices in China started relatively late compared to South Africa 
and some other markets, it was followed by rapid growth, which is observed especially 
for mutual funds. In 2006, the Bank of China Sustainable Growth Equity Fund, which is 
considered to be the first quasi-SRI fund in China, was launched. The Industrial Social 
Responsibility Securities Investment Fund, founded in 2008 by the AEGON-Industrial 
Fund Management Company (henceforth the AEGON-Industrial Fund), is considered to 
be the first truly authentic Chinese RI fund. This fund takes sustainability and ethics 
into consideration; besides economic performance, it aims to promote the fulfilment of 
enterprises’ social responsibility as well. Following the AEGON-Industrial Fund, the 
China Construction Bank Principal Asset Management Company and China Universal 
Asset Management also issued SRI funds in 2010 and 2011 respectively. In 2011, the 
first green equity fund, the Industrial Green Investment Securities Investment Fund, 
was launched by the AEGON-Industrial Fund; this fund focuses exclusively on green 
technology industries. 
 
By the end of October 2014, 18 Chinese mutual funds were being managed according 
to RI approaches, with combined assets of over RMB 22 billion under management 
(China SIF, 2014). However, the number of RI funds and their AuM compared to the 
overall investment industry remain low. In total, only five signatories of the UNPRI 
are from China, consisting of three asset managers and two professional service 
partner (by July 2016). 
 
Against the background of China undergoing an economic transformation, moving 
from a resource- and labour-based economy to a knowledge-based economy, the 
Chinese SIF proposes that fund managers are now less likely to attribute assets to high 
energy consumption and high pollution industries; in future, investment in emerging 
industries that are beneficial to China’s economic transition will most probably 
receive priority (China SIF, 2014). 
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5.2.3 Good practices in corporate governance in South Africa and China 
South Africa is considered to be the pioneer among emerging market countries with 
regard to corporate governance. This achievement is inseparable from the 
implementation of the three King reports, especially the King III report, which 
promotes great opportunities for companies that embrace good corporate governance 
practices. Compared to South Africa, the regulatory environment for corporate 
governance development in China has not been well established. China had its first 
corporate governance code released in 2002 (i.e. the 2002 Code). Unlike the King III 
report, which focuses on corporate governance from the board of directors’ 
perspective, the 2002 Code attributes two of its seven sections to the board of 
directors as well as the supervisory board, and takes note of the controlling 
shareholders’ interests – an aspect not reflected in the King III report. Additionally, 
both the King III report and the 2002 Code acknowledge the important role that 
institutional investors play in corporate governance. 
 
In order to have a better understanding of corporate governance practices in South 
Africa and China, as well as to facilitate further analysis, a summary of corporate 
governance good practices for these two countries is provided in Table 5.4. 
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Table 5.4  
Corporate governance best practices for South Africa and China 
 King III report (South Africa) The 2002 Code (China) 
Content  Ethical leadership and corporate citizenship 
 Boards and directors 
 Audit committees 
 The governance of risk 
 The governance of information technology 
 Compliance with laws, rules, codes and standards 
 Internal audit 
 Governing stakeholder relationships 
 Integrated reporting and disclosure 
 Shareholders and shareholders' meetings 
 Listed company and its controlling shareholders 
 Directors and board of directors 
 The supervisors and the supervisory board 
 Performance assessments and Incentive and disciplinary 
systems 
 Stakeholders 
 Information disclosure and transparency 
Issuing body Institute of Directors in Southern Africa The China Securities Regulatory Commission and the State 
Economic and Trade Commission (the State Economic and 
Trade Commission merged with Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation to become the Ministry of Commerce in 
2003) 
Scope Listed companies, banks, financial and insurance entities, and 
public sector enterprises and agencies; all other companies 
expected to consider applying the principles of this code as 
appropriate in their particular circumstances 
Listed companies 
Board of directors 
Board structure Unitary Two-tier 
 
Note: Chinese listed companies feature a two-tier board system, 
that is, listed companies should establish a board of directors, 
as well as a supervisory board. However, the supervisory board 
plays a very limited role. The Chinese system is not two-tier in 
a real sense. 
Board size Not covered directly. King III report indicates that every board 
should have a minimum of two executive directors. The board 
The number of directors and the structure of the board of 
directors shall be in compliance with laws and regulations and 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
156 
 
should comprise a balance of power, with a majority of non-
executive directors. Thus, the board should have no less than two 
executive directors and three non-executive directors. 
shall ensure the effective discussion and efficient, timely and 
prudent decision-making process of the board of directors. 
 
Note: A company limited by shares shall have a board of 
directors of five to nineteen members (Company Law, 2013 
Amendment). 
Non-executive 
directors 
The board should comprise a balance of power, with a majority of 
non-executive directors. The majority of non-executive directors 
should be independent. 
Not covered 
Board 
independence 
The board should elect the chairman of the board, who is an 
independent non-executive director. The majority of the non-
executive directors should also be independent. 
 
A listed company shall introduce independent directors to its 
board of directors in accordance with relevant regulations. 
 
Note: At least one third of the board shall be independent 
directors (Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to 
the Board of Directors of Listed Companies, 2001). 
CEO duality The CEO of the company should not fulfil the role of chairman of 
the board. 
Not covered 
Board meetings At least four times per year. Not covered 
 
Note: The board of directors shall convene at least two 
meetings each year (Company Law, 2013 Amendment). 
Board committee Public and state-owned companies must appoint an audit 
committee; all other companies should establish an audit 
committee. Companies should also establish risk, nomination and 
remuneration committees. 
The board of directors may establish a corporate strategy 
committee, an audit committee, a nomination committee, a 
remuneration and appraisal committee and other special 
committees in accordance with the resolutions of the 
shareholders' meetings. 
Audit committee 
Size of the 
committee  
The audit committee should consist of at least three members. 
 
Not covered 
 
Note: The audit committee should consist of at least three 
members (SSE Guidance on Operation of Audit Committee of 
Listed Company’s Directorate, 2013). 
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Independence of 
the committee  
All members of the audit committee should be independent non-
executive directors. 
 
The committee shall be chaired by an independent director, and 
independent directors shall constitute the majority of the 
committees. 
Resources of the 
committee 
The committee collectively should have sufficient qualifications 
and experience to fulfil its duties. 
At least one independent director from the audit committee 
shall be an accounting professional. 
Meetings of the 
committee  
The audit committee should meet as often as is necessary to fulfil 
its functions but at least twice a year. 
 
Not covered 
 
Note: The audit committee should meet as often as is necessary 
to fulfil its functions but at least four times a year. 
(SSE Guidance on Operation of Audit Committee of Listed Co
mpany’s Directorate, 2013) 
Responsibilities of 
the committee 
The audit committee should oversee integrated reporting, and 
should be responsible for overseeing of the internal and external 
audit processes. 
The audit committee should inspect the company's financial 
information and its disclosure, and should be responsible for 
overseeing of internal audit and the external audit process. 
Shareholder, stakeholder & disclosure 
Investor protection  
& controlling 
shareholder 
Board of Directors. The board should ensure that minority 
shareholders are protected. 
 
Controlling shareholders. Not covered 
Board of Directors. The board of directors shall treat all the 
shareholders equally. 
 
Controlling shareholders. The controlling shareholders have a 
duty of good faith towards the listed company and other 
shareholders. The controlling shareholder shall not directly or 
indirectly interfere with the company's decisions or business 
activities conducted in accordance with laws; nor shall they 
impair the listed company's other shareholders' rights and 
interests. 
Institutional 
ownership 
Institutional investors should be encouraged to vote and engage 
with companies, or require their agents through mandates to vote 
and engage. 
Institutional investors shall play a role in the appointment of 
company directors, the compensation and supervision of 
management and major decision-making processes. 
Stakeholders Stakeholders such as the community in which the company 
operates, its customers, its employers and its suppliers need to be 
considered when developing the strategy of a company. The board 
should ensure that the company is and is seen to be a responsible 
A listed company shall respect the legal rights of banks and 
other creditors, employees, consumers, suppliers, the 
community and other stakeholders. While maintaining the listed 
company's development and maximising the benefits of 
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corporate citizen. Furthermore, the board should not only consider 
financial performance but also the impact of the company’s 
operations on society and the environment. 
shareholders, the company shall be concerned with the welfare, 
environmental protection and public interests of the community 
in which it resides, and shall pay attention to the company's 
social responsibilities. 
Disclosure Integrated reporting Financial report & Silo reporting-sustainability reporting an 
‘add-on’ 
Enforcement Apply or explain Comply or explain 
This table summarises the corporate governance best practices for South Africa and China. The information is collected from the King III report (2009), the 
2002 Code, and the report International comparison of selected corporate governance guidelines and codes of best practice by Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP 
(2002, 2014) 
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5.3 Literature review 
RI has not only evolved into a trend to be reckoned with on global financial markets 
(Crifo & Forget, 2013), but is also attracting considerable attention from academics. 
Prior studies focusing on RI were predominantly conducted in the context of 
developed markets, and consisted of two primary focus areas: the financial 
performance of RI, and the effectiveness of RI in corporate ESG performance. The 
two focus areas are linked to the two main motives behind RI and ESG practices, 
namely efficiency (instrumental) and legitimation (ethical). This section summarises 
the prior research on these two areas. 
 
5.3.1 Financial performance of RI 
Most studies on RI focus on financial performance (Capelle-Blancard & Monjon, 
2012; Dorfleitner, Halbritter & Nguyen, 2015). Literature on the financial 
performance of RI can be divided into two main topics: the financial performance of 
RI funds, and the performance of SRI indices. 
 
In many cases, RI funds are observed to have no significant differences from their 
conventional counterparts in terms of the financial returns they provide (Bauer, 
Koedijk & Otten, 2005; Cortez, Silva & Areal, 2012; Hamilton, Jo & Statman, 1993; 
Renneboog, Horst & Zhang, 2011; Revelli & Viviani, 2015). Humphrey and Lee 
(2011), however, found that RI funds may underperform relative to their conventional 
peers (Capelle-Blancard & Monjon, 2014; Hong & Kacperczyk, 2009; Mǎnescu, 
2011), or outperform comparable conventional investors (Edmans, 2011; Kempf & 
Osthoff, 2007; Nofsinger & Varma, 2014). 
 
In addition, the financial performance of RI funds is highly related to that of SRI 
index companies, as RI funds are their major investors. In this regard, the 
investigation of RI funds’ financial performance can be extended to examine the 
relationship between corporate ESG performance and CFP, while this relationship 
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seems ambiguous by presenting as positive (Cai, Jo & Pan, 2012; Statman, 2006; 
Statman & Glushkov, 2009), insignificant (Fernando, Sharfman & Uysal, 2010; 
Gladysek & Chipeta, 2012; Halbritter & Dorfleitner, 2015; Humphrey, Lee & Shen, 
2011; Managi et al., 2012), or negative (Bird, Momenté & Reggiani, 2012; Lee & Faff, 
2009). In addition, the relationship between responsible activities and CFP varies over 
different periods and across markets (Bird et al., 2012; Demetriades & Auret, 2014; 
Eccles, Ioannou & Serafeim, 2014; Lee & Faff, 2009). 
 
Prior studies illustrate that superior financial returns might not represent the main 
incentive for RI, but that institutional investors are mostly motivated by their fiduciary 
duty, regulations and other non-financial concerns (Ernst & Young, 2014; PwC, 2015). 
At the same time, it should be noted that financial performance is the critical factor in 
determining whether RI funds will be accepted into the mainstream investment area 
(Bauer et al., 2005; Duan, 2010). Renneboog, Horst and Zhang (2008) found that RI 
investors are unlikely to accept suboptimal financial returns to pursue non-financial 
aims. To date, the debate over the financial performance of RI has been inconclusive, 
to some extent providing an explanation for the absence of a global shift towards 
greater sustainability in finance (Dumas & Louche, 2016). 
 
5.3.2 Effectiveness of RI in corporate ESG performance 
One of the core goals of responsible investors is to use their influence as shareholders 
to positively affect corporate ESG behaviour (Hudson & Wehrell, 2005; Sparkes, 
2001). Prior studies are summarised from two perspectives based on investment 
strategies27. 
 
5.3.2.1 The influences of screening 
Screening practices are widely used among RI investors. Starr (2008) found that 
                                                        
27  Institutional investors can influence corporate behaviour via various strategies - commonly screening, 
shareholder activism (also called advocacy or engagement), and community investing. Community investing only 
accounts for a marginal portion of RI and is not always considered as RI outside the US (Louche & Lydenberg, 
2006). This section therefore only discusses screening and shareholder activism. 
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through negative and positive screening, RI creates opportunities for corporations to 
improve CSP. At the same time, it also provides some scope for pro-social changes. 
On the other hand, Hudson and Wehrell (2005) found that socially responsible 
investors have no significant impact on corporate behaviour. 
 
The one important reason for RI investors to influence corporate ESG behaviour is that 
responsible investors purchase stocks of responsible firms and avoid irresponsible 
stocks, lowering the cost of capital of responsible firms compared to irresponsible ones. 
If firms adjusted their behaviour to lower their cost of capital, “the rates of return on 
socially responsible stocks would be different, … returns seem not to be different” 
(Hudson & Wehrell, 2005: 282). Furthermore, if they are not satisfied with the 
corporate behaviour of an investee firm, institutional investors can exit; unfortunately, 
their positions are easily replaced by other investors (Hudson & Wehrell, 2005). Overall, 
it seems as if it would be difficult to have a substantial impact on corporate ESG 
behaviour by means of an investment screening strategy. Hellsten and Mallin (2006) 
suggested that perhaps RI is only a rhetorical tool for businesses. Schwartz (2003) 
argued that it is important to determine if RI is truly responsible, or if screening is 
merely social, political, or religious. Kumar, Lamb and Wokutch (2002) stated that only 
combined actions by institutional investors could possibly affect stock prices, but that 
RI funds do not always demonstrate consistent behaviour. 
 
5.3.2.2 The influence of shareholder activism 
Shareholder activism seeks to improve corporate ESG behaviour (Sparkes, 2001), and 
is a more direct approach than screening (McLaren, 2004; Ransome & Sampford, 2016). 
 
Neubaum and Zahra (2006) collected data from Fortune 500 companies over the 
period 1995 to 2000, and found that long-term institutional investors with activism 
interaction have a positive effect on CSP. Williams (2010) observed that RI fund 
managers, especially for pension funds, are becoming more active; they can 
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effectively improve the ESG performance of their investee companies via their 
engagement. Cotter and Najah (2012) argued that institutional investors have the 
ability to influence corporate reporting by means of powerful stakeholder coalitions. 
 
RI investors often encourage their portfolio companies to improve their practices on 
ESG issues. No longer limited to RI investors only, sustainability is becoming a 
mainstream investment practice that is also being adopted by conventional investors 
globally (Xiao, Faff & Gharghori, 2013). Some studies have explored the impact of 
institutional investors on ESG performance (not distinguishing between RI 
institutional investors and conventional institutional investors). For instance, an earlier 
study by Graves and Waddock (1994) suggested that pension funds are positively 
associated with some of the dimensions of CSP. Similarly, Rubio and Vázquez (2016) 
found that an increase in shareholding by institutional investors leads to improved 
CSP. Cox, Brammer and Millington (2004) used a sample of 500 UK companies and 
found that long-term institutional investors contribute to improved CSP. Chang, 
Kabongo and Li (2015) studied S&P 500 firms over the period 1995 to 2009, and 
observed that local long-term institutional ownership is related to high CSP, while the 
same relationship was not observed for non-local institutional investors. 
 
Some studies have found that the impact of RI on corporate ESG performance is 
marginal. Haigh and Hazelton (2004) argued that shareholder advocacy lacks the 
power to substantially change corporate behaviour. Vandekerckhove, Leys and 
Braeckel (2007) found that although managers are willing to discuss cases with RI 
investors, they also deny allegations of corporate misbehaviour by claiming that the 
story concerning the allegations are not a true reflection of what happened. Fauzi, 
Mahoney and Rahman (2007) observed limited effects of institutional ownership on 
CSP, providing support to a study by Johnson and Greening (1999), who found that 
mutual funds and investment bank funds have no direct relationship with CSP. 
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The prior literature provides a better understanding of institutional investors, RI and 
ESG performance. However, relatively little is known about the impact of institutional 
investors on ESG performance in the context of South Africa and China. Thus, this 
chapter tries to fill this gap in the existing knowledge by examining the impact of 
institutional investors on ESG performance (and corporate governance individually), 
as well as the role that ESG performance plays in the relationship between 
institutional ownership and improved CFP in these two countries. 
 
This chapter assumes that if an increase in institutional ownership leads to improved 
ESG performance, the institutional investors of a company could be considered 
responsible. As was mentioned before, it should also be noted that sustainability is 
evolving into a mainstream investment practice being adopted by conventional 
investors globally as well (Xiao et al., 2013). This chapter therefore includes all types of 
institutional investors, not only those funds that follow an RI strategy, which is 
consistent with Cahan, Chen and Chen (2015). Additionally, based on the information 
provided in Section 5.2, it is plausible that South Africa provides a favourable 
regulatory environment for institutional investors to conduct RI (especially in terms of 
corporate governance). As a result, institutional investors and companies may have 
reached consensus on the importance of promoting sound corporate governance. It is 
therefore predicted that a significant positive relationship should exist between 
institutional investors and corporate governance in South Africa. Yet it is unclear 
whether institutional investors could encourage their investee companies to improve 
their ESG performance, since the social and in particular environmental dimensions are 
not emphasised in the three King reports. Unlike South Africa, China has not 
established a suitable environment to cultivate RI. Institutional investors’ attitudes 
towards RI is under-explored, and their impact on corporate ESG behaviour remains 
ambiguous. 
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5.4 Data and methods 
This section describes the data source, sample and variables included in this chapter, 
and introduces the methods and regression models employed for further analysis. 
 
5.4.1 Data source and sample 
This chapter mainly examines whether institutional investors are effective in 
promoting corporate ESG performance, with special focus on the corporate 
governance dimension. The data relating to corporate ESG performance for both 
South African and Chinese firms were gathered from the Bloomberg (2015) database. 
The data on institutional ownership were collected from the Bloomberg (2015) and 
RESSET (2015) databases for South Africa and China respectively; while financial 
performance data were obtained from the INET BFA database for South African and 
the CSMAR (2015) database for Chinese companies. 
 
The total number of companies covered by the Bloomberg ESG database amounted to 
116 for South Africa and 943 for China by May 2015, representing 28.3 per cent and 
32.4 per cent of the total number of listed companies in the two countries respectively. 
After excluding companies that are not eligible based on the screening criteria28, the 
sample used in this chapter consisted of 81 South African firms over the period 2010 
to 2013, and 435 Chinese firms for the years 2008 to 2013. 
 
5.4.2 Variables 
5.4.2.1 ESG performance 
It is challenging to measure ESG performance (including corporate governance). 
Consistent with Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) and Humphrey et al. (2011), this 
chapter adopted an ESG disclosure score (ESG_SCORE) as the proxy for corporate 
ESG performance. Although a company’s ESG disclosure score cannot precisely track 
                                                        
28 The screening criteria are consistent with that set out in Chapters 2 and 3. For details, please refer to Chapters 2. 
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its real-world ESG performance (especially in terms of its environmental and social 
performance), these measures provide a standardised estimate based on a set of 
consistent criteria. Given the absence of alternative proxies for ESG performance, the 
ESG disclosure scores were therefore used in this study to investigate the impact of 
institutional investors on ESG. In addition, a company’s corporate governance was 
estimated by its corporate governance disclosure score (G_SCORE). In the 
Bloomberg database, the ESG disclosure score and its three sub-components, i.e. the 
environmental (E), social (S) and governance (G) scores, range from 0 for companies 
that do not disclose any ESG data to 100 for those companies that disclose every data 
point that Bloomberg collected29. 
 
Table 5.5 reports the differences in the mean of ESG_SCORE and G_SCORE over the 
study period. The average ESG disclosure score for South Africa is 34.302, which is 
much higher than the comparative score of 17.149 reported for China. This indicates 
that JSE-listed companies have much better performance in ESG issues than their 
counterparts in China. In addition, companies seem to have better corporate governance 
practices than overall ESG practices in both South Africa and China, as a higher score is 
achieved in corporate governance than in ESG. The listed South African companies 
outperformed the Chinese companies in terms of corporate governance with an average 
G_SCORE of 56.208 for South Africa and 42.939 for China. This finding corresponds 
to expectations, since the facts presented in Section 5.2 point towards a higher level of 
ESG compliance achieved in South Africa than in China. 
 
Additionally, the test results indicated in Table 5.5 show that ESG disclosure 
(including governance disclosure) in China improved significantly during the study 
period. South Africa, however, has experienced only the growth in corporate 
governance, while stagnating in ESG. 
                                                        
29 Notably, according to Dorfleitner et al. (2015), the G disclosure score is the least related to the E and S disclosure 
scores, but the total ESG disclosure score is significantly positively related with the E and S scores in the Bloomberg 
database, as well as the ASSET4 and the KLD database. This offers an additional explanation as to why this chapter 
explores the relationship between institutional investors and corporate governance separately. Also, the relationship 
between institutional investors and the aggregated ESG score would largely reflect their relationship with E and S. 
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Table 5.5  
Differences in the mean of ESG_SCORE and G_SCORE 
 ESG_SCORE  G_SCORE 
 South Africa China  South Africa China 
2008 - 13.865  - 38.934 
2009 - 15.512  - 42.972 
2010 33.069 16.051  54.127 43.243 
2011 34.654 18.423  57.099 44.282 
2012 34.618 19.742  56.636 44.364 
2013 34.761 19.272  56.790 43.801 
Total 34.302 17.149  56.208 42.939 
F-statistic 0.300 63.820  3.060 90.590 
p-value 0.829 0.000  0.028 0.000 
This table reports the average ESG and corporate governance disclosure scores for the 81 
South African firms over the period 2010 to 2013, and the 435 Chinese firms over the period 
2008 to 2013 respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix 1. 
 
5.4.2.2 Other variables 
This chapter also examines if institutional investors could satisfactorily address their 
financial responsibility when investing in responsible firms; financial performance 
thus acts as a dependent variable when conducting this examination. Consistent with 
Chapter 3, which discussed the relationship between institutional ownership and 
financial performance, financial performance is also proxied by return on equity 
(ROE) in this chapter. Chapter 3 explained why this study considered accounting-
based performance instead of market-based financial performance; this chapter only 
intends to extend the conclusions drawn from Chapter 3, and not to examine market 
efficiency towards ESG as well. 
 
As mentioned before, this chapter is not limited to institutional investors who follow 
an RI strategy, but instead considers all types of institutional investors. Thus, 
institutional ownership (IO) is considered as the independent variable to measure the 
effectiveness of institutional investors in promoting ESG and G disclosure. More 
specifically, aggregated institutional ownership (IO_TOTAL), as well as pressure-
insensitive institutional ownership (IO_INSEN) and pressure-sensitive institutional 
ownership (IO_SEN), are included30. 
                                                        
30 For more details about this classification, please refer to Chapter 1.  
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ESG disclosure scores and corporate governance scores were ranked and divided into 
two quantiles, where the second quantile represents relatively better ESG performance 
than the first quantile. Dummy variables for ESG_SCORE and G_SCORE (i.e. 
ESG_DUMMY and G_DUMMY) were then defined based on these quantiles. If an 
ESG_SCORE or a G_SCORE was located in the second quantile, the value of its 
dummy variable would equal 1; otherwise, it was 0. The interactions between 
ESG_DUMMY and G_DUMMY with IO (i.e. IO_TOTAL, IO_INSEN and IO_SEN) 
were used to examine institutional investors’ effectiveness within different ESG 
performance contexts. 
 
Based on prior studies (e.g. Ahmed, Islam, Mahtab & Hasan, 2014; Chang et al., 2015; 
Cotter & Najah, 2012; Rubio & Vázquez, 2016), financial leverage (LEV), firm size 
(SIZE) and listing history (AGE) were included as control variables when examining 
the relationship between institutional ownership and improved corporate governance 
and overall ESG performance. When exploring the impact of institutional investors on 
CFP within the different ESG performance contexts, LEV, SIZE, AGE and firm 
growth (GROW) were included as control variables, similar to the approach employed 
in Chapter 3. Table 5.6 presents the descriptive statistics for the major variables 
employed in this chapter. These statistics show that the mean (median) aggregated 
institutional ownership over the period 2010 to 2013 for the 81 South African firms 
was 50 per cent (45.4 per cent); the comparable figure for China was 19.7 per cent 
(13.6 per cent) over the period 2008 to 2013. The average percentages of shares held 
by pressure-insensitive and pressure-sensitive institutional investors were 9 per cent 
and 1.2 per cent respectively. 
 
Table 5.6 also reports that the mean ROE for the South African companies was 0.243, 
more than double the value of 0.105 reported by their Chinese counterparts. The 
selected companies in both South Africa and China appear highly dependent on debt, 
with mean LEV of 0.557 and 0.530 respectively. Also, the statistics reveal that the 
Chinese companies are larger in terms of firm size, reflecting a mean SIZE of 22.764 
compared to a value of 16.155 for the South African companies, but younger in terms 
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of listing history, with a mean AGE of 2.403 compared to the South African value of 
3.110. The Chinese companies also experienced higher growth, with average growth 
of 21.4 per cent exceeding the South African average of 11.3 per cent. 
 
Table 5.6  
Descriptive statistics 
Variable  Mean SD Min Max Med 
Panel A Descriptive statistics for South Africa 
G_SCORE 56.208 6.885 23.214 71.429 57.143 
ESG_SCORE 34.302 12.861 9.917 64.115 35.124 
IO_TOTAL 0.500 0.289 0.000 1.272 0.454 
ROE 0.243 1.442  -17.561  3.610 0.226 
LEV 0.557 0.227 0.019 1.259 0.554 
AGE 3.110 0.868 0.000 4.771 3.135 
SIZE 16.155 1.247 13.021 20.420 16.078 
GROW 0.113 0.277 -0.428 3.410 0.088 
Panel B Descriptive statistics for China 
G_SCORE 42.939 4.811 28.571 62.500 44.643  
ESG_SCORE 17.149 6.472 6.612 45.041 18.182 
IO_TOTAL 0.197 0.187 0.000 0.906 0.136 
IO_INSEN 0.090 0.102 0.000 0.665 0.053 
IO_SEN 0.012 0.021 0.000 0.241 0.003 
ROE 0.105 0.177 -4.891 1.600 0.100 
LEV 0.530 0.184 0.014 1.056 0.543 
AGE 2.403 0.408 0.000 3.135 2.485 
SIZE 22.764 1.214 19.267 26.999 22.715 
GROW 0.214  0.478 -0.615 3.869 0.141 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the regressions for  
81 South African firms over the period 2010 to 2013 (324 observations) in Panel A, and  
435 Chinese firms over the period 2008 to 2013 (2 610 observations) in Panel B. Variable 
definitions are reported in Appendix 1. 
 
5.4.3 Methodology 
To assess if institutional ownership is effective in promoting the corporate ESG 
performance and corporate governance of their portfolio companies, Equations 5.1 
and 5.2 were established. 
0 , ,1
_
n
it k k it j j it itj
ESG SCORE IO CON   

                                 (5.1) 
0 , ,1
_
n
it k k it j j it itj
G SCORE IO CON   

                                    (5.2) 
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In Chapter 3, institutional ownership was found to be positively related to improved 
CFP (except in the case of pressure-sensitive institutional ownership). By adopting 
this reasoning, and considering the potential economic efficiency of RI practices, this 
chapter examined the relationship between institutional ownership and CFP in 
different ESG performance contexts to determine if this relationship is moderated by 
ESG performance. For this purpose, Equations 5.3 and 5.4 were developed. 
 
0 , , 1
,1
_ * _it k k it k it k it it
n
j j it itj
ROE IO ESG DUMMY IO ESG DUMMY
CON
   
 

   
 
              (5.3) 
0 , , 1
,1
_ * _it k k it k it k it it
n
j j it itj
ROE IO G DUMMY IO G DUMMY
CON
   
 

   
 
                (5.4) 
 
where ESG_SCOREit and G_SCOREit measure corporate ESG performance and 
corporate governance for company i at time t. ROEit measures CFP. IOk,it refers to 
institutional ownership variable k (k = TOTAL, INSEN and SEN). ESG_DUMMYit 
and G_DUMMYit are the dummy variables. CONj,it represents control variables j (j = 
1, 2,…n). 0 is the intercept; k and j are the regression coefficients of IOk,it and 
CONj,it respectively. 1 is the regression coefficient of ESG_DUMMYit and 
G_DUMMYit, while k is for their interaction item with IOk,it. it is the error term. 
 
Apart from pooled OLS and FE estimations, this chapter also employs 2SLS 
estimation to address endogeneity issues. The instrument variables for institutional 
ownership are introduced by using trading liquidity (TURN) and return volatility 
(VOL) for both South Africa and China31. For the 2SLS regressions, the F-statistic for 
testing the joint statistical significance of the instrument variables is reported; this 
figure in all cases is higher than the value of 10, suggesting that the instruments are 
not weak (Staiger & Stock, 1997). At the same time, a Sargan test was performed and 
the results did not result in the rejection of the null hypothesis, suggesting that the 
instruments are valid in all 2SLS regressions. 
                                                        
31 This choice for instrumental variables is consistent with Chapters 3 and 4. For the reason, please refer to Chapter 3. 
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5.5 Results 
This section reports and discusses the results of whether institutional investors are 
effective in encouraging overall ESG behaviour (as well as corporate governance), 
and if corporate ESG performance (as well as corporate governance) moderate the 
relationship between institutional ownership and CFP. 
 
5.5.1 Institutional ownership and ESG performance 
Panel A of Table 5.7 reports the relationship between aggregated institutional ownership 
and corporate ESG performance. IO_TOTAL is positively but insignificantly associated 
with ESG_SCORE in both South Africa and China. It seems that institutional investors 
as a whole are observed to have an insignificant relationship with advanced ESG 
performance. Panel A of Table 5.8 shows similar results for disaggregated institutional 
ownership, with IO_INSEN and IO_SEN also being positively but insignificantly 
related to ESG_SCORE. The results suggest that the relationship between institutional 
ownership and ESG performance does not differ between South Africa and China; 
neither does it between aggregated and disaggregated institutional ownership. 
 
These results are consistent with most prior studies, where it was reported that 
institutional ownership is unlikely to contribute to improved corporate ESG 
performance. A report by the UNEP FI in 2007, titled The State of Responsible 
Investment in South Africa, indicates that the lack of satisfactory measurement tools is 
regarded as the most important factor for not incorporating ESG concerns into 
investment decision-making. In South Africa, disclosure of the G element of ESG 
enjoys relatively clear policy guidelines to follow, while it is still difficult to judge what 
exactly the E and S elements are. Because of ambiguous measurement, institutional 
investors find it difficult to set ESG goals, and thus it is not surprising to see that there 
is no significant relationship between institutional ownership and ESG performance. 
Moreover, the absence of a link with return is considered a major motivation for 
disregarding ESG issues (UNEP FI, 2007). Table 5.9 shows an insignificant relationship 
between the ESG dummy variable and ROE; this lack of financial incentive reduces the 
motivation for institutional investors to pursue improved ESG performance by their 
investee companies. These possible explanations also apply to China. 
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Table 5.7  
Regressions of relationships between aggregated institutional ownership and ESG performance 
 South Africa  China 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
2SLS 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
2SLS 
6 
Panel A Relationship between aggregated institutional ownership and aggregated ESG performance 
IO_TOTAL 1.218 0.388 0.878  0.133 0.123 0.151 
 (0.52) (0.35) (0.20)  (0.21) (0.11) (0.09) 
LEV -1.412*** -0.712* -2.066***  -5.295*** -5.464*** -5.216*** 
 (-4.83) (-1.69) (-5.69)  (-7.67) (-5.68) (-6.82) 
SIZE 3.099*** 2.309*** 3.408***  2.332*** 2.048*** 2.188*** 
 (5.79) (2.92) (5.17)  (22.34) (12.14) (18.64) 
AGE 1.465* 2.715** 1.910*  1.493*** 0.797*** 0.975*** 
 (1.90) (2.19) (1.65)  (5.25) (10.27) (2.78) 
Intercept -13.050 -7.822 -14.560  -36.730*** -37.880*** -31.860*** 
 (-1.43) (-0.59) (-1.33)  (-15.93) (-10.80) (-12.06) 
F-statistic   38.988    1 128.440 
Sargan p-value   0.356    0.549 
R2 (%) 17.22 17.08 21.91  17.31 68.92 14.35 
N 324 324 324  2 610 2 610 2 610 
Panel B Relationship between aggregated institutional ownership and corporate governance 
IO_TOTAL 2.438* 0.602* 4.659*  -0.371 -0.877 -0.417 
 (1.88) (1.79) (1.84)  (-0.72) (-1.52) (-0.64) 
LEV -0.608*** -0.430** -0.729***  -1.736*** -1.670** -1.753*** 
 (-3.75) (-1.99) (-3.97)  (-3.02) (-2.25) (-3.04) 
SIZE 1.356*** 1.314*** 1.200***  0.793*** 0.728*** 0.796*** 
 (4.57) (2.94) (3.61)  (8.98) (6.15) (8.99) 
AGE -0.068 -0.018 -0.029  -0.542** -0.364 -0.619** 
 (-0.16) (-0.03) (-0.06)  (-2.35) (-0.16) (-2.35) 
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Table 5.7 (continued) 
 South Africa  China 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
2SLS 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
2SLS 
6 
Intercept 36.690*** 35.690*** 39.140***  27.900*** 28.310*** 28.070*** 
 (7.24) (4.74) (6.93)  (14.21) (10.78) (14.13) 
F-statistic    34.521    1 965.610 
Sargan p-value   0.164    0.151 
R2 (%) 11.15 54.43 11.54  3.62 58.05 3.75 
N 324 324 324  2 610 2 610 2 610 
This table presents pooled OLS, FE and 2SLS estimations of the relationship between aggregated institutional ownership and ESG performance over the 
period 2010 to 2013 for South Africa, and 2008 to 2013 for China. The results regarding aggregated institutional ownership and aggregated ESG performance 
are reported in Panel A, and Panel B reports the relationship between aggregated institutional ownership and corporate governance. All variables included in 
the regressions are winsorised at the 1% and 99% level. The F-test and Hausman test reject the null hypothesis, and hence FE is more suitable compared to 
pooled OLS and RE. For the 2SLS, the F-statistic for testing the joint statistical significance of the instrument variables and the Sargan statistic for testing 
overidentifying restrictions are also reported, and the results show that the instruments are not weak, and are valid. Year and industry effects are controlled in 
all regressions. T-statistics are reported in parentheses; ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Variable definitions are reported in 
Appendix 1. 
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Table 5.8  
Regressions of relationships between disaggregated institutional ownership and ESG performance 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
2SLS 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
2SLS 
6 
Panel A Relationship between disaggregated institutional ownership and aggregated ESG performance 
IO_INSEN 0.779 0.638 2.957     
 (0.61) (0.45) (1.60)     
IO_SEN     2.416 6.242 9.334 
     (0.43) (0.41) (0.91) 
LEV -5.265*** -3.929*** -5.144***  -5.293*** -4.359*** -5.218*** 
 (-7.61) (-3.78) (-6.68)  (-7.66) (-3.61) (-6.80) 
SIZE 2.327*** 1.050*** 2.180***  2.326*** 0.689** 2.170*** 
 (22.23) (4.90) (18.47)  (22.15) (2.54) (18.15) 
AGE 1.498*** 0.899*** 0.994***  1.486*** 0.990*** 0.953*** 
 (5.27) (7.98) (2.83)  (5.22) (4.26) (2.71) 
IO_TOTAL YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Intercept  -36.680*** -26.040*** -31.850***  -36.620*** -19.960*** -31.450*** 
 (-15.90) (-6.30) (-12.04)  (-15.79) (-3.85) (-11.75) 
F-statistic    1 245.480    411.149 
Sargan p-value   0.749    0.581 
R2 (%) 17.29 68.25 14.17  17.29 68.92 14.30 
N 2 610 2 610 2 610  2 610 2 610 2 610 
Panel B Relationship between disaggregated institutional ownership and corporate governance 
IO_INSEN -1.384 -1.788 -1.022     
 (-1.29) (-1.21) (-0.74)     
IO_SEN     -0.250 -0.785 -0.260 
     (-0.05) (-0.16) (-0.03) 
LEV -1.788*** -1.831* -1.776***  -1.710*** -1.936* -1.434** 
 (-3.10) (-1.84) (-3.07)  (-2.97) (-1.95) (-2.38) 
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Table 5.8 (continued) 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
2SLS 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
2SLS 
6 
SIZE 0.800*** 0.742*** 0.799***  0.791*** 0.818*** 0.755*** 
 (9.05) (3.93) (9.01)  (8.89) (4.53) (8.09) 
AGE -0.628** -0.614 -0.626**  -0.620** -0.766 -0.633** 
 (-2.38) (-0.26) (-2.37)  (-2.34) (-0.32) (-2.38) 
IO_TOTAL YES  YES  YES   YES  YES YES 
Intercept  28.080*** 27.890*** 28.070***  28.090*** 26.140*** 28.320*** 
 (14.13) (6.64) (14.14)  (14.05) (6.53) (13.87) 
F-statistic    1 245.480    83.056 
Sargan p-value   0.111    0.491 
R2 (%) 3.65 58.06 3.85  3.55 58.03 2.79 
N 2 610 2 610 2 610  2 610 2 610 2 610 
This table presents pooled OLS, FE and 2SLS estimations of the relationship between disaggregated institutional ownership and ESG performance over the 
period 2008 to 2013 for China. The results regarding disaggregated institutional ownership and aggregated ESG performance are reported in Panel A, and 
Panel B reports the relationship between disaggregated institutional ownership and corporate governance. All variables included in the regressions are 
winsorised at the 1% and 99% level. The F-test and Hausman test reject the null hypothesis, and hence FE is more suitable compared to pooled OLS and RE. 
For the 2SLS, the F-statistic for testing the joint statistical significance of the instrument variables and the Sargan statistic for testing overidentifying 
restrictions are also reported, and the results show that the instruments are not weak, and are valid. Year and industry effects are controlled in all regressions. 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses; ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix 1. 
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Aside from the dubious measurement of ESG dimensions, political rent seeking could 
also be an important reason to explain Chinese institutional investors’ responsible 
behaviour. Furthermore, responsible behaviour for institutional investors in China is 
symbolic in many cases. This attribute clarifies their insignificant relationship with 
improved corporate ESG performance. Even for responsible investors, the 
insignificant association between ESG performance and financial performance does 
not motivate them to actively encourage ESG practices. 
 
Considering the control variables, the results of Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show that in both 
South Africa and China, financial leverage is significantly and negatively associated 
with ESG performance, while large firms with long listing histories are more likely to 
achieve high ESG performance. 
 
5.5.2 Institutional ownership and corporate governance 
Panel B of Table 5.7 shows that IO_TOTAL is significantly and positively related to 
G_SCORE in the context of South Africa, while the relationship is not significant in 
the Chinese context. In this regard, institutional investors as a whole in South Africa 
appear to have a positive association with the corporate governance of their portfolio 
companies, while this seems untenable in China. When considering disaggregating 
institutional ownership, both pressure-insensitive and pressure-sensitive institutional 
ownership in China are negatively but insignificantly related to the G_SCORE, as 
reflected in Panel B of Table 5.8. 
 
Corporate governance is considered to be the most important component of ESG in 
the South African context (UNEP FI, 2007) and dominates integrated reporting, which 
is the main tool for institutional investors to access the ESG information of a company. 
This phenomenon could be influenced by the series of corporate governance scandals 
globally and locally. In addition, the King III report provides clear corporate 
governance compliance guidelines, making corporate governance the most 
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standardised dimension among the ESG issues in South Africa. As mentioned in 
Section 5.5.1, clear measurement motivates institutional investors to engage in 
responsible activities. More importantly, the board of directors has a relatively clear 
picture regarding corporate governance as it falls more directly into their 
understanding of fiduciary duty (Viviers, 2015). Therefore, it is understandable that 
institutional investors are effective in promoting corporate governance, and behave 
responsibly in terms of corporate governance in South Africa, and in this respect, 
institutional investors in South Africa are likely to conduct effective monitoring. 
 
Unlike in South Africa, the presence of institutional investors is not beneficial to 
improved corporate governance (from both an aggregated and a disaggregated 
perspective) within the Chinese context. This finding suggests that in this sense, 
institutional investors perform an inefficient monitoring role. It seems that even 
though Chinese institutional investors have gained much momentum in recent years, 
the percentage of shares they hold is still small, making it unlikely for them to 
constrain majority shareholders. Ownership serves as the fundamental reason for 
institutional investors to engage in corporate governance; their small ownership 
holding therefore explains their weak impact on improved corporate governance. 
Furthermore, the attributes of Chinese institutional investors hinder them from 
participating in corporate governance. Unlike in South Africa and many developed 
markets, where pension funds play a prominent role, the major institutional investors 
in China are mutual funds. Mutual funds experience pressure for rankings, which 
results in short-term behaviour, and hinders their corporate governance engagement. 
Besides, as opposed to South Africa, where the regulatory environment for corporate 
governance is superior not only between emerging markets but also compared to 
developed markets (Van Dijk et al., 2012), Chinese regulations do not provide a 
suitable mechanism that encourages institutional investors to engage in shareholder 
activism, and to participate in corporate governance.  
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When considering the control variables, the results of Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show that in 
both South Africa and China, large firms with low degrees of financial leverage are 
more likely to achieve sound corporate governance. Listing history does not display a 
significant relationship with corporate governance in the South African context. In 
China, however, recently listed companies display better corporate governance than 
companies with longer listing histories. A possible explanation for this is presented by 
Liu and Yu (2010), who suggested that in China, some firms with long listing histories 
have problems with accounting manipulation, or lose focus of their primary business 
strategies. By contrast, younger firms with shorter listing histories appear to be 
characterised by healthy financial structures and performance, and to be focused on 
their core business. 
 
5.5.3 Moderating effects of ESG 
Tables 5.9 and 5.10 present the relationship between institutional investors and CFP 
moderated by overall ESG performance (and corporate governance). Without 
including the influence by ESG performance (and corporate governance), institutional 
ownership (except for pressure-sensitive institutional ownership) presented a 
significant and positive relationship with financial performance. 
 
Considering the influence by ESG performance, Panels A of Tables 5.9 and 5.10 
report that ESG_DUMMY is insignificantly associated with ROE in South Africa and 
China, suggesting that ESG performance is not related to CFP. The interaction item 
IO_TOTAL*ESG_DUMMY is not significantly associated with ROE, indicating that 
it is unlikely for institutional investors as a whole to improve financial performance in 
better ESG performance companies. When disaggregating institutional ownership, 
pressure-insensitive institutional investors seem to be more effective in promoting the 
financial performance of a company with superior ESG disclosure, while pressure-
sensitive ones do not. These findings suggest that ESG plays a moderating role in the 
relationship between pressure-insensitive institutional investors and CFP. 
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Table 5.9 
Moderating effects of ESG performance on the relationship between aggregated institutional ownership and financial performance (ROE) 
 South Africa  China 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
2SLS 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
2SLS 
6 
Panel A Moderating effect of aggregated ESG performance 
IO_TOTAL 0.296* 0.211** 0.372*  0.076** 0.041** 0.086* 
 (1.72) (2.10) (1.73)  (2.00) (2.33) (1.68) 
IO_TOTAL*ESG_DUMMY -0.237** -0.086 -0.203  0.038 0.015 0.040 
 (-2.23) (-1.09) (-1.58)  (1.53) (1.09) (1.29) 
ESG_DUMMY 0.050 0.050 0.032  -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.73) (0.92) (0.43)  (-0.15) (-0.69) (-0.38) 
LEV -0.151 -0.383*** -0.202  -0.121*** -0.227*** -0.052*** 
 (-0.42) (-2.73) (-0.56)  (-9.66) (-8.99) (-3.85) 
SIZE 0.112*** 0.243*** 0.110***  0.014*** 0.054*** 0.009*** 
 (6.09) (6.28) (5.97)  (7.24) (9.15) (4.08) 
AGE 0.632* 0.200** 0.690**  -0.017*** -0.149*** -0.017*** 
 (1.97) (2.48) (2.14)  (-3.22) (-9.86) (-2.80) 
GROW 0.253** 0.060 0.261**  0.057*** 0.041*** 0.051*** 
 (2.21) (1.06) (2.30)  (12.99) (10.52) (10.81) 
Intercept -2.377*** -5.847*** -2.369***  -0.151*** -0.654*** -0.052 
 (-5.59) (-6.47) (-5.54)  (-3.50) (-5.80) (-1.11) 
F-statistic   49.360    440.825 
Sargan p-value   0.596    0.137 
R2 (%) 20.06 86.30 19.35  14.22 52.92 10.52 
N 324 324 324  2 610 2 610 2 610 
Panel B Moderating effect of corporate governance 
IO_TOTAL 0.823*** 0.268*** 1.411**  0.053*** 0.039** 0.073* 
 (3.08) (2.71) (2.47)  (2.82) (2.17) (1.65) 
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Table 5.9 (continued) 
 South Africa  China 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
2SLS 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
2SLS 
6 
IO_TOTAL*G_DUMMY -0.591*** -0.150* -1.008**  0.050*** 0.029* 0.071* 
 (-3.21) (-1.78) (-2.28)  (3.52) (1.78) (1.71) 
G_DUMMY 0.245** 0.091* 0.497*  -0.021*** -0.011* -0.023*** 
 (2.14) (1.75) (1.86)  (-3.67) (-1.66) (-2.67) 
LEV -0.294 -0.398*** -0.194  -0.111*** -0.208*** -0.109*** 
 (-1.01) (-2.84) (-0.38)  (-8.50) (-8.06) (-8.26) 
SIZE 0.247*** 0.235*** 0.100***  0.014*** 0.052*** 0.014*** 
 (3.12) (5.95) (5.34)  (7.04) (8.84) (6.90) 
AGE 0.667** 0.210*** 0.703**  -0.016*** -0.147*** -0.016*** 
 (2.00) (2.64) (2.04)  (-2.64) (-9.96) (-2.69) 
GROW 0.325*** 0.115 0.281***  0.054*** 0.041*** 0.053*** 
 (2.75) (1.23) (3.40)  (11.47) (10.36) (11.25) 
Intercept -0.085 -5.727*** -2.744***  -0.129*** -0.626*** -0.128*** 
 (-0.50) (-6.15) (-5.98)  (-2.86) (-5.54) (-2.85) 
F-statistic   64.476     406.971 
Sargan p-value   0.324    0.128 
R2 (%) 11.40 86.52 15.01  13.30 62.24 13.61 
N 324 324 324  2 610 2 610 2 610 
This table presents pooled OLS, FE and 2SLS estimations of the moderating effects of ESG performance in the relationship between aggregated institutional 
ownership and ROE over the period 2010 to 2013 for South Africa, and 2008 to 2013 for China. The results regarding the moderating effect of aggregated 
ESG performance are reported in Panel A, and Panel B reports the moderating effects of corporate governance. All variables included in the regressions are 
winsorised at the 1% and 99% level. The F-test and Hausman test reject the null hypothesis, and hence FE is more suitable compared to pooled OLS and RE. 
For the 2SLS, the F-statistic for testing the joint statistical significance of the instrument variables and the Sargan statistic for testing overidentifying 
restrictions are also reported, and the results show that the instruments are not weak, and are valid. Year and industry effects are controlled in all regressions. 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses; ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix 1. 
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Table 5.10  
Moderating effects of ESG performance on the relationship between disaggregated institutional ownership and financial performance (ROE) 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
2SLS 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
2SLS 
6 
Panel A Moderating effect of aggregated ESG performance    
IO_INSEN 0.243*** 0.127** 0.356***     
 (4.02) (2.02) (4.22)     
IO_SEN     -0.469 -0.559 -1.051 
     (-1.37) (-1.55) (-1.57) 
IO_INSEN*ESG_DUMMY 0.097** 0.081* 0.116**     
 (2.50) (1.83) (2.11)     
IO_SEN*ESG_DUMMY     0.171 0.022 0.309 
     (0.84) (0.32) (0.98) 
ESG_DUMMY -0.006 -0.010 -0.008  -0.006 -0.001 -0.007 
 (-1.04) (-1.58) (-1.41)  (-1.18) (-0.25) (-1.21) 
LEV -0.107*** -0.214*** -0.090***  -0.112*** -0.230*** -0.108*** 
 (-8.97) (-8.56) (-7.22)  (-8.43) (-9.13) (-8.08) 
SIZE 0.012*** 0.052*** 0.011***  0.014*** 0.055*** 0.014*** 
 (6.54) (8.86) (5.37)  (6.75) (9.31) (6.61) 
AGE -0.014*** -0.128*** -0.013**  -0.015** -0.143*** -0.014** 
 (-2.79) (-8.45) (-2.33)  (-2.47) (-9.31) (-2.23) 
GROW 0.053*** 0.039*** 0.048***  0.054*** 0.042*** 0.053*** 
 (12.80) (10.05) (10.81)  (11.36) (10.54) (11.08) 
IO_TOTAL YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Intercept -0.125*** -0.666*** -0.102**  -0.144*** -0.685*** -0.149*** 
 (-3.08) (-5.98) (-2.31)  (-3.11) (-6.04) (-3.18) 
F-statistic   247.85    73.791 
Sargan p-value   0.349    0.118 
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Table 5.10 (continued) 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
2SLS 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
2SLS 
6 
R2 (%) 23.07 54.25 23.76  12.75 52.96 11.72 
N 2 610 2 610 2 610  2 610 2 610 2 610 
Panel B Moderating effect of corporate governance 
IO_INSEN 0.268*** 0.157*** 0.280***     
 (5.03) (3.38) (3.00)     
IO_SEN     -0.322 -0.442 -0.748 
     (-0.98) (-1.32) (-1.24) 
IO_INSEN*G_DUMMY 0.111** 0.086* 0.171**     
 (2.39) (1.73) (2.26)     
IO_SEN*G_DUMMY     0.097 0.089 0.275 
     (0.40) (0.35) (0.59) 
G_DUMMY -0.017*** -0.012* -0.023***  -0.013** -0.006 -0.015* 
 (-2.64) (-1.80) (-2.86)  (-2.19) (-0.97) (-1.95) 
LEV -0.108*** -0.218*** -0.093***  -0.111*** -0.232*** -0.107*** 
 (-9.07) (-8.71) (-7.47)  (-8.46) (-9.19) (-8.07) 
SIZE 0.013*** 0.052*** 0.012***  0.015*** 0.055*** 0.015*** 
 (7.21) (8.99) (6.31)  (7.10) (9.36) (6.97) 
AGE -0.013*** -0.132*** -0.013**  -0.016** -0.144*** -0.015** 
 (-2.65) (-8.97) (-2.29)  (-2.57) (-9.70) (-2.49) 
GROW 0.053*** 0.039*** 0.047***  0.053*** 0.041*** 0.052*** 
 (12.61) (9.98) (10.67)  (11.30) (10.52) (11.03) 
IO_TOTAL YES YES YES  YES YES  YES 
Intercept -0.136*** -0.665*** -0.117***  -0.141*** -0.681*** -0.145*** 
 (-3.41) (-5.95) (-2.72)  (-3.10) (-6.03) (-3.14) 
F-statistic   447.953    122.705 
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Table 5.10 (continued) 
 Pooled OLS 
1 
FE 
2 
2SLS 
3 
 Pooled OLS 
4 
FE 
5 
2SLS 
6 
Sargan p-value   0.129    0.133 
R2 (%) 23.10 63.44 23.28  12.91 53.05 12.15 
N 2 610 2 610 2 610  2 610 2 610 2 610 
This table presents pooled OLS, FE and 2SLS estimations of the moderating effects of ESG performance in the relationship between disaggregated 
institutional ownership and ROE over the period 2008 to 2013 for China. The results regarding the moderating effect of aggregated ESG performance are 
reported in Panel A, and Panel B reports the moderating effects of corporate governance. All variables included in the regressions are winsorised at the 1% 
and 99% level. The F-test and Hausman test reject the null hypothesis, and hence FE is more suitable compared to pooled OLS and RE. For the 2SLS, the F-
statistic for testing the joint statistical significance of the instrument variables and the Sargan statistic for testing overidentifying restrictions are also reported, 
and the results show that the instruments are not weak, and are valid. Year and industry effects are controlled in all regressions. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses; ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix 1. 
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Panel B of Table 5.9 shows that G_DUMMY is significantly and positively related to 
ROE in South Africa, while the relationship is negative in China. This suggests that 
well-governed companies may contribute to good returns in South Africa, thereby 
providing support for the findings from Section 5.2, where institutional investors are 
considered effective in promoting the corporate governance of their investee 
companies. However, the interaction item between IO_TOTAL and G_DUMMY is 
significantly and negatively associated with ROE in South Africa; this means that 
institutional investors are less effective in promoting financial performance in well-
governed companies. A possible explanation for this is that institutional investors pay 
more attention to improved corporate governance, engendering diversion of their 
resources away from financial performance; the benefit brought from good corporate 
governance, however, exceeds the cost. 
 
In China, even though well-governed companies are not likely to promote financial 
performance, institutional investors in well-governed companies seem more effective 
in advancing financial performance than those invested in companies characterised by 
poor governance. The results are similar to those presented in Panel B of Table 5.10, 
where pressure-insensitive and pressure-sensitive institutional investors are likely to 
be more effective in promoting financial performance within well-governed 
companies. It can be interpreted as meaning that companies extract resources to 
improve corporate governance away from financial performance, resulting in well-
governed companies not being related to strong financial performance. Institutional 
investors contribute little to improved corporate governance, whereas they might 
enjoy the welfare brought by sound corporate governance and use it to advance 
financial performance. Additionally, South Africa enjoys a well-established corporate 
governance framework; that is why institutional investors find it difficult to earn extra 
benefits because of good corporate governance. The same, however, cannot be said 
for China. 
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5.6 Conclusions 
RI has been evolving from a marginal activity to a mainstream investment strategy. 
This chapter examined if institutional investors are able to influence companies to act 
in a more responsible way, thereby evaluating the responsibility of institutional 
investors. By employing a sample of 81 South African firms over the period 2010 to 
2013, and 435 Chinese firms over the period 2008 to 2013, this chapter failed to find 
significant evidence that institutional investors are able to advance overall ESG 
performance in both South Africa and China. In this regard, institutional investors do 
not appear to be fully executing their fiduciary duty. Combined with the findings from 
Chapter 3, institutional investors may be less willing and successful to encourage non-
financial performance compared to financial performance. Furthermore, it could not 
be refuted with certainty that RI may just be a label to soothe institutional investors’ 
conscience or serve as mere window-dressing to appease stakeholders. 
 
Nonetheless, there is evidence that institutional ownership is associated with 
improved corporate governance in the context of South Africa, while this finding was 
not observed in China. This positive relationship benefits from the favourable 
regulatory environment for RI and corporate governance in South Africa, and 
demonstrates the success of corporate governance reform in South Africa. In terms of 
corporate governance, institutional investors as a whole therefore appear to effectively 
address their responsibilities. It must be noted that institutional investors in South 
Africa seem unlikely to have greater influence on the improved financial performance 
of companies with better ESG practices; similar results were found for aggregated 
institutional ownership and pressure sensitive institutional investors in China, 
although the opposite was observed for pressure insensitive institutional investors.  
 
Given the actual state of affairs on South African and Chinese markets and the 
situation being faced by market participants, the findings of this chapter appear to 
attribute the ineffective role that institutional investors play in corporate ESG 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
185 
 
performance to (among other factors): (1) the small share of RI in the market; (2) the 
lack of effective links between financial performance and non-financial performance; 
(3) the low level of awareness of RI (especially in China); (4) poorly established 
regulatory and legal systems; (5) inadequate non-financial information disclosure. 
More importantly, the participants in RI markets not only consist of institutional 
investors, corporations, and governments, but also include market intermediaries, the 
public and a number of other stakeholders. Improving RI and sustainable development 
requires the joint efforts of all parties involved in RI. The results thus provide some 
guidelines on RI for current and potential local and international investors, 
policymakers and other related parties. 
 
This chapter investigated whether institutional investors are effective in encouraging 
ESG performance in their investee companies. The question on how they generate 
their influence could unfortunately not be discussed as it is out of this study’s scope. 
When considering the results reported in this chapter, it should be noted that the ESG 
scores and sub-scores are comprehensive, and that their relationships with institutional 
ownership are unlikely to fully reflect the impact of institutional investors on each of 
the dimensions that constitute the scores. Exploring the relationship between 
institutional ownership and the different dimensions of the ESG issues would 
contribute to an improved understanding of the topic. Furthermore, corporate ESG 
performance involves two contradictory facets, namely responsibility and 
irresponsibility. This chapter, similar to most prior studies, focused on institutional 
investors’ impact on promoting the responsible side of ESG, neglecting that they could 
also attempt to mitigate the irresponsible side. Given the insignificant relationship 
found between institutional ownership and ESG performance in many cases, it would 
be worthwhile to further explore the relationship between institutional investors and 
corporate irresponsibility reduction, in order to have an improved understanding of 
institutional investors’ fiduciary duty from another angle. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Institutional investors are typically viewed as sophisticated investors that are more 
likely to play an active monitoring role in corporate governance compared to 
individual investors. From the NI context, institutional investors bear a fiduciary duty; 
their investment behaviour is largely regulated and guided by a series of rules. Their 
fiduciary duty and the relevant rules imply their financial and non-financial 
responsibilities towards both shareholders and stakeholders. This is consistent with 
the definitions of corporate governance in a broad sense. 
 
By taking South Africa and China as cases and employing pooled OLS, FE, 2SLS and 
Sys-GMM estimations, this study investigated the role of institutional investors in 
corporate governance by examining their impact on CFP, earnings management and 
corporate ESG performance, constituting Chapters 3, 4 and 5 respectively. Given that 
the fiduciary duty of institutional investors is largely demonstrated in their 
stockholding behaviour, this study also placed focus on which stocks institutional 
investors tend to invest in, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.1 provides the 
overarching conclusions drawn from the preceding four chapters, and highlights 
implications for enabling institutional investors to engage with their investee companies 
on advancing corporate governance. The contributions of the study are presented in 
Section 6.2, while the study’s limitations are summarised and recommendations for future 
research are made in Section 6.3. 
 
6.1 Overarching conclusions and implications 
This section draws overarching conclusions by organising and summarising the 
results reported in the preceding four chapters, thereby providing a more intuitive and 
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comprehensive understanding of this study. At the same time, some implications 
relevant to engagement by institutional ownership in corporate governance are also 
presented in this section. 
 
6.1.1 Overarching conclusions 
According to the results reported in Chapter 2, institutional investors in both South 
Africa and China do not always appear prudent when making stockholding decisions. 
After an investment relationship has been established with a firm, institutional 
ownership is reported to be significantly related to improved CFP and a reduction of 
earnings management, but insignificantly to corporate ESG performance in Chapters 3, 
4 and 5 respectively. These findings suggest that institutional investors are more 
conventional than socially responsible. Furthermore, far from being homogeneous, 
institutional investors are heterogeneous in stock selection and in shaping firms’ 
corporate governance across markets and types. 
 
6.1.1.1 Not always prudent 
The fiduciary duty assigned to institutional investors implies that they have to protect 
their clients’ interests; among their most important duties, they are expected to be 
prudent during their investment decision making. Institutional investors are therefore 
required to follow a range of formal and non-formal institutions that constrain and 
guide them in this regard. To examine whether institutional investors exhibited 
prudent investment decision-making, this study investigated their stockholding 
behaviour. The findings suggest that institutional investors in both South Africa and 
China largely tend to select safe stocks, such as stocks with sound financial 
performance. South African institutional investors also appear to show preferences 
towards stockholdings of large firms with high trading liquidity and large dividend 
payments, while Chinese institutional investors hold investments in firms with low 
degrees of financial leverage and small betas. However, they do not always exhibit 
prudent behaviour, with the evidence also presenting their investment preference 
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towards stocks with high return volatilities. Nonetheless, it should be noted that 
prudence is a process, not a result. A breach of fiduciary duty by imprudence does not 
fully determine the ultimate benefits to shareholders and other stakeholders. It is thus 
not surprising to find that overall institutional ownership is associated with improved 
CFP and earnings management reduction. 
 
6.1.1.2 Still conventional 
Not limited to stockholding behaviour, the fiduciary duty of institutional investors to 
their clients is also reflected in their practices after becoming shareholders in their 
portfolio companies. To address this issue, this study assessed the relationship 
between institutional ownership and improved corporate governance from both 
financial and non-financial perspectives. 
 
From the financial perspective, this study found that institutional ownership in both 
South Africa and China is associated with improved CFP as well as earnings 
management alleviation (a reduction in income-decreasing and income-increasing 
earnings management in South Africa and China respectively). In this regard, 
institutional ownership is positively related to advancing the financial goals of their 
investee companies. However, in contrast with its significant impact on fulfilling 
financial goals, institutional ownership was not observed to have a significant 
relationship with improved corporate ESG performance in these two countries. These 
findings illustrate that it remains questionable whether institutional investors fully 
address their responsibility in terms of non-financial aspects. An exception is that 
institutional ownership in South Africa were found to have a positive impact on 
corporate governance improvement, while this was not observed in China. 
 
In summary, although the development of the RI market is increasingly being 
recognised, institutional investors still appear to be more conventional than socially 
responsible in South Africa and China. Based on the findings of this study, the 
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missing link between CFP and corporate ESG performance could be considered an 
explanation for this; in other words, investors’ efficiency (instrumental) motive for 
engaging in ESG practices is not fully stimulated. Institutional investors are unlikely 
to accept suboptimal financial performance to pursue ESG aims. 
 
6.1.1.3 Heterogeneous 
Institutional investors in South Africa show some similarities with their counterparts 
in China. For instance, institutional investors in both countries show investment 
preferences for companies with sound past financial performance, and both are related 
to advanced CFP and a reduction in earnings management. Additionally, there is no 
significant relationship between institutional ownership and improved ESG 
performance in either South Africa or China. 
 
Nonetheless, institutional investors are far from homogeneous; their characteristics 
vary between countries (South Africa versus China), groups (pressure-insensitive 
versus pressure-sensitive) and investment strategies (index-investing versus non-
index-investing). More specifically, differences in the aggregate stockholding 
preferences of institutional investors in terms of leverage, listing histories, share 
turnover ratios, betas and dividend payments were found between South Africa and 
China. In addition, the significant association of institutional investors with a 
reduction in earnings management pointed more towards the income-decreasing 
scenario in South Africa, but towards income-increasing activities in China. A non-
linear relationship was observed between institutional ownership and earnings 
management reduction in South Africa, while no such relationship was noted in China. 
 
Investment behaviour is also determined by the type of institutional investor. 
Pressure-insensitive institutional investors demonstrate different stockholding 
preferences in many aspects (e.g. leverage, firm size, beta and return volatility) 
compared to their pressure-sensitive counterparts; the former are also related to 
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improved CFP, while the latter are not. Furthermore, the heterogeneous stockholding 
behaviour of institutional investors is presented under different index strategies. When 
considering stockholding, sound past financial performance seems to be less 
important to passive institutional investors than to their non-passive counterparts in 
both South Africa and China. Institutional investors who select index-listed 
companies are more likely to advance CFP in China. 
 
6.1.2 Implications for institutional ownership engagement in corporate governance 
This study mainly investigated the responsible investment of institutional investors 
and their relationship with corporate governance. To advance the effective role 
institutional investors could perform in corporate governance calls for efforts not only 
from institutional investors, but also from corporations, governments as well as a 
variety of other stakeholders. Based on the findings from this study, as well as the 
actual conditions faced by institutional investors, corporations and the regulative 
environment in South Africa and China, this sub-section provides some suggestions 
relevant to institutional ownership engagement in corporate governance from the 
perspectives of institutional investors, corporations and governments. 
 
6.1.2.1 For institutional investors: To establish sound mechanisms to improve their 
ability to engage in corporate governance 
Institutional investors have important responsibilities towards their clients and 
beneficiaries. The internal mechanisms of institutional investors determine the role 
they can play in corporate governance. Thus, firstly, the internal control mechanisms 
of institutional investors need to be strengthened in order to improve their 
implementation of their fiduciary duty, where protecting clients’ interests should be 
considered as the fundamental principle. Secondly, the prudence of institutional 
investors is associated with investment risk reduction; and it is suggested that 
institutional investors establish and improve their risk management mechanisms to 
ensure that their fiduciary duty is sufficiently addressed. Thirdly, optimising the 
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agency contract between institutional investors and their clients or beneficiaries is of 
importance. Clients or beneficiaries should be encouraged to take corporate 
governance seriously, which will likely encourage institutional investors to consider 
corporate governance issues in their agency contracts to fulfil their investors’ 
preferences. Furthermore, corporate governance engagement could be designed as a 
criterion to evaluate the performance of institutional shareholders, in order to 
strengthen their engagement in the corporate governance of investee companies. 
 
6.1.2.2 For corporations: To standardise information transfer to enhance the 
effectiveness of institutional investor engagement 
Only when sufficient information is acquired are institutional investors more likely to 
evaluate the intrinsic value of the investee companies, and to make their decisions in 
favour of monitoring and engaging in corporate governance and ESG activities. Given 
that earnings management is prevalent and that non-financial (ESG) information is not 
adequately disclosed among South African and Chinese firms, it is necessary to 
initiate an improvement of both financial and non-financial information disclosure, 
and to enhance the quality of the information disclosure, thereby reducing information 
asymmetry. International organisations such as Bloomberg and MSCI provide in-
depth research, ratings and other services relating to ESG practices, but the South 
African and Chinese company coverage is limited in these service providers, and the 
evaluation criteria are more international than local. It would be beneficial for South 
African and Chinese corporations to build their own corporate governance and ESG 
disclosure/evaluation systems by incorporating international standards as well as the 
local context. 
 
6.1.2.3 For government and regulators: To reduce external barriers to institutional 
investors’ engagement in corporate governance 
A sound regulatory environment is of importance for institutional investors to engage 
in corporate governance. Firstly, the governments in both South Africa and China 
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should further promote the development of institutional investors, and pay particular 
attention to pressure-insensitive and long-term institutional investors, who may be 
more willing to engage in corporate governance. Secondly, equity allocation 
restrictions make institutional investors unlikely to conduct diversified investment, 
which is against prudent investor requirements. At the same time, limited ownership 
held by institutional investors makes them unwilling and unable to effectively engage 
in corporate governance. Thus, less restricted ownership limits should be imposed on 
institutional investors, with the prerequisite of controllable risks. Last but not least, 
governments and regulators should improve the relevant legislation in order to clarify 
and strengthen the rights and obligations of institutional investors, and at the same 
time, to ensure the effectiveness of supervision and enforcement. Furthermore, 
governments and regulators need to ensure the operability of the mechanisms, systems 
and rules they establish, and avoid making them a mere formality. 
 
The advanced capability of institutional ownership engagement in corporate 
governance is located in the improved corporate performance of their investee 
companies. The above-mentioned suggestions are intended to enable institutional 
investors to promote CFP and corporate ESG performance by fulfilling their 
legitimation (ethical) and efficiency (instrumental) motives. 
 
6.2 Contributions 
The contributions of the present study are manifold, and are summarised below from 
the research perspective, research content and research methodology employed in this 
study respectively. 
 
6.2.1 Research perspective 
Most prior research on this study’s topic has been conducted in the context of 
developed markets, and paid less attention to emerging markets. With the rapid 
development of institutional investors and listed companies in emerging markets, this 
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study shifted the angle from developed markets to emerging markets, and took South 
Africa and China as examples to explore the role of institutional investors in corporate 
governance. Therefore, this study contributes to the advancement of the South African 
and Chinese literature on institutional investors and corporate governance. 
 
In addition, unlike companies in the US and the UK (with a diffused corporate 
ownership structure), companies in South Africa and China are usually characterised 
by concentrated ownership. Concentrated ownership structures mean that the agency 
problem originates not only from a conflict between managers and shareholders, but 
also between majority and minority shareholders. Thus, it provides multiple 
backgrounds for the relationship between institutional investors and improved 
corporate governance, enriching the existing literature on institutional ownership and 
corporate governance engagement in the context of the double agency problem. 
Moreover, South Africa and China are both undergoing corporate governance reforms. 
This study is presented as a periodical test to examine the corporate governance 
development and RI implementation by institutional investors in the two countries, 
and also provides related evidence that could be used to re-evaluate their activism in 
corporate governance. 
 
Furthermore, the impact of institutional investors on corporate governance is 
demonstrated in various dimensions, summarised into financial and non-financial 
aspects. Unlike most extant studies from South Africa and China, which have 
emphasised financial performance, this study adopted both financial and non-financial 
perspectives, incorporating financial performance, earnings management and 
corporate ESG performance. 
 
Institutional investors are a far-from-homogeneous group in their attitudes towards 
corporate governance. As opposed to many prior studies from South Africa and China, 
which considered institutional investors as a group and only focused on the 
homogeneity among institutional investors, this study tested not only the similarities 
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but also the differences between institutional investors in terms of their preferences 
and the influence that they have on corporate governance and performance. 
 
6.2.2 Research content 
The present study contributes to the body of knowledge on the relationship between 
institutional ownership and corporate governance in a number of ways from the 
research content perspectives, and the specific contributions per chapter are presented 
in this sub-section. 
 
The questions of whether institutional investors choose companies with sound 
financial performance to invest in, or if CFP improves as a result of institutional 
investors’ participation, are still being debated. Relatively little is known about either 
side of this debate in the context of South Africa; though some Chinese evidence 
exists, most is from the period before the NTS Reform. Moreover, most previous 
research only focused on one of the above-mentioned perspectives, and evaded the 
issue on the interaction between institutional ownership and CFP. Given this 
limitation in prior studies, both perspectives were considered in this study, and the 
findings are presented in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively. Additionally, an index 
investing strategy is widely used by institutional investors, but little is known about 
the heterogeneity in terms of stock selection and the impact on CFP between index-
investing and non-index-investing institutional investors. This concern was taken 
account in Chapters 2 and 3, which contributed towards an improved understanding of 
index-investing institutional investors’ investment behaviour. 
 
In terms of the relationship between institutional investors and earnings management 
reduction, there is little evidence relating to this issue either in South Africa or in 
China. Moreover, institutional investors’ impact on income-increasing and income-
decreasing earnings management is rarely studied separately in either country. 
Chapter 4 therefore took earnings management in absolute values, as well as in 
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different scenarios into account, allowing for a more detailed examination of 
institutional investors’ impact on earnings manipulation. At the same time, Chapter 4 
contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between 
institutional ownership and earnings management reduction under different earnings 
distributions, for which relatively little is known in South Africa and China. In South 
Africa, the King III report was released in 2009, followed by the implementation of 
integrated reporting since 2010. In China, the NTS Reform was basically completed 
in 2007, and NAS became mandatory for listed firms from the same year. Given the 
limited research that has been conducted to date on institutional investors’ influence 
on earnings management subsequent to these important events, this chapter thus fills 
this gap in the existing body of knowledge. 
 
Chapter 5 provides empirical evidence of the relationship between institutional 
ownership and improved overall ESG performance as well as corporate governance 
improvement, which is seldom found in the South African or Chinese context. 
Another contribution is that this research built linkages between institutional 
ownership, CFP and corporate ESG performance. It was found that there is no 
significant relationship between overall ESG performance and CFP, and institutional 
investors are not more effective in advancing the financial performance in companies 
with superior ESG performance. This finding offers an innovative explanation to the 
fact that no significant relationship between institutional ownership and improved 
overall ESG performance is observed. 
 
6.2.3 Research methodology 
In order to reach more reliable and comprehensive results, and considering the nature 
of the data, this study adopted a panel data methodology for the period 2010 to 2013 
for South Africa and 2008 to 2013 for China, as opposed to most existing studies from 
South Africa and China, which have been limited to cross-sectional data. 
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This study not only used FE models to deal with endogeneity problems, but also 
introduced instrument variables to ensure improved insights into the relationship 
between institutional ownership and corporate governance from the perspectives of 
financial performance, earnings management and ESG performance, as estimated by 
2SLS regressions in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. Considering that appropriate instrumental 
variables were difficult to be identified in Chapter 2, Sys-GMM was employed to deal 
with potential endogeneity problems. 
 
6.3 Limitations and suggestions for future study 
This study experienced limitations due to data restrictions and scope, as presented in 
this section. Based on these limitations, suggestions for further study are provided. 
 
6.3.1 Limitations 
The limitations of this study were mainly due to data restrictions. More specifically, 
data were not available for different types of institutional investors and the extent of 
real earnings management calculation for South African listed companies during the 
study period. In this regard, the heterogeneity between pressure-insensitive and 
pressure-sensitive institutional investors in terms of their stockholding preferences 
and their impact on CFP, as well as earnings management and corporate ESG 
performance could not be investigated within the South African context. In addition, 
the relationship between institutional ownership and earnings management was 
assessed with the focus on accrual-based earnings management only. Controlling 
ownership data during the study period were not available in South Africa, which 
means that the influence of controlling shareholders on the relationship between 
institutional investors and corporate governance could not be directly detected. Given 
the limited period covered in this study, the long-term impact of institutional investors 
on corporate governance and performance is not well addressed. 
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This study also explored whether or not institutional investors are effective in 
promoting financial and non-financial performance; as for how they generate their 
influence and complement their monitoring (by voting with their hands or with their 
feet), is not discussed in this study for either South Africa or China. In addition, the 
study investigated institutional investors and overall corporate governance 
improvement, the relationship between institutional ownership and corporate 
governance was not covered in extensive detail because it fell outside the scope of the 
present study. 
 
6.3.2 Future research 
Building on the limitations identified in the preceding four chapters, this study 
suggests the following areas for future research: 
 
(1) a detailed investigation of the different types of institutional investors in South Africa; 
(2) controlling shareholders’ impact on relationships between institutional 
ownership and improved CFP (as well as advanced corporate ESG performance); 
(3) the long-term effect of institutional ownership on CFP and on corporate ESG 
performance; 
 
Furthermore, this study opens the possibility to extend to following areas (from 
institutional investors’ perspective): 
 
In terms of financial aspects, 
(4) institutional investors’ impact on real earnings management in both South 
Africa and China; 
(5) a comparison between institutional investors’ impact on earnings management 
reduction before and after NAS was released in China; 
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(6) institutional investors’ impact on controlling shareholders’ tunnelling; 
(7) financial efficiency of ESG integration for institutional investors; 
 
In terms of non-financial aspects, 
(8) stockholding preferences towards corporate governance and ES issues; 
(9) institutional investors’ impact on corporate ES practices; 
(10) relationships between institutional ownership and corporate irresponsibility reduction; 
(11) a comparison between institutional investors’ impact on corporate governance 
before and after the King III report was released in South Africa; 
(12) a comparison between institutional investors’ impact on corporate ESG 
performance before and after CRISA was released in South Africa; 
(13) a comparison between institutional investors’ impact on corporate governance 
before, during and after the NTS reform in China; 
(14) barriers to and enablers of institutional ownership engagement in ESG practices.  
 
This study shed valuable light on prudent investment behaviour of institutional 
investors and their impact on financial performance, earnings management and ESG 
performance of their investee companies. The aforementioned research areas can 
provide further insights into issues concerning corporate governance, institutional 
investors and firm performance. 
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APPENDIX 1 VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Table 1  
Variable definition 
Variable Definition 
IO Proportion of shares held by the institutional investors for the end of year 
IO_TOTAL 
Proportion of shares held by the institutional investors as a whole for the 
end of year 
IO_INSEN 
Proportion of shares held by pressure-insensitive institutional investors for 
the end of year 
IO_SEN 
Proportion of shares held by pressure-sensitive institutional investors for 
the end of year 
ROE Net income/ average equity 
DROE Changes in ROE from the beginning to the end of year 
EPS (Basic) (Net income-preferred dividends)/ average common shares outstanding 
ROA Net income/ average assets 
LEV Total debt/ total assets 
AGE Natural log of listing years 
SIZE Natural log of total assets for the end of year 
TURN 
Average monthly trading volume relative to total shares outstanding for the 
preceding twelve months 
BETA 
Calculated by means of a market model using daily stock returns for the 
preceding twelve months 
VOL Standard deviation of daily stock returns over the preceding twelve months 
DP Dividends/ net income 
TOP40 
If the firm is a constituent of the FTSE/JSE Top 40 index, the value equals 
1, otherwise 0 
CSI300 
If the firm is a constituent of the Shanghai Shenzhen CSI 300 index, the 
value equals 1, otherwise 0 
INDEX 
If the firm is a constituent of the TOP40 or CSI300, the value equals 1, 
otherwise 0 
GROW Growth rate in sales from the beginning to the end of year 
CFO Cash flows from operations divided by total assets 
DA Obtained using the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) 
|DA| Absolute value of DA 
DA+ Income-increasing discretionary accruals; positive value of DA 
DA- Income-decreasing discretionary accruals; negative value of DA 
NNI Non-discretionary earnings; earnings less discretionary accruals 
DNNI Changes in NNI from the beginning to the end of year 
ESG_SCORE 
ESG disclosure scores, ranging between 0 (no disclosure) to 100 (full 
disclosure) 
G_SCORE 
Corporate governance scores, ranging between 0 (no disclosure) to 100 
(full disclosure) 
ESG_DUMMY 
A dummy variable for ESG score that takes the value 1 if ESG_SCORE is 
located in the second quantile and 0 otherwise 
G_DUMMY 
A dummy variable for corporate governance score that takes the value 1 if 
G_SCORE is located in the second quantile and 0 otherwise 
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APPENDIX 2 INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE (CHINA, 2010-2013)  
Table 1  
Regression of relationship between institutional ownership and financial performance (China, 2010-2013) 
 ROE  EPS 
 Pooled OLS FE 2SLS  Pooled OLS FE 2SLS 
Panel A Relationship between aggregated institutional ownership and financial performance 
IO_TOTAL 0.067*** 0.024* 0.096***  0.387*** 0.128** 0.583*** 
 (8.89) (1.70) (10.93)  (7.16) (2.32) (9.97) 
LEV -0.133*** -0.138*** -0.129***  -0.562*** -0.579*** -0.535*** 
 (-7.33) (-9.31) (-7.10)  (-4.32) (-5.28) (-3.85) 
SIZE 0.011*** 0.033*** 0.010***  0.129*** 0.167*** 0.126*** 
 (9.65) (8.16) (9.14)  (16.56) (10.45) (11.50) 
AGE -0.002 -0.123*** -0.002  -0.012 -0.360*** -0.015 
 (-0.32) (-11.59) (-0.43)  (-0.37) (-8.47) (-0.53) 
GROW 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030***  0.128*** 0.137*** 0.126*** 
 (11.65) (15.50) (11.52)  (6.73) (11.86) (5.38) 
Intercept -0.156*** -0.270*** -0.148***  -2.562*** -2.161*** -2.515*** 
 (-5.40) (-3.51) (-5.11)  (-12.77) (-7.14) (-10.52) 
F-statistic   3 884.820    3 896.580 
Sargan p-value   0.836    0.435 
R2 (%) 10.62 55.58 10.35  11.91 74.31 11.67 
N 4 416 4 416 4 416  4 416 4 416 4 416 
Panel B Relationship between pressure insensitive institutional ownership and financial performance 
IO_INSEN 0.405*** 0.284*** 0.454***  2.493*** 1.047*** 3.032*** 
 (23.60) (11.33) (22.19)  (16.39) (4.63) (14.99) 
LEV -0.131*** -0.090*** -0.127***  -0.550*** -0.597*** -0.528*** 
 (-7.83) (-8.82) (-7.60)  (-4.04) (-5.19) (-3.88) 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 ROE  EPS 
 Pooled OLS FE 2SLS  Pooled OLS FE 2SLS 
SIZE 0.008*** 0.022*** 0.006***  0.104*** 0.077** 0.096*** 
 (5.87) (4.80) (4.92)  (10.04) (2.17) (9.64) 
AGE -0.004 -0.005 -0.006  -0.079 -0.373 -0.089 
 (-0.10) (-0.34) (-0.15)  (-0.26) (-0.88) (-0.29) 
GROW 0.029*** 0.023*** 0.028***  0.119*** 0.178*** 0.115*** 
 (11.95) (12.38) (11.77)  (5.28) (6.78) (5.13) 
IO_TOTAL YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Intercept -0.098*** -0.174* -0.077***  -2.075*** -1.028 -1.936*** 
 (-3.48) (-1.91) (-2.71)  (-9.23) (-1.29) (-8.88) 
F-statistic   2 300.470    2 317.180 
Sargan p-value   0.564    0.281 
R2 (%) 24.71 72.33 24.27  21.91 81.35 21.26 
N 4 416 4 416 4 416  4 416 4 416 4 416 
Panel C Relationship between pressure sensitive institutional ownership and financial performance 
IO_SEN -0.328 -0.098 -0.426  -0.288 -0.269 -0.783 
 (-1.56) (-0.77) (-0.41)  (-0.57) (-1.06) (-0.85) 
LEV -0.134*** -0.100*** -0.129***  -0.563*** -0.529*** -0.538*** 
 (-7.34) (-3.94) (-7.10)  (-4.33) (-4.51) (-4.13) 
SIZE 0.011*** 0.010* 0.010***  0.129*** 0.208*** 0.127*** 
 (9.77) (1.67) (9.06)  (16.57) (6.01) (16.08) 
AGE -0.002 -0.129*** -0.002  -0.012 -0.426*** -0.016 
 (-0.37) (-8.18) (-0.34)  (-0.39) (-5.54) (-0.53) 
GROW 0.030*** 0.024*** 0.030***  0.128*** 0.092*** 0.125*** 
 (11.62) (11.04) (11.40)  (6.71) (6.64) (6.56) 
IO_TOTAL YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 ROE  EPS 
 Pooled OLS FE 2SLS  Pooled OLS FE 2SLS 
Intercept -0.157*** 0.197* -0.156***  -2.563*** -2.906*** -2.518*** 
 (-5.44) (1.66) (-5.43)  (-12.77) (-4.05) (-12.52) 
F-statistic    136.055    435.599 
Sargan p-value   0.913    0.462 
R2 (%) 10.71 64.86 11.05  11.89 74.75 11.65 
N 4 416 4 416 4 416  4 416 4 416 4 416 
This table presents the pooled OLS, FE and 2SLS estimations of the relationship between aggregated institutional ownership and financial performance and 
disaggregated institutional ownership and financial performance over the period 2010 to 2013. The results regarding aggregated, pressure insensitive and 
pressure sensitive institutional ownership are reported in Panels A, B and C respectively. The dependent variables are ROE and EPS in all panels. All 
variables included in the regressions are winsorised at the 1% and 99% level. The F-test and Hausman test reject the null hypothesis, and hence FE is more 
suitable compared to pooled OLS and RE. For the 2SLS, the F-statistic for testing the joint statistical significance of instrument variables and the Sargan 
statistic for testing overidentifying restrictions are also reported, and the results show that instruments are not weak, and are valid. Year and industry effects 
are controlled in all regressions. T-statistics are reported in parentheses; ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Variable definitions 
are reported in Appendix 1. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
234 
 
APPENDIX 3 DISCRETIONARY ACCRUALS DISTRIBUTION 
Panel A Distribution of DA (South Africa) 
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Panel B Distribution of DA (China) 
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Figure 1 Histogram of discretionary accruals (DA) by year. This figure presents the DA 
distribution of a sample of 174 listed companies in South Africa (Panel A) and 1 069 listed 
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companies in China (Panel B). The distribution interval widths are 0.02, and the location of 
zero on the horizontal axis is marked by the solid red line. The vertical axis labelled 
Frequency represents the number of observations in each DA interval.  
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